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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the political ideas of the Labour Party between 1983 and 1992.  It adopts two detailed 
case studies: Labour’s economic policy and Labour’s social policy.  Part I provides an historical context of 
Labour’s political ideas and Part II analyses the political ideas content of Labour’s social and economic 
policy between 1983 and 1992.  This includes the work of ‘Labour intellectuals’, ‘thinker-politicians’ and 
official party documents, notably the Policy Review.   
 The thesis shows the need for an historical context based on three factors.  First, the history of 
Labour’s political ideas, discussed in Part I, illustrates the extent to which former debates re-emerge; to a 
large extent, Labour continued in the 1980s to be pre-occupied with traditional arguments.  Second, 
Labour’s economic and social policy thinking was, at least in part, a reflection on its own ‘record’ in 
government.  An historical context inevitably includes an analysis of Labour’s own post-war economic and 
social policy thinking.  Third, the immediate political context between 1983 and 1992 is also central to an 
understanding of Labour’s ideas over this period.  This includes the impact of Thatcherism, its policy and 
ideas, as well as the effect of fundamental economic and social change.   However, it is the first which is 
most important.  The history of Labour’s ideas is noticeably neglected in the literature on the period.  This 
thesis constitutes an attempt to redress the balance.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
This doctoral thesis examines the political ideas of the Labour Party between 1983 and 1992.  It adopts two 
detailed case studies: Labour’s economic policy and Labour’s social policy.  Part I provides an historical 
context of Labour’s political ideas and Part II analyses the ‘ideational’ content of the party’s social and 
economic policy between 1983 and 1992. 
 The thesis demonstrates the need for an historical context based on three factors.  First, the history of 
Labour’s political ideas, discussed in Part I, illustrates the extent to which former debates re-emerge.  It is 
contended here that an assessment of Labour’s political ideas demands an examination of the history of 
those ideas themselves.  To a large extent, Labour continued in the 1980s to be pre-occupied with traditional 
arguments.  Second, an historical context inevitably includes an analysis of Labour’s own post-war 
economic and social policy thinking.  Labour’s economic and social policy thinking between 1983 and 1992 
was, at least in part, a reflection on its own ‘record’ in government.  Third, the immediate political context 
between 1983 and 1992 is also central to an understanding of Labour’s ideas over this period.  This includes 
the impact of Thatcherism, its policy and ideas, as well as the effect of fundamental economic and social 
change.   However, it is the first which is most important.  The history of Labour’s political ideas is 
noticeably neglected in the literature on the period.  This thesis constitutes an attempt to redress the balance. 
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 The study is based on three primary contentions.  First, the debates and issues surrounding Labour’s 
political ideas over this period have an historical context which is imperative to their understanding.  
Second, whereas other research scrutinises Labour’s institutional and policy changes, the distinctive 
examination offered here analyses the highly significant developments in political ideas over this period.  
Existing interpretations of the Labour Party highlight the lack of an ideational examination.  Third, it is both 
valid and  important to structure an analysis of Labour’s political ideas, but this requires an historical 
context.  This raises an important question, however, for how do we comprehend the political ideas of a 
political party?   Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical issues raised by an attempt to structure such an analysis. 
 The thesis adopts a conception of ‘political ideas’ which lies between a ‘structuralist’ account, that 
relegates ideas to a subordinate level, and an ‘idealist’ account, which takes the diametrically opposite view 
that ideas have explanatory power. 
 Part I provides an historical context of Labour’s political ideas from the early thinking of R. H. 
Tawney, G. D. H. Cole, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, L. T. Hobhouse and J. A. Hobson, through to the ideas 
of William Beveridge, Anthony Crosland and John Maynard Keynes.  It is demonstrated why it is important 
to examine the work of  liberals as well as socialists.  It is shown that it is both feasible and instructive to trace a 
conceptual history of Labour’s political ideas.  The most important issues and arguments within socialism, and 
then within the Labour Party after its birth in 1917, resonate from, and are explained by, various key political 
ideas.  The resolution, and attempted resolution, of conceptual debates which emerge and re-emerge at different 
times are traced.  Part II analyses the ideational content of Labour’s social and economic policy.  This 
produces a complicated account which sees the discarding of former conceptions and ideas, the resurrection of 
old themes and the formulation of new thinking. 
 The study of Labour’s political ideas is a much neglected area in the political science literature.  The 
literature review in Chapter 1 highlights the fact that there has been very little, and certainly no fundamental, 
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analysis of Labour’s political ideas between 1983 and 1992.  The literature concentrates on either institutional 
change within the party or on policy.  A key reason for this is the conception of ‘Labour’ that is taken; what 
are the fulcrums of the Labour’s political ideas?  It is taken here to include both formal and informal 
contributions to the party’s political thinking.  The formal side covers official party publications, mainly 
policy statements.  There is a direct engagement of ideas with policy in Labour’s Policy Review which took 
place between 1987 and 1989.  I examine the political ideas content of Labour’s economic and social policy 
between 1983 and 1992.  It is equally important to encompass the individual work of senior party figures 
and academics, described here as ‘thinker-politicians’ and ‘Labour intellectuals’ respectively1.  The existing 
literature concentrates on official party documentation, notably the Policy Review.  It certainly neglects the 
work of Labour intellectuals, such as the ‘market socialists’.   
 The changes in the political ideas of the Labour Party were disparate and un-coordinated.  There was 
no ‘school of thought’ or pioneering university department formulating a new chapter in the history of 
socialist ideas.  Neither was there one hallmark text, describing contexts and setting agendas in the way that 
Tawney’s Equality and Crosland’s The Future of Socialism had so marked previous generations.  Despite 
this, the political ideas of the Labour Party underwent a process of analysis and change as significant, if not 
more so, than these earlier generations had seen.   
 Five inter-connecting conceptual comparisons are at the core of the historical context.  First, the 
relationship between the means and the ends of socialism.  Second, the argument over which one of the two 
most fundamental means socialists should pursue: democracy or revolution?  Third, the relationship 
between the ethical and the economic.  Fourth, the interplay between the state and the market.  Fifth, the 
relationship between the state and the individual.  An historical examination of Labour’s political ideas 
 
1  The obvious constituency excluded from the thesis is the party’s broad membership.  For an analysis of recent developments, 
see P. Seyd and P. Whiteley, Labour’s Grassroots: The Politics of Party Membership, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992.  
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indicates the re-emergence of older concerns, the resolution, or attempted resolution, of which may inform 
an understanding of later disputes.  It will be demonstrated how this set of relationships dominates the 
history of the Labour Party’s political ideas.  For one generation, one relationship may be of overriding 
concern, while others may not rise to the fore of the contemporary debate.  Rodney Barker uses the term 
“recessive themes” in the second edition of his Political Ideas in Modern Britain.  Its usage is analogous 
with biology:   
 
 “...a gene may pass from grandparents to grandchildren via the  
 intermediate generation in whom it has no great consequences,  
 where it is recessive.  In the same manner themes in political  
 thinking can be dormant, subordinate, or recessive, yet become  
 powerful components  of the thinking of later generations”2.  
 
It is not necessarily the case, therefore, that the debate of the day will be couched directly in terms of all of 
these relationships, though sometimes it will do so explicitly.  These relationships are, however, central to 
the changing formations and evolving patterns of Labour’s political ideas. 
 The academic debate over the 1983-1992 period is often pitched around one central question.  For many 
commentators the question is whether Labour acquiesced in the face of Thatcherism or whether the totality of 
Labour’s thinking on ideas and policy was wholly introspective and a product of revisionist reflection.  The 
former argument takes two forms, arguing either that Labour was motivated purely by electoral 
considerations, or that the arguments of economic liberalism were accepted on their own terms.  The latter 
argument defines Labour’s thinking and policy revision as a fundamental reappraisal of ideas and policies in 
the light of a changing social, economic and political environment.  The Policy Review, from this 
 
2 R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, Routledge, London, 1997 (second edition), p.275. 
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perspective, was an exercise in political revisionism comparable to the German Social Democratic Party’s 
revisionism at Bad Godesberg in 1959.  
 The two hypotheses lack breadth and sophistication, a fault which can be blamed on the failure to 
provide an historical context in which the history of Labour’s political ideas is central.  This is demonstrated 
through the examination of the ideational content of Labour’s economic and social policy between 1983 and 
1992.  The thesis illustrates the need for a much broader analysis: an historical context. 
 This analysis of the Labour Party’s political ideas in the 1980s necessitates an understanding of the 
influence of Thatcherism and the political ideas of the New Right.  
But as the historical context will show this is only one part of a broader picture and can be over-stated,  as it is in 
much of the literature .  We will see the impact of Thatcherism on Labour’s economic policy and social policy.  
The reform of the welfare state, for example, in part shaped, and in part gave Labour the space for a reappraisal 
of, its political ideas.  For some this took the form of a crusade: reclaiming freedom as a socialist idea away 
from the polemics of the New Right.  Roy Hattersley’s Choose Freedom3 aimed to reconstruct the party’s 
political ideas on the basis of a re-statement of values, freedom in particular.  At the same time, the reason 
behind his work was a perceived need to challenge Thatcherism on the level of ideas.  
 Does the re-examination of Labour’s political ideas and the revision of policy form a continuity with 
Labour tradition or a move in another direction?  If the pursuit of either hypothesis provokes the 
organization of sources directed at proving one, this would be disingenuous.  However, within a broad 
framework of the analysis of ideas within an historical context, encompassing the political, social and 
economic, the dichotomy may serve the purpose of identification and understanding. 
 The ideas of the market socialists produce greater complications, but demonstrate the relevance of 
an ideational context.  The thinking is marked by revisionist strictures, especially the re-affirmation of the 
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means and ends dichotomy.  However, the analysis of the values, liberty and equality, appears to break new 
ground.  Liberty is asserted as the foremost socialist idea.  The study, however, of the thinking of the ethical 
socialists and their similarity with new liberalism, indicates that this analysis too is embedded in a wider 
history of political ideas.    
 
 The following chapter examines the theoretical problems surrounding an analysis of a party’s 
political ideas.  This is followed by a literature review.  Although there is no one text that exclusively 
examines Labour’s political ideas over this period, there are many important discussions and arguments 
which have a bearing on this work.  Existing interpretations of the Labour Party highlight the lack of an 
ideational examination, while simultaneously contributing to and assisting such a study.      
 
 
 
3 R. Hattersley, Choose Freedom: The Future for Democratic Socialism, Penguin, London, 1987.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Political Ideas and the Labour Party 
 
 
 
 
Part I of this thesis provides an historical context of Labour’s political ideas and Part II analyses the 
political ideas behind Labour’s social and economic policy between 1983 and 1992.   This chapter has 
two specific objectives.  One, to introduce the tradition of the ‘history of political ideas’ and apply it to the 
ideas of a political party.   Two, to examine the relationship between political ideas and the Labour Party in 
light of recent texts on the developments in the Labour Party.   
 The literature review will highlight the fact that there has been very little, and certainly no 
fundamental, analysis of Labour’s political ideas over the period.  Existing interpretations of the Labour 
Party highlight the lack of an ideational examination.  Although there have been studies of the Labour 
Party over this time, these have concentrated on different aspects of the party such as the reform of its 
institutions or on its policies, particularly over the second half of this period.  Those that have tackled ideas 
have done so from one perspective: the relationship between Labour and Thatcherite ideas.   
 Over the period between 1983 and 1992 Labour was seriously challenged as one of Britain’s main 
two political parties, and in 1992 Labour suffered its fourth successive general election defeat.  A dramatic 
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political upheaval had occurred.  The Thatcher years appeared to represent both an end to traditional, two-
party adversarial politics and, apparently also, to the socio-economic structure in which this political entity 
sat, the so-called post-war consensus4.   A central question, therefore, concerned the impact of Thatcherism: 
were the developments in the Labour Party essentially a reaction to the Thatcherite agenda?  Do Neil 
Kinnock’s reforms constitute the Thatcherisation of the Labour Party?  Or, was there a more 
fundamental reappraisal of ideas and policies in the light of a changing social, economic and political 
environment?  These are the two dominant hypothesis in the literature on the Labour Party over this period. 
 They both revolve around the central question of Thatcherism.  This thesis will demonstrate that neither 
hypothesis is sufficient.  Thatcherism was necessarily a vital part of the equation - the context presented 
here - but alone it provides for an inadequate understanding of Labour’s political ideas.     
 
 
The History of Political Ideas 
 
The majority of the literature on the Labour Party between 1983 and 1992 prioritizes factors that are 
seen to influence Labour’s reforms over this period: Thatcherism, internal policy reform, changing 
social and economic conditions, electoral analyses.  Political ideas, if they are not ignored completely, 
carry a contingency status, the reason for which requires an understanding of two related points.  First, 
political science has been dominated by alternative, indeed, outwardly hostile approaches; in particular, 
post-war empiricism, which has its roots in positivism, and the tradition of studying political 
institutions5.   Positivism “led naturally” to behaviourism6.  A doctrine which argues that social science 
 
4 The question as to whether the post-war years represented a political consensus is discussed in later Chapters.  
5 For a brief introduction to the fundamentals of these schools of thought see C. Navari, ‘Introduction’, in C. Navari (ed.), British 
Politics and the Spirit of the Age, Keele University Press, Keele, 1996, pp. 1-4.  
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should focus on people’s objective behaviour patterns is far removed from a focus on political ideas.  A 
preference for a supposed scientific approach was coupled, in the Cold War era, with the connection of 
ideologies with fascism and communism7.   
 Second, and more importantly here, the study of ideas was also challenged from within the 
socialist tradition by Marxism.  Political ideas are seen as superficial - at best, a façade to disguise the 
structure of capitalism.  Karl Marx formed the following argument: “What else does the history of ideas 
prove, than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is 
changed?  The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class”8.  Stefan Collini has 
challenged this: 
 
 “...it is one mark of the cynic that he sees other people’s expressions of  
 their principles as a kind of smokescreen for their putative ‘real  
 interests’, but even were he always correct it would not follow that the  
 study of such statements was devoid of explanatory power.  Even the 
 most disingenuous legitimation involves an appeal to existing   
 characterisations”9.   
 
 Similarly, within the field of the ‘history of ideas’, one important school of thought insists that 
political, social and economic factors determine the meaning of texts10.  This approach can be compared 
with structuralist and Marxist political theory.  (The recent accounts in this area focus on the 
 
6 P. Dunleavy and B. O’Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy, Macmillan, London, 1987, p.18.  
7 R. Leach, British Political Ideologies, Prentice Hall / Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1996, p.5. 
8 K. Marx, quoted in D. McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx, Macmillan, London, 1980, p.136.  
9 S. Collini, ‘Liberalism and Sociology: L. T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in England 1880-1914’, quoted in R. Barker, 
Political Ideas in Modern Britain, 1997, op.cit., p.5. 
10 This approach is explored, and ultimately rebuked, by Skinner in ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History 
and Theory, vol.8, no.1, pp.3-53. 
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relationship between structure and agency11.  There is little or no role in these debates for ideas.)  
Arguments based on ideas are presented as rationalizations of class interests.  Such accounts place ideas 
and values within an ‘appearance-reality distinction’12.  This claims that explanations of social 
phenomena do not require reference to the intentions of individuals13.  The familiar retort to such 
determinism is to ask what part Marx and others hoped to play in this schema14.   
 Preston King argues that it should not be claimed that the social context determines the meaning 
but that it may facilitate our understanding of a text15.  In his classic study, of the ideas at the centre of 
the relationship between socialism and liberalism, Peter Clarke counters the argument that ideas are 
essentially a functional means of disguising “the real interests or motives which governed actions”16.  
He argues that there will be a connection between thinking and social circumstance.  However, to ignore 
ideas, “means ignoring men’s own understanding of their position and behaviour”17.  The ‘history of 
ideas’ approach partly accepts the Marxist analysis of the subservience of ideas. It may be the case that 
often ideas are “discursively constructed”18 for purposes which have little connection to these political 
ideas, but are viewed as useful for their realisation19.  Others, however, are not.  Ideas “may have a 
psychological verisimilitude for individuals.  But ideas have their own force, rules and congruence.  
Admittedly, there is the logic of a situation; but there is also logic”20.  The history of political ideas 
aims to place ideas into a broader context encapsulating the political, social and economic.  For as
 
11 C. Hay, Structure and Agency’, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science, Macmillan, London, 1995.  
12 P. Dunleavy and B. O’Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy, Macmillan, London, 1987, 217.  
13 This interpretation of Marx was asserted by Althusser.  Ibid., p.218. 
14 Patrick Dunleavy quotes Marx to show how he deployed intentionalist as much as structuralist arguments: “Men make their 
own history, but they do not make it just as they please”; ibid.  
15 P. King, ‘The Theory of Context and the Case of Hobbes’, in P. King (ed.), The History of Ideas: An Introduction to Method, 
Croom Helm, London, 1983, p.291-2. 
16 P. Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, p.3. 
17 Ibid. 
18 C. Hay, ‘Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the Winter of Discontent’, Sociology, vol.30, no.2, 1996.   
19 Conceptions, for example, of the ‘national interest’ or the ‘public good’ are periodically assimilated to very different political 
ideas and policy.   
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commentator has put it, “it is impossible to explain the distinctive development of British political 
ideologies without reference to the historical context within which they have been shaped”21.  
 Second, there is the issue of methodology, the problems associated with the analysis of political 
ideas, or ideology22, of political parties.  For proponents of the above-mentioned schools, this would be 
an example of the problematic nature of studying ideas in the first place.  This is, however, the very 
subject of those concerned with what is known as the ‘history of political ideas’ which focuses, in 
general terms, on a debate concerning the relative merits of either a textual or a contextual method23.  
The former advocates the single and exclusive study of political writing, while the latter argues for the 
necessity of a broader consideration, from the relevance of alternative texts to the broader social and 
intellectual climate of the day.  The most important advocate of a contextual approach is Quentin 
Skinner who argues that meaning is contextual to its era, and that the adoption of such an approach 
might “help us to illuminate some of the connections between political theory and practice”24.  The 
tradition whereby “political historians” allot political ideas with a marginal role in trying to explain 
political behaviour, he believes, undermines such a possibility:   
 
 “...it  is evident that as long as historians of political theory  
 continue to think of their main task as that of interpreting a  
 canon of classic texts, it will remain difficult to establish any  
 closer links between political theories and political life”25.       
 
20 P. Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats, op.cit., p.3. 
21 R. Leach, British Political Ideologies, op.cit., p.37.  
22 The issue of whether or not to refer to ‘ideology’ is contestable.  For an introduction into the history of the term, which well 
illustrates its broad usage, see D. McLellan, Ideology, 1988, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1989. For reasons explained below 
a different conception will be used here, although there is a tradition of referring to ‘party ideology’; see, for example, L. Tivey and A. 
Wright (eds.), Party Ideology in Britain, Routledge, London, 1989.  
23 P. King, ‘Historical Contextualism: The New Historicism’, History of European Ideas, vol.21, no.2, pp.209-233. 
24 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume One: The Renaissance , CUP, Cambridge, 1978, p.xi. 
The most recent expression of this methodology can be found in his Liberty before Liberalism, CUP, Cambridge, 1998, ch.1.  
25 Ibid. 
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 The problem, however, is that this only relates to individual texts or perhaps the entire work of 
particular thinkers.  Skinner’s proposition, that to concentrate on  texts themselves is to defeat the 
prospect of “genuine histories” of political ideas26, is affirmed here27.  Yet, this does not directly affect 
the task in hand, for the subject of this thesis is the political ideas of a ‘political party’.  I would suggest 
that, for a variety of reasons, these ideas are even more difficult to analyse.  There are two main reasons 
why this may be the case.  The first is that it is not immediately clear what or whom is meant by 
‘party’28.  The second, which relates to the first, is that political ideas do not only emanate from a 
political party, they surround it.  It is important to arrive at some kind of formulation if we are to 
proceed.    
 One of the most central texts in the field of British political ideas is W. H. Greenleaf’s The 
British Political Tradition29, which perceives an interplay between the libertarian and collectivist 
strands of modern ideologies as central to British politics.  The location of the ideas themselves is all 
important.  In Rodney Barker’s study of modern British political ideas, ideas are conceived as the 
“middle principles of politics, the ideas which lay between philosophy and the hustings”30.  Similarly, 
ideas are crucial to Leonard Tivey and Anthony Wright’s Party Ideology in Britain, in which Tivey 
focuses on “the politics of ideas”31.  In a more recent study, Cornelia Navari offers an important 
introduction to a collection of essays intended to explore: “the political concepts and ethical ideas 
behind ordinary political language and the way...they entered into contemporary political debate, set the 
 
26 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, op.cit., p.xiii. 
27 For a review of the debate in this field, see T. Tully (ed.), Meaning and Content: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1988. 
28 The author would like to thank Rodney Barker for useful private correspondence on this issue. 
29 W. H. Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition, Vol.2, The Ideological Heritage, London, 1983. 
30 R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, op.cit., pp.2-3. 
31 L. Tivey, ‘Introduction: Left, Right, and Centre’, in L. Tivey and A. Wright (eds.), Party Ideology in Britain, op.cit., p.1. 
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frame of policy or inspired a political movement.  They are about ideas in action”32.  This point is also 
made by Michael Foley who argues that ideas are crucial in shaping political choice and action33.  
 However, when it comes to parties themselves, one arrives at an issue which is relatively 
unexplored.  There is next to nothing on the complex interplay between ideas  and the actions of parties: 
how is one to understand the political ideas of a political party? Geoffrey Foote makes a point of crucial 
importance which underlines the difficulties involved:  
 
 “An individual philosopher’s thought may evolve by obeying certain  
 rules and canons of logic and internal consistency, but we are not dealing  
 with an individual thinker, or a philosophical school here.  Labour is a  
 living political organism, always seeking new ways to adapt and develop  
 older ideas, if only to gain and maintain political power”34.   
 
A similar point was made by Rodney Barker. 
 
 “Precisely because political thinking is a major part of politics, political  
 ideas are not found in isolation, but are associated with institutions and   
 organizations.  Ideas may cluster around parties, but they do not follow  
 the same paths as those pursued by party politicians”35.  
  
 This research will adopt a reformed version of the ‘history of political ideas’, based on a broadly 
based historical context, as its analytical approach.  It is understood as a conception of political ideas 
which is designed to understand the ideas of a political party.  It strikes a balance between ideas and 
 
32 C. Navari, British Politics and the Spirit of the Age, op.cit., p.1. 
33 M. Foley, Ideas that Shape Politics, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1994. 
34 G. Foote, The Labour Party’s Political Thought, Croom Helm, London, 1985, p.4. 
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events so that as Leonard Tivey has proposed: “We do not insist that the ideas caused the events.  But at 
least the ideas are part of the events: they happened, as much as the wars and crises.  To neglect them is 
to ignore major relevant factors.  And, furthermore, it is party ideas that structure the debate”36.   
 However, this work will not be exclusively concerned with ideas that emerge from the Labour 
Party, whether through policy documents or election manifestos.  The definition of ‘Labour’ deployed 
here is not bound by the usual confines of Labour’s own structure.  This is the case because what is 
under scrutiny here is ‘Labour’s political ideas’ and these ideas do not only emanate from or within the 
Labour Party.  Ideas surround the party but it is possible to identify three fulcrums.  First, official 
Labour Party publications. This includes expressions of values and ideas, which are rare, and the ideas 
implicit or explicit in policy documents.  Second, the works of prominent Labour Party figures, 
described here as ‘thinker-politicians’, which appear to make an intellectual contribution.  Third, the 
studies and debate among academics, journalists and specialists, termed ‘Labour intellectuals’, within 
the economic and social policy areas.   
 An account which includes the individual work of academics, politicians and journalists is, 
therefore, broader than Henry Drucker’s definition of doctrine, defined as “coherent statements of a 
position” that emanate from within the party37.  Neither is it the same as Drucker’s conception of 
ethos38 which is used to describe what is perceived as Labour’s “spirit”, its habits and traditions39.  In 
contrast, the notion of Labour’s political ideas employed here represents a synthesis combining an 
assessment of party publications and what is relevant on t  p
 
35 R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, 1997, op.cit., p.6. 
36 L. Tivey, ‘Introduction: Left, Right, and Centre’, op.cit., p.6. 
37 Ibid. 
38 H. Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party, Allen and Unwin, London, 1979.  
39 H. Drucker, ‘The Influence of the Trade Unions on the Ethos of the Labour Party’, in B. Pimlott and C. Cook, Trade Unions in 
British Politics, Longman, London, 1991, p.244.  
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 As understood here Labour’s political ideas are understood within a contextual framework in 
which the developments in ideas under examination will be appraised within their historical context.  
There remains a necessary distinction to be made between political ideas and political theory.  The 
historical context of the writing in question is crucial.  As Barker has observed, “the various segments 
and varieties of socialism” exist and relate to each other in the way they do “not because they express 
some logically prior principle from which they all necessarily flow, but because of a series of historical 
conjunctures”40.  Nicholas Ellison has referred to the significance of “exogenous circumstances” on 
ideas or, what he terms, doctrine: 
 
 “When it is closely aligned to the future of a political party, doctrinal  
 development is unlikely to follow an even, evolutionary course.   
 Political and economic events will impinge on intellectual debate,  
 altering its nature and the significance accorded to certain  
 elements”41.   
 
 In Part II of the thesis the context is expanded further.  An understanding of the ideational 
content of Labour’s economic and social policy requires a comprehension of previous Labour policy, 
both in and out of government, and a more immediate political, social and economic contextualization 
of the 1980s.  In particular, this analysis demands an assessment of the dominant rival set of political 
ideas of the time, Thatcherism.  The central contention of the thesis, therefore, is that an examination of 
Labour’s political ideas necessitates a broad context in which the ideas originated, evolved or are re-
assessed.  Moreover, from such a perspective, an assessment can be made as to the relative novelty of 
developments in the period in question.   
 
40 R. Barker, Politics, Peoples and Government: Themes in British Political Thought Since the Nineteenth Century, Macmillan, 
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Labour Interpretations 
 
 
Nicholas Ellison’s Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics42 rests upon the premise that ideas are 
significant, and that they provide a useful means for understanding the actions and motivations of the 
Labour Party, in and out of office.  The juxtaposition within the term political ideas - political and ideas 
- is confronted, but only implicitly, in the title itself.  Ellison distinguishes between Labour’s ‘thought’ 
and Labour’s ‘politics’.  He does not, however, expound upon the nature of this dichotomy.  The 
underlying point in the study here is that no such distinction can be made: ideas inform politics and, in 
turn, politics impacts on ideas.  Further, an understanding of ideas requires a substantially wider 
analysis than an exclusively ‘political’ context.  An understanding of the ideational content of economic 
policy and social policy demands an historical examination of these policy areas, and of the 
developments brought about by Conservative governments in the economy and welfare state over the 
1983-1992 period.        
 Ellison’s preference is to define “visions”, arguing that party “doctrine and policy” has 
invariably been dominated by debate over “the nature of equality” and “conceptions of the egalitarian 
future”43.  He is making an important assumption about the centrality of political ideas, which form his 
“visions”, because he is interpreting a substantial degree of modern British political history from a 
 
London, 1994, p.17.     
41 N. Ellison, The Idea of Equality in the British Labour Party, PhD thesis, London School of Economics, July 1988, p.8.  
42 N. Ellison, Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics: Retreating Visions, LSE/Routledge, London, 1994.  
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stand-point which prioritizes ideas.  Ellison does not set out to define equality but rather to explore the 
history of the Labour Party through “the prism of disagreement about its central organizing principle”, 
the vision of “equality and the egalitarian socialist society”44.  He justifies this focus on equality by 
citing Bernard Crick’s view that there are three core socialist values, which formed the rallying cry of 
the French Revolution: liberty, equality, fraternity.  But equality is the cohering idea: 
 
 “Without its gravitational pull the remaining values can be subject to the  
 force of competing interpretations.  Some Party factions reinforced their  understandings of 
equality with help from the additional values of liberty  
 or fraternity, some did not.  But no group entirely rejected equality, or   
 denied that a more egalitarian society should be Labour’s abiding  
 raison d’etre”.45 
 
 The visions that are defined are set firmly around interpretations of equality. All three evoke 
ends and means, values and policy priorities; but it is the extent to which this balance is struck which is 
crucial.  A “technocratic” vision comprehends equality in terms of economic power, and thus holds 
public ownership as an imperative.  Conversely, a so-called “Keynesian socialist” vision prioritizes 
social reform over economic ownership.  Redistribution is regarded as the prime means to be pursued in 
a mixed economy.  In marked contrast to both of these, a “qualitative socialist” vision emphasizes 
values, in particular, fellowship and fraternity46.  These ideas are today understood in terms of the 
notion of community but Ellison does not mention this.  The exact distinction between Keynesian and 
qualitative socialism, however, is unclear.  In which category should we place Anthony Crosland, a key 
 
43 Ibid., pp.ix-x. 
44 Ibid., p.ix. 
45 Ibid., p.xi. 
46 Ibid., p.ix-x. 
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political thinker and acknowledged so by Ellison?  Although some divergence in opinion is diagnosed 
with others who also encapsulated  Keynesian socialism - primarily the Gaitskellites47 - he is placed 
within the Keynesian tradition and understandably so.  Crosland’s economic analysis and, indeed, the 
prime strategies he advocated in The Future of Socialism depend firmly on the efficacy of Keynes’ 
economic theory of demand-management and growth?  Moreover, the centrality of redistribution and an 
explicitly non-doctrinaire approach to public ownership were crucial to the thesis set out in his 1956 
work.  However, at the same time, the prime concern of Ellison’s “qualitative socialism”, the ideals and 
values of socialism, was crucial to the Crosland political perspective.  Crosland’s socialism was set 
firmly within the tradition of revisionism48.  It echoed Eduard Bernstein’s epoch-making rupture from 
Marxism at the turn of the century: ethics were viewed as superior to economics49. 
 It is helpful to view the works on the Labour Party between 1983 and 1992 from the point of 
view of the ‘histories’ of the party they present, whether directly or indirectly. Were the changes viewed 
as having constituted a complete break from prior thinking?  Or, is an essential continuity perceived 
which attempts to cast these developments - however they are defined - in the light of an historical 
context (as progression or regression perhaps)?  Moreover, perhaps there are useful comparisons to be 
made with former debates on Labour political ideas and policy; an approach which may avoid the 
rigidity of more narrow, non-historical analyses.  On the other hand, perhaps the changes can be 
explained solely, or mainly, in terms of contemporary phenomena, by highlighting for example 
 
47 This is an interesting point because although Crosland is commonly placed firmly within the Gaitskellite camp, it is also the 
case that Crosland could become impatient with the right's cautious approach to the pursuit of greater equality.  I have pursued 
this point further in ‘Revisionism in the 1950s: the ideas of Anthony Crosland’, in C. Navari (ed.), British Politics and the Spirit 
of the Age, op.cit. 
48 The socialist dispute between the revolutionary and the reformist method, often termed revisionism because it was seen to be revising 
Marxist orthodoxy, was to be endorsed even by Engels at the turn of the century.  A. Wright provides an excellent introduction to this 
episode in Socialisms, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, pp.61-66.  
49 For an analysis which examines the political ideas of Anthony Crosland, particularly from the historical context of socialist 
revisionism, see R. Wicks, ‘Revisionism in the 1950s: the ideas of Anthony Crosland’,  op.cit. 
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immediate political issues with powerful electoral resonance, such as the economic climate of the day.
  
 The literature that has been produced in this area is largely concerned with either policy 
changes, the most prominent examples of which took place towards the end of the decade, or with the 
structural changes that have occurred to the Labour Party’s institutions.  The debate between Martin 
Smith and Colin Hay, and Mark Wickham-Jones’ response to the dialogue, in the journal Political 
Studies, over what Smith terms Labour’s “modernization”50, offers important evaluations of Labour’s 
reforms51.  Colin Hughes and Patrick Wintour have written a very sympathetic account of the 
developments during the Policy Review process following the 1987 General Election, in Labour 
Rebuilt52.  This offers an intriguing journalistic insight into the mechanics and internal politics of 
Labour’s policy-making process.  A polemical critique from the left of the whole Kinnock period is 
presented by Richard Heffernan and Mike Marqusee in their Defeat from the Jaws of Victory53.  One of 
the most important analyses is Martin Smith and Joanna Spear’s edited work, The Changing Labour 
Party54, which provides a detailed discussion of individual policy developments and some minor 
discussion of political ideas55.   
 Only Eric Shaw’s book, The Labour Party Since 197956 represents an example of a study of 
both institutional and policy transformation.  However, again this is not a study of ideas and - at best -
the developments that occurred in political ideas are raised only implicitly.  An analytical description of 
 
50 C. Hay, ‘Labour’s Thatcherite Revisionism: Playing the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’’, Political Studies, 1994, vol.42, no.4, pp.700-
707; M. J. Smith, ‘Understanding the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’: the Modernization of the Labour Party’, Political Studies, 1994, 
vol.42, no.4, pp.708-715; M. Wickham-Jones, ‘Recasting Social Democracy: a Comment on Hay and Smith’, Political Studies, 
1995, vol.43, no.4, pp.698-702. 
51 Discussed below.  
52 C. Hughes and P. Wintour, Labour Rebuilt: The New Model Party, Fourth Estate, 1990.  
53 R. Heffernan and M. Marqusee, Defeat from the Jaws of Victory, Verso, 1992.  
54 M. J. Smith and J. Spear, The Changing Labour Party, Routledge, London, 1992. 
55 M. J. Smith, ‘A return to revisionism? The Labour Party’s Policy Review’, ibid.  
56 E. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979: Crisis and Transformation, London, 1994. 
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the changes in policy, structure and the image of the Labour Party in the 1980s produces an 
illuminating, but not a comprehensive, picture. Hence, this thesis is not merely a discussion of the 
Policy Review which took place between 1987 and 1989 (see Part II).  For this was merely the poli
although highly symbolic, crystallization of a far wider c
 Martin Smith, in The Changing Labour Party57, views the Policy Review as a progression - a 
development that began in the 1950s.  The then Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell, began what is here 
termed “modernization” and tried - if unsuccessfully - to remove Clause Four of the party’s 
Constitution, the crucial section on public ownership.  Harold Wilson continued the process: “he 
gradually removed nationalization from Labour’s agenda”58.  For Smith, Kinnock became leader 
wishing to continue this modernization which, symbolized by the failure of In Place of Strife, had 
clearly failed under Wilson59.  Barbara Castle’s 1969 White Paper aimed to create a structure for 
industrial relations based on centralized  trade unions.  The proposals to require unions to hold a ballot 
on official strikes deemed contrary to the public interest or the economy, and to give government the 
power to impose a solution on inter-union disputes over  recognition, were opposed by many union 
leaders and Labour MPs, and subsequently defeated in the House of Commons. 
 However, now there was the potential for dramatic change: 
 
 “...he (Kinnock) held advantages over previous leaders.  Coming from  
 the Left he did not alienate the constituency parties  in the way Wilson  
 and Callaghan had.  His attempt at reform, initially anyway, was not  
 
57 M. J. Smith, ‘The Labour Party in opposition’ and ‘A return to revisionism? The Labour Party’s Policy Review’ in M. J. Smith 
and J. Spear, The Changing Labour Party, op.cit., chs.1-2. 
58 M. J. Smith, ‘A return to revisionism: The Labour Party’s Policy Review’, ibid., p.18.  
59 For a detailed account of these events, see L. Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party, 
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1991, p.114-17.       
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 seen as a right-wing attack on the Left.”60 
 
Although clearly Wilson too was very much a leader propelled from the ranks of the left, Smith 
manages to combine an implicit statement of the relevance of political history with the particular 
political scene in the 1980s.  Thus it is said that: “In modernizing the Labour Party he [Kinnock] is not 
doing anything new.  However, the combination of electoral defeat, leadership support and the leader’s 
skill has enabled Kinnock to be much more successful than any of his predecessors”61.  In a final 
assessment of the process, Martin Smith concludes that the changes have transformed Labour into a 
European party of social democracy, “clearly distinguishing itself from reformist and revolutionary 
socialist parties”62.   
 The importance of political ideas is briefly discussed63 and Smith contends that a  comparison 
with Thatcherism is more accurately understood in terms of marked contrast than acquiescence.  Three 
key concepts are stated and placed in terms of Labour’s reforms.  These are freedom, the state and the 
market.  All are naturally inter-connected and are firmly embedded within one of the classic debates in 
the history of political philosophy: the freedom and equality dichotomy.  This, and the corresponding 
relationship between positive and negative freedom, or liberty, is linked directly to disputes over the 
balance between state intervention and the market.  The historical resonance and importance of this 
schism is not affirmed in the text.  Smith illustrates these contrasting ideas in order to pursue the 
argument that Labour has not “accepted the Thatcherite agenda”64.  The Conservative interpretation of 
freedom is presented in its Thatcherite guise: thus it is portrayed as concerned with state encroachment 
 
60 Ibid., p.19. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., p.223. 
63 Ibid., pp.21-28. 
64 M. J. Smith, ‘A return to revisionism? The Labour Party’s Policy Review’, op.cit., p.23. 
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into areas of individual freedom, which are guaranteed only by the market.  Conversely, Labour’s 
coupling of freedom with equality makes for clear divergence, according to Smith: “the role of the state 
is positive. To enable the individual to gain greater freedom, choice and welfare within society, the state 
must intervene”65.  When it comes to the market, however, there is significant movement by Labour.  
Martin Smith asserts that the traditional left/right divide has narrowed but juxtaposes this point by 
pointing to a continued distinction.  The Policy Review and Thatcherism, he believes, take “divergent 
views” on the role of the market: 
 
 “In New Right thinking the market is morally right and economically  
 efficient and, to some extent, social and political problems are  
 caused by interventions in the market which distorts its outcomes.   
 In the Policy Review the market is essentially morally neutral.  It is  
 an efficient means of distributing certain goods, but there is a  
 danger of it producing distortions and inequalities particularly  
 where there are monopolies or it is necessary to provide public  
 goods”66.   
 
A pragmatic distinction is made, Smith believes, as to when market solutions are applicable, both 
morally and economically.  The overall conclusion of The Changing Labour Party on the level of 
political ideas is that important change and re-positioning has occurred but not an assimilation of New 
Right ideas.  It is therefore “ideologically closer to revisionism than Thatcherism”67.  What the book 
does not do, however, is state how it comprehends the relationship between policy and ideas; and how 
they relate, in turn, to other pressures, such as economic and historical factors. 
 
65 Ibid., p.24. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., p.25. 
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 By “revisionism” Smith is referring to Anthony Crosland’s argument in The Future of Socialism, 
and great comparisons are made with this and the Policy Review: 
 
 “In terms of principles, the review and revisionism have strong  
 similarities.  The Policy Review is revisionist in its view of capitalism.  
 Capitalism can be reformed to achieve public goals, the market is a  
 useful means of distribution and nationalization is only desirable  
 where it can provide the means to particular ends”68.       
 
Smith, however, has two crucial amendments to this comparison.  First, the economic framework which 
was so integral to Crosland’s thesis, Keynesianism, is rejected.  The strategy of demand-management 
and the assumption of perpetual economic growth was widely seen as having fallen flat in the 1970s.  
This was the analysis, he points out, of the Policy Review, which turned instead to an emphasis on 
measures which the state could take to improve the supply side of the economy: 
 
 “The Policy Review is an attempt to develop post-keynesian  
 revisionism where the emphasis is moved from demand to supply...it  
 is a revisionism for a different era which has learned the lessons of  
 the 1970s”69. 
 
Second, Smith highlights Labour’s fear of being tagged as a party that would consistently be seeking to 
increase direct taxation and the levels of borrowing.  The result was that Labour has only accepted “one 
half of the revisionist equation - capitalism - but not the second half - radicalism for social justice”70. 
 
68 Ibid., p.26. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p.27.  
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 The comparison between the Policy Review and revisionism is also subject to a discussion, if 
only briefly, in Eric Shaw’s The Labour Party since 197971.  This entails an argument which points to 
the contrast between the revisionism of the 1950s and what he calls the “post-revisionism” of the 1980s 
and beyond72: “The post-revisionist answer was to adapt by redefining Labour’s purpose as the 
enlargement of individual freedom”.  This is a revealing statement, as is the adjoin, that “this had little 
public resonance”73.  What is Shaw saying existed before this redefinition?  This passage illustrates an 
altogether different interpretation of the thinking on political ideas in the 1980s to the one offered by 
Martin Smith.  There is no understanding of the historically crucial strand of ethical socialist thought 
which emphasized the supremacy of freedom as a socialist value, and as an idea which is bereft of 
meaning unless coupled with a conception of equality.  R. H. Tawney wrote that a social and economic 
policy which converted the privileges of the few into the opportunities of the many was “twiced bless”, 
for it “not only subtracts from inequality, but adds to freedom”74.  This is indicative of a highly 
significant strand in modern British political ideas which has been central to the work of G. D. H. Cole, 
Crosland and then the new revisionism of the 1980s, represented by Roy Hattersley, Bryan Gould and 
Raymond Plant among others.       
 Eric Shaw makes the extremely important point, however, that the Policy Review was not a 
standard Labour Party response to electoral defeat: “Previously its leadership had supposed that 
electoral losses had been caused largely by short-term, political - and therefore reversible - factors.  
Now it had to confront the prospect of relentless attrition set in motion by powerful social and cultural 
forces - unless it took drastic action”75.  Now, the predicament for Labour was “how to respond to 
 
71 E. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979: Crisis and Transformation, op.cit. 
72 Ibid., p.103. 
73 Ibid., p.224. 
74 R. H. Tawney, Equality, Allen and Unwin, London, 1964, p.235.   
75 E. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979: Crisis and Transformation, op.cit., p.84. 
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cultural patterns which fit uneasily with traditional collectivist ideals - whether to adapt or resist”76.  
There is a problem here, however, as “collectivist ideals” is in many ways a non sequitur.  Collectivism 
is a means, not an end or ideal.  It is certainly a political idea but one which conceptualizes the means to 
an end - be it community or greater equality - through the mechanism of the state, public ownership 
being one particular example.   
 Such tensions are also visible in Nicholas Ellison’s distinction between qualitative and 
Keynesian socialism.  In comparing the ethical tradition with the more dominant technocratic and 
Keynesian socialism, Ellison points to the difficulty of turning ideas into practice: 
 
 “Being primarily concerned with the prospect of political power,  
 technocrats and Keynesian socialists naturally had an eye to electoral   
 considerations when fashioning policies to complement their egalitarian   
 doctrines.  At one remove from the political process, qualitative  
 socialists were less inhibited by such matters - although the distance did  
 not prove an advantage”. 
 
Thus, “qualitative socialism in the 1950s failed...to overcome the gap between policy and vision that 
had plagued Cole and Tawney in the 1930s”77.  It has certainly been the case that whether due to 
externally imposed defeats or the predominance of certain socialisms, values and ethics have struggled 
to find a voice in the Labour Party.  The one criticism of Ellison here would be in his discussion of 
Titmuss and his followers at the London School of Economics.  In placing Titmuss as one of the 
foremost qualitative socialists, Ellison perceives a retreat in the form of a narrowing of the “egalitarian 
 
76 Ibid., p.224. 
77 N. Ellison, Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics: Retreating Visions, op.cit., p.109. 
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vision to more manageable social issues”78.  The problem here is that Richard Titmuss was primarily a 
thinker in social policy.  It is certainly true that his social policy and, indeed, his socialism had an 
ethical foundation79, but his starting point was social policy so it should be unsurprising that this was 
also where he finished.   
 In the concluding chapter, entitled ‘Beyond the Three Visions?’, Ellison begins with the brutal 
assessment that all three visions were in crisis by the 1980s: “the egalitarian visions that had informed 
Labour Party doctrine over the past fifty years were discredited”80.  So whereas other commentators 
point to electoral failure and explain this, for example, in terms of what is seen as Labour’s shrinking 
class base or the popularity of Thatcherism, Ellison emphasizes an intellectual vacuum.  It is an analysis 
based on the relationship between internal Labour thinking and economic and social phenomena which 
are judged to have destroyed formerly established principles and assumptions.  Thus, Keynesian 
socialism has not been able to overcome the impasse in which it found itself when low growth in the 
1970s appeared to rule out the social equality that Crosland was calling for81.  Qualitative socialism 
meanwhile was more marginalised than ever and faced an uphill struggle against a Conservatism which 
claimed the value liberty as its own82.  Moreover, Thatcherism appeared to be able to do exactly what 
advocates of this type of socialism could not.  Through policies from the encouragement of owner-
occupation in public housing to the decreasing levels of direct taxation, the Conservatives appealed to a 
 
78 Ibid., p.134. 
79 In Commitment to Welfare, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1968, p.116, Titmuss wrote: “Socialist social policies are, in my 
view, totally different in their purposes, philosophy and attitudes to people from Conservative social policies.  They are (or 
should be) pre-eminently about equality, freedom and social integration”.  
80 N. Ellison, Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics: Retreating Visions, op.cit., p.201. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid, pp.203-4. 
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notion of individual liberty against the interventionist welfare state83: political ideas were linked to 
political practice. 
 
 A significant factor behind Labour’s political ideas in the 1980s concerns the impact of 
Thatcherism.  This is a fundamental aspect of the overall context presented here. For not only did 
consecutive Conservative administrations enact many important, and deeply contentious, changes in 
economic and social policy84, Thatcherite political ideas implied a fundamental shift in political 
thinking.  The influence of Thatcherism on the electorate was disputed, but Labour’s intellectuals 
explicitly recognised its potency and implications for their own ideational corpus.  The core of the 
debate on the Labour Party over this period focused on this question: the relative affect Thatcherism had 
on why and how Labour re-cast itself, primarily during the Policy Review period of the late 1980s.  
 The debate between Colin Hay and Martin Smith85 was very much representative of the debate.  
The argument between the two revolves around the question of the relative influence of Thatcherism on 
Labour’s changes.  Both accept that important changes occurred.   Their point of departure concerns 
extent and purpose: the extent to which Labour reacted to Thatcherism and its purpose in doing so.  Hay 
responds to Smith’s analysis that the period was one of necessary “modernization” by arguing that 
Labour simply accommodated much of the Thatcherite agenda, leading to what has now become a 
“post-Thatcher settlement”86: 
 
 “In place of the ‘modernization thesis’ I propose an alternative  
 
83 Ibid., p.204. 
84 Discussed in Part II.  
85 C. Hay, ‘Labour’s Thatcherite Revisionism: Playing the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’’, op.cit.; M. J. Smith, ‘Understanding the 
‘Politics of Catch-Up’: the Modernization of the Labour Party’, op.cit.  
86 C. Hay, ‘Labour’s Thatcherite Revisionism: Playing the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’’, op.cit., p.701. 
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 analysis.  This accepts that the Labour Party has indeed undergone 
 a profound transformation of structure and policy.  However, it  
 suggests that in so doing it has accepted the terms of a ‘post’- 
 Thatcher, yet nonetheless ‘Thatcherite’ settlement”87.  
 
Mark Wickham-Jones responds to this debate by disputing Hay’s basic assertion that Labour’s policy 
changes represent unnecessary concessions to Thatcherism88.  “Preference accommodation”, he argues, 
“need not be Thatcherite”.  Thus, the Thatcherite objective of promoting “a liberal economic order”, is 
very different from the “distinctive economic strategy and set of objectives”, which Labour offered89. 
 
 
 
87  Ibid. 
88 M. Wickham-Jones, ‘Recasting Social Democracy: a Comment on Hay and Smith’, op.cit.  
89 Ibid., p.699. 
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  A History of Labour’s Political Ideas 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
Historical Context: 
     Origin and Formulation         
 
 
An understanding of the political ideas of the Labour Party between 1983 and 1992 requires 
an historical examination of Labour’s political ideas.  An historical context is both justified 
and informative because latent debates may be re-ignited and even resolved, or seemingly 
resolved, many years after they first emerge.  Above all, five inter-connecting conceptual 
comparisons are paramount.  First, the relationship between the means and the ends of 
socialism.  Second, the dispute itself over which one of the two most fundamental means 
socialists should pursue, democracy or revolution?  Third, the interplay between the 
ethical and the economic.  Fourth, the relationship between the state and the market.  
Fifth, the relationship between the state and the individual.  An examination of Labour’s 
political ideas may indicate the re-emergence of older concerns, the resolution - or 
attempted resolution - of which may inform an understanding of later disputes.  For some 
generations one may be of overriding concern; others may not rise to the fore of the 
contemporary debate.  It is not necessarily the case that the debate of the day will be 
couched directly in these terms; though sometimes it will do so explicitly.  They are 
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central, however, to the changing formations and evolving patterns of Labour’s political 
ideas.  Are there, however, continuities in political ideas over the years?  
 A central theme to be discussed here is the debate of the 1920s and 1930s between 
ethical, or Guild, socialism90, and Fabianism91.  Such a ‘history of political ideas’ must 
concern those ideas which have had a significant effect on Labour.  This means that the 
general context of British socialism is pertinent as well as its so-called rival, liberalism, 
which was of great relevance.  Indeed, it is an irony of political history, as well as of 
political ideas in the twentieth century, that two of the public figures who would head, or 
certainly come close to heading, a list of those who have had a pivotal influence on Labour 
ideas and policy have been the liberals, John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge.  The 
movement which led, in intellectual terms, to the ideas of these thinkers, new liberalism92, 
had an important bearing on the Labour Party.  What emerges is significant ideational 
rapprochement between socialism and liberalism through the convergence of central 
political ideas.  While socialists strove to reconcile the development of the state with the 
more ethical content of its political ideas, the new liberalism undergoes a similar 
reappraisal.  The central political values of liberty and equality are located within the 
rapidly changing relationship between the state and the market.   
 As a theme in the history of political ideas, the balance between the state and the 
individual is often seen primarily as a liberal conceptual dilemma.  But if this was a debate 
 
90. Ethical socialism and Guild socialism are terms which are often used interchangeably.  The political ideas of 
the two share more in common than they do apart.  However, ethical socialism involves a more conceptual 
advocation of moral values, which will be discussed further below, whereas Guild socialism sough to provide a 
more precise thesis on the desirability of group theory and pluralism (an introduction to Guild socialism can be 
found in A. Wright, G. D. H. Cole and Socialist Democracy, Clarendon Press, London, 1979).     
91. For an introduction to the political ideas of socialism over this period see R. Barker, Political Ideas in 
Modern Britain, 1978, op.cit.   
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based on distinctly liberal conceptual parameters, it was to become a debate of particular 
concern to socialists.  From the 1880s, the context was clear and gave rise to debate and 
dispute among socialists and liberals alike: the development of the modern collectivist state. 
 As Rodney Barker has written, the “ways in which people thought about the state,  
and the development of state activity, cannot easily be separated from each other”93.  The 
evolution of political ideas can, in some sense, be seen as a circular process.  If some 
liberals welcomed the growth of the state because it enabled the realisation of liberty - and 
socialists might make a not dissimilar judgment that the democratic state could deliver 
many of its own political goals - then traditional liberals, in turn, countered that these 
developments threatened liberty.   
 The argument was settled - or so it seemed - with the election of the first ever 
majority Labour government in 194594.  Its programme was imbued and underpinned by 
distinctively Fabian political ideas, but also liberal ones.  The reforms, some would say 
transformation, of the early post-war years, consolidated by later administrations, saw the 
state greatly extend its reach into the socio-economic arena.  The subsequent so-called 
political settlement, or consensus95, notwithstanding the deeply contentious nature of this 
conception96, owed much to the thinking of the Fabians, Sidney and Beatrice Webb.    
 
92. The political thinkers of New Liberalism are discussed in M. Freeden, The New Liberalism, Clarendon, 
Oxford, 1978.  
93. Ibid., p.10. 
94. Discussed in Chapter 3, pp.59-70.   
95. This is a greatly contested conceptualisation discussed at greater length in Chapter 5.  It is widely 
accepted, for example, in many of the central texts in British politics, such as S. Beer’s Modern British 
Politics, Faber and Faber, London, 1965 and R. K. Middlemas’ The Politics of Industrial Society, André 
deutsch, London, 1979.  A perceptive account of the critique of a notion of ‘consensus’ can be found in R. 
Barker’s Political Ideas in Modern Britain, Routledge, London, 1978, pp.172-189. 
96. For a review of the notion of post-war consensus, see C. Hay, Re-stating Social and Political Change, Open 
University Press, Milton Keynes, 1996, ch.3. 
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 This must be understood, however, within the historical context of political ideas; in 
particular, two epoch-making events in the history of ideas which preceded it: the schism 
which led to the creation of new liberalism; and the divide within socialism between the 
revolutionary and the democratic method.  The latter led to revisionism.  Moreover, these 
two sets of relationships were inter-connected, for they both involved reactions to the 
changing nature of the state.  They were based on realizations that the changed and 
changing state, and - perhaps most importantly - the democratic state, had completely 
altered the political terrain.  Some liberals and socialists, responding as they were to the 
ideas of John Locke and Karl Marx, respectively, argued that fundamental developments 
had transformed the political, economic and social landscape.  Hence, although on one hand 
the development of revisionism and new liberalism are distinct events, and are normally 
studied as such, the two were in fact different aspects of the same response to the rise of the 
modern state.  Both reactions were positive, to the extent that the growth of the state is 
broadly welcomed, at least from a theoretical confidence in its potential97.    
 
 
 
British socialism and revisionism 
 
 
The political ideas of both British socialism in general and the Labour Party in particular  
 
97. Thus, Rodney Barker’s phrase, “friends of the modern state”, which he used to describe both the new 
liberals and the Fabians, in Political Ideas in Modern Britain, 1978, op.cit., ch.2.  
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were embedded in the tradition of socialist revisionism.  Historically, two types of 
revisionism may be distinguished.  There is a ‘classical’ revisionism which can be 
understood as the philosophical break instigated by Eduard Bernstein from within 
Marxism98 at the turn of the century99.  Bernstein rejected revolutionary means in favour of 
the possibilities of democratic change, a position which he based upon a broader tradition of 
ethical values:  
 
 “In all advanced countries we see the privileges of the capitalist  
 bourgeoisie yielding step by step to democratic organisations... 
 Factory legislation, the democratisation of local government...the  
 freeing of trade unions...all these characterise this phase of  
 evolution”100.  
 
The two principal competing interpretations of socialism in Britain over this period, Fabian 
and ethical socialism, exist within this paradigm.  Revisionists have generally co-opted 
Bernstein’s analysis and his conclusions (as a perpetual socialist canon): socialists should 
always be ready to relate their values to the nature of the times, economically, socially and 
politically; and this will often entail pragmatism and strategic specificity in the light of 
contemporary developments101.  As Donald Sassoon has written, when socialists “tried to 
 
98. Although, as Donald Sassoon has pointed out, the ‘Marxism’ Bernstein and others criticized was in fact 
that of Kautsky and the Second International, which was based on a “catastrophic view of the destiny of 
capitalism: its ultimate collapse preceded by the growing pauperization of the working class”; D. Sassoon, 
One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, Fontana Press, 
London, 1997, p.242.    
99. E. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, Schocken Books, New York, 1975. 
100. Ibid., pp. xxv-xxvi. 
101. For a concise examination of the foundations of revisionism see Donald Sassoon’s monumental, One 
Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, op.cit., ch.10.  
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redefine what socialism should be, and what its supporters should do, they presented this 
revision as a necessary adaption to modernity and altered circumstances”102.     
 The means and ends of socialism were understood by revisionists to be distinct.  Vic 
George and Paul Wilding have defined ‘means’ and ‘ends’ as the following: “Ends are 
matters of judgements about what constitutes the good society.  Means are susceptible to 
research and evaluation and they can often be shown to be right or wrong”103.  This basic 
 distinction is adopted here, save to note the inter-connection between the two: means are 
designed or adopted to serve or further ends.  Economic strategy was equated with the 
means while some broader ethical construction of society was held to constitute the end; 
equally, the ethical was held to predominate over the economic.  Later, particularly over the 
post-1945 period, the prime analysis of Labour revisionists was concerned with public 
ownership104.  It was argued that it had come to be understood, incorrectly, as the end or 
goal of the socialist agenda, whereas it should have been understood, in the words of Sam
Beer, as “merely one of various means to Socialist goals”105.  More generally, revisionists 
argue that socialist ends centre traditionally on the values which formed the rallying cry of 
the French Revolution, “liberty, equality and fraternity”106.   
 While revolutionary socialism, such as the Russian and Chinese interpretations of 
Marxism, declare the necessity of overthrowing the capitalist state by a violent revolution, 
 
102. Ibid., p.241.  
103. V. George and P. Wilding, Welfare and Ideology, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1994, 
p.210.     
104. The most important exponent of this argument is Anthony Crosland in The Future of Socialism, Cape, 
London, 1956.  His work is discussed in Chapter 3.     
105. S. Beer, Modern British Politics, op.cit., p. 236. 
106. For an analysis of the importance of the French Revolution to the history of socialism see B. Crick, 
Socialism, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1987, pp. 14-27.  
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stating a belief in one, single ‘correct’ socialist path107, revisionist socialism, or ‘democratic 
socialism’, states that it seeks to persuade the electorate of the validity of its values and 
policies.  Democratic socialism is therefore evolutionary, as Bernstein argued: socialist 
objectives would be realised policy by policy, government by government.  Democracy, 
however, is interpreted as more than pure methodology; it has positive value in itself.  Evan 
Durbin wrote in 1940 that “the democratic method is not only essential for the achievement 
of socialism, it is part of that achievement”108.  
 In Britain, however, during the inter-war years, this contention was disputed, and 
many thought that change through the existing system of parliamentary democracy was 
impossible.   In 1938, Harold Laski wrote that the constitution existed for those “who were 
agreed about the way of life the English State should impose”109, and in the 1930s this 
certainly did not include socialism.  As Robert Skidelsky has put it, there existed both “the 
fear of the possessing classes that democracy would rob them of their privileges, and of 
radicals that it would rob them of the revolution”110.  Socialists predicted imminent conflict 
with conservative forces embedded in the state in the event of electoral support for a radical, 
reforming Labour Party, particularly after the debacle of 1931111.  Neither was this analysis 
the preserve of the Marxist left, as Anthony Wright has pointed out: “the fear, or even 
expectation, of such subversion was widely expressed and debated on the British Left in the 
1930s (so much so that in 1932 the impeccably moderate Clement Attlee, future prime 
minister, was to be found suggesting that socialists should train people to take over 
 
107. Ibid., p.79-80. 
108. E. Durbin, The Politics of Democratic Socialism, Routledge, London, 1940. 
109. H. Laski, quoted in R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, Methuen and Co, London, 1978, p. 166. 
110. R. Skidelsky, Men and Ideas: Keynes and the Reconstruction of Liberalism, Encounter, April 1979, p. 30. 
111. B. Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1977.  
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command positions in the armed forces in anticipation of such an eventuality)”112.  The 
paradox here is that, on the one hand, Britain appeared immune from Marxism113 but, on the 
other hand, there was an explicit analysis in the mainstream of British socialism, in its 
conception of power, which is certainly Marxian114. Nonetheless, as John Callaghan has 
written in his study of Labour’s ideology, despite the pessimism and disillusion following 
the two minority governments of 1924 and 1929-1931, “the great majority of British 
socialists retained their faith in the future socialist commonwealth arising out of the 
parliamentary gradualism to which they had always subscribed”115.  This helps to explain 
the party leadership’s reaction to the 1926 General Strike.  It was seen as “an unmitigat
disaster, threatening Labour’s claim to be a constitutional party”116.  
 The writing of R. H. Tawney was particularly relevant and influential in establishing 
a ‘democratic’ socialism:  
 
 “The rank and file of the labour movement...regard democracy, not 
  as an obstacle to socialism, but as an instrument for attaining it, and  
 socialism, not as the antithesis of democracy, but as the extension of  
 democratic principles into spheres of life which previously escaped  
 their influence”117.   
 
It is here that one begins to see the emergence of an historical convergence that breaches the  
 
112. C. Attlee, quoted in A. Wright, Socialisms, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, p.73. 
113. G. Foote, The Labour Party’s Political Thought: A History, op.cit., p.17. 
114. This issue is returned to in Chapter 4, pp.2-3.  
115. J. Callaghan, The Left: The Ideology of the Labour Party, in L. Tivey and A. Wright (eds.), Party Ideology 
in Britain, op.cit., p.28. 
116. A. Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party, Macmillan, London, 1997, p.62. 
117. R. Tawney, The Radical Tradition, Penguin, London, 1966, P. 147-8. 
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frontier of a traditionally distinct socialism and liberalism118.  Tawney’s socialism was based 
on a conception of liberty, or freedom, intertwined with equality.  L. T. Hobhouse, one of the 
most important new liberals, claimed that: “Liberty without equality is a name of noble 
sound and squalid result”119.  A trajectory can then be traced from the liberal tradition of 
John Stuart Mill120, and the move towards what is described as ‘positive liberty’121, and the 
ethical tradition of socialism which Tawney encapsulates: 
 
 “Liberty is composed of liberties...There is no such thing as freedom  
 in the abstract, divorced from the realities of a particular time and  
 place.  Whatever else the conception may imply, it involves the power  
 of choice between alternatives, a choice which is real”122.   
 
It can be seen that the liberal conception of positive liberty approaches the socialist notion of 
equality.  Hobhouse wrote that socialism coincided with the liberalism that seeks to “apply 
the principles of Liberty, Equality and the Common Good to the industrial life of our 
time”123.  There are two interrelated points.  First, ethical socialists have defined equality in 
terms of liberty, to an extent that equality becomes more of a means - a means to greater 
(positive) freedom - than an end.  Second, the perspective which socialists would present of 
 
118. For a discussion of the relationship between socialism and liberalism, which examines many of the 
political thinkers examined here, see Peter Clarke’s classic, Liberals and Social Democrats, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1978.    
119. L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1964, p.53. 
120. In his autobiography, Mill espoused a conception of “qualified socialism”.  He argued that the social 
problem of the future was “how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action with a common ownership in 
the raw material of the globe”; quoted in R. Berki, The History of Political Thought: A Short Introduction, J. M. 
Deny and Sons, London, 1977, p. 186.  This can be seen to encompass both socialist and new liberal ideas.     
121. I. Berlin, ‘Two concepts of Liberty’, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969.  
122. R. H. Tawney, Equality, op.cit., p.227.  
123. L. T. Hobhouse, ‘Contemporary Review’, 93, 1908, quoted in N. Dennis and A. H. Halsey, English 
Ethical Socialism: Thomas More to R. H. Tawney, Clarendon Press, London, 1988, p.75. 
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the free market would have at its core a critique of ‘negative liberty’ which would differ very 
little from that of the new liberals.  In The Case for Socialism, published in 1911, Fred 
Henderson wrote: “liberty in its negative aspect means what the state is to refrain from 
doing; while liberty in its positive aspect means constructive civilisation, and finds its 
expression in the activities of the state”124.  Rodney Barker has offered an explanation for 
this apparent convergence:   
 
 “Both the socialist argument and the social radical argument of the  
 New Liberals were assisted by being part of a wider state collectivist  
 ambience.  There had been a change in the terms of the debate which  
 had expanded the range of affairs which were thought of as public  
 issues, extended the expectations of the state as competent and  
 appropriate to deal with these issues, and broadened the scope of  
 what was thought of as a political issue”125.  
 
 It is both feasible and genuinely instructive to link together socialism and liberalism 
through ethical socialism and new liberalism.  Both perceive the potential of a positive state 
to act as a liberating force.  There is historical precedence for such an idea in socialism and 
liberalism.  The essence of new liberalism, as Halsey and Dennis have written, is that the 
state could “enlarge and extend the freedom of the individual - the doctrine of T. H. 
Green”126.  Likewise, a non-Marxist post-utopian127 socialism emerged towards the close of 
the nineteenth century which held that the state could serve socialist ends.  Once this 
 
124. F. Henderson, The Case for Socialism, Messrs Jarrolds Ltd, London , 1911, p. 47. 
125. R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, op.cit., pp.48-49.  
126. N. Dennis and A. H. Halsey, English Ethical Socialism, op.cit., p. 158. 
127. This is how Marx had termed the ideas of Charles Fourier and Robert Owen; see D. McLellan, The 
Thought of Karl Marx: An Introduction, Macmillan, London, 1971.   
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‘revisionism’ had occurred, the new liberalism and the new socialism can also be seen to 
unite on means: the democratic process and the potential of the collectivist state.  This is the 
context of political ideas which later saw the Labour Party replace the Liberal Party as the 
principal opponent of the Conservatives, in a political system which had room for no 
more128. 
 
 
Socialism and liberalism: the new liberal fusion. 
 
 “A society is free in so far, and only in so far, as, within the limits set  
 by nature, knowledge and resources, its institutions and policies are  
 such as to enable all its members to grow to their full stature...In so far  
 as the opportunity to lead a life worthy of human beings is needlessly  
 confined to a minority, not a few of the conditions applauded as  
 freedom would more properly be denounced as privilege.” 
        - R. H. Tawney129 
  
If liberalism has one central principle, then it is individual freedom, or liberty.  This is 
certainly evident in the writing of the classical liberal political thinkers.  For John Stuart 
Mill, the concept is essential if there is to be “individuality”, whereby people are free to 
fulfill their ambitions and potential130.  This seemed to necessitate a limited ‘nightwatchman’ 
state.  However, by the turn of the century, it appeared to some liberals that a theoretical 
 
128. The classic study of this episode remains George Dangerfield’s The Strange Death of Liberal England, 
MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1966, which discusses a variety of possible causes for the Liberal demise.  
129 R. H. Tawney, Equality, op.cit., p.235. 
130. J. S. Mill, On Liberty, Everyman’s Library, London, 1964, ch. 3. 
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freedom was of no true consequence if the reality was poverty and deprivation.  The new 
liberals argued that the time had come to transform the notions of individual freedom from 
abstraction to actuality.  The gap between negative and positive liberty was bridged: the state 
would provide the arena in which nominal liberty could be actualized. 
 In many ways, it is the role of the state which separates the  ‘old’ from the ‘new’ 
liberals, in the form of ‘individualists’ and ‘collectivists’, respectively.  It is necessary to 
reaffirm that the type of state intervention being advocated concerns the social and economic 
arenas.  The need for state action in a legal sense was not being questioned, except by the 
most ardent of libertarians131; indeed, the notion of the rule of law formed a key part of John 
Locke’s philosophy132.  The rule of law was regarded as essential by the classical liberals 
because liberty was linked to the protection and maintenance of private property.  The 
relationship between a legalistic role for the state and the state intervening in the socio-
economic arena is a complicated one.  On the one hand, the two are distinct and a belief in 
the rule of law may have no bearing on whether one believes in the free market or the 
collectivist state.   
 On the other hand, however, for critics of laissez-faire economics it might be pointed 
out that a conception of the rule of law based on the sanctity of private property would 
inevitably find interventionist social and economic policies problematic.  The tension is 
exposed by Hobhouse who mocks the validity of laissez-faire individualism on its own 
terms: 
 
 
131. See, for example, the ‘anarcho-capitalists’, such as R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1974.  
132. J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Everyman’s Library, London, 1962.  
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 “Why should a man who has been soundly beaten in physical fight  
 go to a public authority for redress?...Was it not a kind of pauperization 
 to make men secure in person and property through no efforts of their  
 own, by the agency of a state operating over their heads?  Would not a  
 really consistent individualism abolish  this machinery?”133. 
 
What appears to have taken place is a transplantation of the notion of liberty into the 
economic arena, a conception which lies at the heart of ethical socialism in the first place.  
As Tawney has argued, “the extension of liberty from the political to the economic sphere is 
evidently among the most urgent tasks of industrial societies”134.  The comparison between 
Tawney and Hobhouse has been made by Dennis and Halsey in their work on the history of 
English ethical socialism.  They cite Morris Ginsberg’s term ‘liberal socialists’, in which 
category he places both Tawney and Hobhouse135.   
 Hobhouse clearly opposes what he sees as the remarkably limited nature of classical 
liberalism’s definitions.  He illustrates both the potential breadth of the notion of crime and 
the presuppositions behind the idea of the rule of law.  It is pointed out that at one time it was 
left to individuals to seek their own personal recompense for injustice.  Then, in the 
nineteenth century, this itself was seen as unjust: 
 
 “What, we may ask in our turn, is the essence of crime?  May we not  
 say that any intentional injury to another may be legitimately punished 
 by a public authority, and may we not say that to impose twelve hours’  
 daily labour on a child was to inflict a greater injury than the theft 
 
133. L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism, op.cit., p, 49. 
134. R. H. Tawney, Equality, op.cit., p.167.  
135. N. Dennis and A. H. Halsey, English Ethical Socialism, op.cit., p.179. 
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 of a purse for which a century ago a man might be hanged?”136. 
 
Hobhouse demonstrates that the classical liberals’ distinction between individual freedom 
and the collectivist state was merely a polarization based on unclear, partial assumptions.  
Moreover, in Democracy and Reaction, a reconciliation between liberalism and socialism is 
called for137.  What emerges, and accounts for the rapprochement between liberalism and 
socialism, is the argument that the existing conflict between the two ideologies is based on 
the false polarization of individual freedom and collectivism. 
 Classical liberals, who deny the compatibility of freedom and collectivism, claim 
historical legitimacy.  Thus, for Herbert Spencer, the new liberals “lost sight of the truth that 
in past times Liberalism habitually stood for individual freedom ‘versus’ State-coercion”138. 
 Hence, the invalidity of new liberalism’s conceptual reconcilement depends on the viability 
of this history.  Spencer’s interpretation of liberalism, however, centred around the state 
rather than liberty.  It is true that any understanding of liberty must include a comprehension 
of the state, both its role and its boundaries of legitimate intervention.  Spencer lists what he 
believes to be the achievements of liberalism, such as the restrictions which have been lifted 
on religious and political publication.  The point or objective of such action, according to 
Spencer, was “limited parliamentary authority”139.  However, it is not clear that his examples 
lead us to this conclusion.              
 
136. L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism, op.cit., p.49-50.  
137. L. T. Hobhouse, Democracy and Reaction, quoted in N. Wintrop (ed.), `Liberal Democratic Theory and its 
Critics’, Croom Helm, 1983, p. 109. 
138. H. Spencer, The Man Versus the State, Liberty Classics, 1982, p. 10. 
139. Ibid., p. 26. 
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 The central political value of liberalism is individual freedom, and freedom of speech 
is  an essential prerequisite to freedom.  The assertion that the state should not impose a 
religious orthodoxy or suppress rival opinion is a prime example.  But this is still only an 
example of an idea in action, rather than a synonymous expression.  For the new liberals it 
had become evident that the state could play a strong role in creating a situation where all in 
society were capable of attaining freedom.  Thus Hobhouse’s contention that “the state, 
which had been opposed by Liberals as the foe of liberty, should be recognised as one of the 
principal means of securing it”140.  Norman Wintrop has described what he perceives as 
Hobhouse’s conception of “liberalism’s history”: 
 
 “Liberalism was presented as having begun its work, in the seventeenth  
 century, with a protest against authoritarian government; later, its  
 theorists and its actors evolved more positive forms of freedom, rights, 
 citizenship and government, eventually embracing the democratic  
 principle and the insights of the socialist protest against an exclusively  
 individualist liberalism.”141 
 
 This debate was no philosophical abstraction; indeed, it was embedded in the 
political context of the day.  In the years immediately preceding the First World War, the 
nature of the relationship between individual freedom and collectivism was truly in the 
balance.  What we have termed the politics of political ideas, or party political ideas, is 
significant: liberalism’s ‘actors’ were of great relevance.  The reform programme of the 
Liberal Government, particularly Lloyd George’s 1909 Budget and the subsequent 
 
140. N. Dennis and A. H. Halsey, English Ethical Socialism, op.cit., p.76. 
141. N. Wintrop, op.cit., p. 110. 
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constitutional crisis, were pivotal142.  J. A. Hobson, an influential new liberal figure, argued 
that the significance was that, although quantitatively small, the Budget made wealth a “test 
of taxable capacity”.  Hence, the obstructionist action of the House of Lords was not really 
about the veto at all: “The reason...why Conservatives have decided to stake the very 
constitution in the hazard of the present fight, is that they recognize in New Liberalism...the 
beginnings of an enlarging attack upon the system of private property and private industrial 
enterprise”143.  The political situation could not have been more critical for the collectivist 
liberals: 
 
 “When the essential distinction between earned and unearned income  
 and property [is] once clearly accepted, not merely as a theory but as  
 a first principle of public policy, to be applied progressively, as an  
 instrument for financing ‘social reform’, resistance may be too late”144. 
 
These ideas of state intervention and collectivism were clearly also shared by many British 
socialists before and after the formation of the Labour Party.     
 The nature of the state, and interpretations of the nature of the state, is central to this 
analysis.  It is the changing perception of the state among liberals which helps to explain the 
move away from the classical liberal position.  However, it is not just the changing scope of 
the state which is important but also the political framework within which it sits.  The value 
of individual liberty was juxtaposed with an attack on what was seen as authoritarian and 
arbitrary government based upon a self-perpetuating ruling elite.  However, this situation, by 
 
142. For a wide-ranging discussion of this period see G. Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, 
op.cit., Part 1. 
143. J. A. Hobson, The Crisis of Liberalism: New Issues of Democracy, Harvester Press, 1974, pp. ix-x. 
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the 1880s, had been reformed out of existence.  Hobhouse believed that greater democracy 
had altered the situation dramatically: a minority state had become a peoples’ state.  
Hobhouse held collectivism as not just one particular expression of democracy, but an 
inherent part of it.  Like J. S. Mill before him he was aware of the problem of majority rule: 
“Democracy is not merely the government of a majority.  It is rather the government which 
best expresses the community as a whole, and towards this ideal the power assigned legally 
to the majority is merely a mechanical means”145.         
 If, however, the similarities between socialism and liberalism in Hobhouse’s work 
are important and informative, so are the distinctions:  
  
 “In the socialistic presentment... [the expert] sometimes looks strangely  
 like the powers that be - in education, for instance, a clergyman under a  
 new title, in business that very captain of industry who at the outset was 
 the Socialist's chief enemy.  Be that as it may, as the “expert” comes to the  
 front, and “efficiency” becomes the watchword of administration, all that  
 was human in Socialism vanishes out of it”146.  
 
 
 
Socialism and ethics: R. H. Tawney 
 
 
 
144. Ibid., p.x. 
145. L. T. Hobhouse, 1972, op.cit., p.108.   
146. L. T. Hobhouse, quoted in R. Barker, op. cit., p. 21. 
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It is striking that this argument is remarkably similar to the criticism of Fabian socialism that 
came powerfully, at the same time, from within socialism.  There was a powerful strand in 
British socialist thought which was wary of an over-powerful state, the tradition of ethical 
and libertarian socialism, associated in particular with Robert Owen in the early nineteenth 
century and, later, William Morris147.  The concerns of this tradition pointed to the possible 
ramifications for individual freedom of large scale public ownership, particularly if, in 
reality, public ownership meant state ownership.  Public ownership had a socialist elasticity: 
it could be very important as a means for socialists; but if it were instituted for its own sake, 
or in order to create an all-powerful state, it could break and only serve other, strictly non-
socialist, purposes. Anthony Wright has distinguished between a libertarian and an 
organizational socialism: 
 
 “The former has depicted the release of individuality consequent upon  
 the eradication of the oppressive structures of class and state, and has  
 often thought in the terms of the self-direction of small communities.  It  
 deploys the language of freedom and spontaneity to describe its  
 purpose.  By contrast, organizational socialism focuses less upon the  
 unfreedom of capitalism than upon its disorder.  It seeks to replace the  
 chaos of capitalist competition, wasteful and undirected as it is, with  
 socialist planning and efficiency”148.  
      
 The divide between a statist and a pluralist socialism, or between an organizational 
and libertarian socialism, as Wright describes it, pre-dates the Labour Party.  The arguments 
of the Fabians and their Guild socialist opponents echo much older concerns.  Edward 
 
147. A. Wright, Socialisms, op.cit., ch. 5. 
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Bellamy’s Looking Backward - 2000, which was written towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, pre-empted the Webbs’ formulation of a socialism of technocratic, ordered state 
efficiency.  William Morris’ News from Nowhere countered with a vision of fellowship 
which did not depend on Bellamy’s technocratic innovation149.   
 Within the framework of democratic institutions, the Fabians were adamant that the 
role of socialism was to advance “the economic side of the democratic ideal”150.  This 
closely resembles Tawney’s analysis of the relationship between political and economic 
freedom151.  The basis of his argument was that it was entirely possible for a society to be 
“both politically free and economically the opposite”, because “political arrangements may 
be such as to check excess of power, while economic arrangements permit or encourage 
them”152.  This strikes at the core of the relationship between the state and the market.  
Socialists, both Fabians and ethical socialists, applied the democratic test to both; they found 
that while the state was democratic, economic power was not.  What was lacking, for 
Tawney, was “the economic analogy of political freedom”153.  
 The difference between Fabianism and ethical socialism concerned means and ends 
rather than this analysis.  In Tawney’s criticism, the problem of the Fabians’ means stems 
directly from their ends.  The lack of an ethical content in the thinking of the Webbs is the 
reason why they “appear to think that the evils of the existing order can be removed by 
 
148. Ibid., p.27. 
149. Stefan Berger has written of the popularity of ‘utopian’ socialist literature in the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century, in The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900-1931, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1994, p.182.  
150. A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., p. 65. 
151. See pp.10-11. 
152. R. H. Tawney, Equality, op.cit., p.167.   
153. Ibid.  
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leaving it as it is and heaping regulation upon regulation to check its abuses”154.  Analysing 
this period, Crosland allowed that to compare the Fabianism of Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
with that of Marx, might seem extreme.  Yet, both shared the view that there was an 
inevitability to history.  In these ideas, public ownership, or nationalization, also held a 
prominent position.  The role of the state was also central: the Webbs had developed a theory 
of policy-making based on an all-knowing, bureaucratic elite who, through rigorous 
research, were capable of solving all the problems of the day155.  Thus, there was an elitist 
comparison to be made as well: both Soviet communism and Fabianism displayed oligarchic 
tendencies.  Moreover, in the 1930s the two had explicitly come together with the 
publication of the Webbs’ Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?, and in later editions the 
question mark was removed.  As Rodney Barker has said, “the book was the major 
expression of the attraction which the soviet model could have for state collectivists and the 
adherents of technocratic oligarchy”156. 
 The major proponents of the alternative, ethical tradition were Tawney and G. D. H. 
Cole.  Their work can be distinguished from Fabianism and Marxism, which both prioritize 
the state and economics over ethics.  Again, the comparison can be made with the new 
liberalism of those like Hobhouse who opposed “bureaucracy, imported from Bismarckian 
Germany, which he later came to associate with his old friends the Fabians”157.  The 
socialism of Tawney and Cole was based on ethics, morality and equality, first and foremost; 
on government structure and economic organization, second.  Peter Clarke has made a 
 
154. R. H. Tawney, The Radical Tradition, op.cit., p.178.  
155. For a critical analysis see R. Barker, ‘The Fabian State’, in B. Pimlott (ed.), Fabian Essays in Socialist 
Thought, Heinemann, London, 1984.  
156. R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, op.cit., p. 164. 
157. N. Dennis and A. H. Halsey, English Ethical Socialism, op.cit., p.61. 
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similar distinction between “moral” reform and “mechanical” reform158.  Socialism was not 
seen as an economic structure only but as a condition for living.  The locus classicus of the 
ethical tradition is Tawney’s Equality159.  Tawney attempted to link the two classic concepts 
of liberty and equality, deploring a “traditional antithesis” between the two, by arguing that 
the former was meaningless without the latter:  
 
 “To desire equality is not...to cherish the romantic illusion that men  
 are equal in character and intelligence.  It is to hold that, while their  
 natural endowments differ profoundly, it is the mark of a civilised  
 society to aim at eliminating such inequalities as have their source,  
 not in individual differences, but in its own organisation”160. 
 
 One may reasonably see the history of socialism in terms of a structural divide 
between ethics and economics.  If Marxism was long on economic analysis, it was short on 
ethics, at least as commonly understood.  In an attempt to offer a scientific alternative to the 
utopianism of thinkers such as Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, Marx, as we have seen, 
relegated values and morals to the role of a contingent feature of the economic system: “The 
ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class”161.  If Marx rejected the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man as ‘bourgeois’ rights, many later socialists would claim that 
Declaration as their heritage.  Bernstein wrote that the only possible conclusion of the 
Marxist position was that “the movement, the series of processes is everything; whilst every 
 
158. P. Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats, op.cit., pp.1-8.   
159. Equality, op.cit., is a crucial work in the history of British socialism, and is a hallmark of the ethical 
socialist tradition. 
160. Ibid., p.57.  
161. K. Marx, quoted in D. McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx, op.cit.  
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aim fixed beforehand in its details is immaterial to it”162.  The later cabinet minister, Herbert 
Morrison, indicated the influence of this thinking when he said that socialism was “what a 
Labour government does”163. As has been seen, the ethical socialists had altogether very 
different aspirations.  
 
 
 
 
Socialism and the state: G. D. H. Cole  
 
 
In the same way as Tawney noted socialism’s “radiant ambiguities”164, so has Cole’s version 
been termed a “parade of paradoxes”165.  It may appear that Cole’s work in and before the 
1920s is radically different to his thinking in and beyond the 1930s.  The inconsistency of 
Cole’s writing has been well documented; it stretches from both the standard categorization 
of revolutionary socialist, on the one hand, to democratic socialist, on the other166.  But on 
another level, it may emerge that underlying principles remain unaltered; and, rather, that 
society and the role of the state have changed to such an extent that political analysis will 
necessarily have changed simultaneously.  The debate concerning G. D. H. Cole very much 
concerns this balance: does his re-appraisal lead to relevance or inconsistency?  Could a 
 
162. E. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, op.cit., p. 204. 
163. A. Wright, Socialisms, op.cit., p.19. 
164. R. H. Tawney, Equality, op.cit., p.201.  
165. A. Wright, G. D. H. Cole and Socialist Democracy, op.cit., p. 264.  
166. R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, op.cit., pp.100-103.  
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thinker be taken seriously who in 1917 called for workers’ control and then in the 1930s 
advocated both state ‘socialization’ and planning?  “Having no political ambitions, I rather 
fancy myself for a place on the National Planning Commission”167.    
 Cole’s early work is based around his criticisms of the Webbs’ exposition of state 
planning and state welfare.  In Self Government in Industry, Cole noted the developing 
collectivist state, but concluded that it just offered a new kind of subordination to the 
workers168.  Power was being redistributed, but only at the top - the boss was being replaced 
by the bureaucrat.  While Cole and the Guild socialists were advocating industrial 
democracy, the Fabians were judged to be offering industrial bureaucracy.  Then later, 
however, when the new dawn of Fabianism seemed to break in the 1940s, when large 
sections of British industry were nationalized, the welfare state created and full employment 
established as a prime duty of the state (rather than as a right of decentralized guilds), Cole 
was in support.  For Anthony Wright this can be held together if Cole’s more universal ideas 
are understood.  There was unity to the apparent contradictions:  
 
 “There was certainly change and development in Cole’s thinking over  
 time...but it has the character of movement within the framework of  
 a single and durable socialist conception, however complex and 
 untidy”169.   
 
This was the idea of fellowship, a conception based on morality rather than political or 
economic theory, which is more recently understood as community.  The influence of 
 
167. G. D. H. Cole, quoted in A. Wright, G. D. H. Cole and Socialist Democracy, op.cit.  
168. G. D. H. Cole, Self-Government in Industry, Bell, London, 1917. 
169. A. Wright, G. D. H. Cole and Socialist Democracy, op.cit ., p.268. 
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William Morris on both Cole and Tawney is well documented; the central tenet of Morris’ 
socialism is also fellowship.  Morris is useful for our purposes here: he shows the historical 
breadth of these ideas, and he provides a neat definition of socialism, which evidently eluded 
Cole, which encapsulates the essence of both thinkers’ substance and spirit.  For central to 
these writers’ understanding of fellowship was the notion of equality: 
 
 “there should be neither rich nor poor, neither master nor master’s  
 man, neither idle nor overworked, neither brain-sick brainworkers,  
 nor heart-sick handworkers, in a world, in which all men would be 
 living in equality of condition...” 
 
It can be seen that both Morris and Cole ground their socialism firmly within the world of 
work.  The ethical underpinning is also clear, as Morris goes on to make the case for 
fellowship, thus making the conceptual linkage with equality: 
 
 “...and [men] would manage their affairs unwastefully, and with the  
 full consciousness that harm to one would mean harm to all - the  
 realization at last of the meaning of the word  
 ‘COMMONWEALTH’” 170.          
 
 It is not just the case that there are consistencies in Cole’s political writing.  Rather, 
there is one, all-encompassing paradigm.  There remains a continuous recognition of what is 
desired in the good society.  The ends remain the same throughout; and there is, moreover, a 
 
170. W. Morris, ‘Justice’, reprinted in A. Briggs (ed.), William Morris: selected writings and designs, 1962,  
pp.33-34. 
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continuous moral framework.  Cole’s socialism is based on ethics and the value of 
fellowship before economic analyses.  Furthermore, Cole’s shift from the guild to the state 
can be placed into a wider context: the balance between theory and practice in British 
socialism.  Cole did not just turn towards the state after the 1920s but towards the party - that 
is, the Labour Party - as well.  His important work, The Next Ten Years in British Social and 
Economic Policy (1929), contained a rejection of theoretical abstraction in favour of 
practical policy171.  A critical influence here was the mass unemployment of the 1930s, the 
resulting poverty and the link - adamantly maintained by socialists - with the spread of 
fascism.  This was a situation which the socialist could hardly ignore.  It appears to have 
become clear to Cole that parochial guilds were highly inadequate, and that only the central 
state had the means to deal with such problems172. 
 It was not just Cole whose thinking underwent such a process of re-evaluation.  A 
similar shift has been traced in the writings of Harold Laski173.  Nicholas Ellison has 
observed that “from an early pluralist, anti-state position...Laski moved through federalism 
in his Grammar of Politics to the belief that the central state had a leading role to play in the 
transition to socialism”174.  Like Cole again the influences behind his change in thinking 
were the same, the political crisis of 1931 and the emergence of fascism.   
 For many, this led inevitably to the state and the parliamentary road.  It is also 
possible to understand such a transition in thinking in terms of the wider notions explicit in 
revisionism.  Indeed, a circular process of evolving political ideas can be observed which can 
 
171. G. D. H. Cole, quoted in Wright, op.cit., p.157. 
172. Ibid., p. 158. 
173. Anthony Wright places Laski alongside Tawney and Cole as representing the most significant 
influences on British socialism in the first half of the twentieth century; A. Wright, R. H. Tawney, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1987, p.vii.  
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be seen to highlight a reconciliation between Guild Socialism and Fabianism.  The former 
begins as an attack on the perceived top-down, non-ethical socialism of Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb.  Its preference for voluntarism over determinism is a critique of both Fabianism and 
Marxism175.  Dennis and Halsey state that an opposition to historicism and an assumption of 
“voluntarism as opposed to necessitarianism” is a key condition of “membership in the 
ethical-socialist tradition”176.  However, this also represents a rejection of revolution in 
favour of gradualism, a core Fabian concept.  It is here where the socialism of those like 
Cole and Tawney leads to parliamentary democracy because it can be seen to represent a 
combination of both ethical socialism and voluntarism.  Moreover, it was a 
parliamentarianism which was soon to have its day, with the election in 1945 of the first ever 
majority Labour government.  
 
 
174. N. Ellison, Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics: Retreating Visions, op.cit., p.5. 
175. A. Wright, G. D. H. Cole and Socialist Democracy, op.cit., p. 60. 
176. N Dennis and A. H. Halsey, English Ethical Socialism, op.cit., p.10. 
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CHAPTER 3      
 
Historical Context:  
Anthony Crosland, Socialism and the  
Labour Party after 1945  
 
 
 
 
Introduction: the 1945 watershed 
 
 
This period is clearly marked by the developments in 1945, chiefly the election of the Labour 
Government.  It was central to a period of critical examination and re-thinking about Labour’s political 
ideas.  Three central arguments will be developed.  First, 1945 constituted a major shift in the way the 
Labour Party thought about itself and the ideas that were important to it.  Second, in so doing, the five 
conceptual relationships which were raised earlier were fundamental to the developments concerning 
Labour’s political ideas during this period.  These were the relationship between democratic and 
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revolutionary socialism; the distinction between means and ends; the role of the economic and the 
ethical in socialism; the balance between the state and the market; and the balance between the state and 
the individual.  One of these, the first, was resolved: the argument concerning the viability of a 
parliamentary political party, whether to pursue revolution or co-opt democratic procedures.  Third, we 
again see the broader context of political ideas, the inter-connection of socialism with liberalism: the 
influence of the new liberals.  We see a degree of convergence between the two, an occurrence 
explicable by the developments discussed earlier.  One political thinker, in particular stood out: Anthony 
Crosland, whose landmark text, The Future of Socialism177, is central to the history of the political ideas 
of the Labour Party.  
 
 The significance of the 1945 General Election178 for Britain can hardly be over-stated, and is of 
particular pertinence to both the history of political ideas and to the history of the Labour Party.  Despite 
being a great hero of the Second World War, Winston Churchill failed to win the subsequent election179. 
 As A. J. P. Taylor put it, “The electors cheered Churchill and voted against him”180.  The Conservative 
Party appeared to be saying that now the war had been won the nation could return to how things were 
before.  Such sentiment did not seem to catch the public mood.  For many, before symbolized very little 
beyond the mass unemployment and wide-spread poverty of the 1930s.  If it is correct to refer to a 
common feeling then it can be argued that there was a belief that the sacrifices of war merited a better 
society. 
 
177 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, Cape, London, 1956. 
178 For a general account and analysis of the 1945 General Election see A. J. P. Taylor, English History: 1914-1945, Clarendon Press, 
London, 1988.   
179 For an explanation see C. Hay, Re-stating Social and Political Change, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1996, ch.2. 
 60 
 
 
 
                                                                         
 This is the background for the election of a Labour government in 1945, the first Labour 
government, moreover, to possess an overall majority of Members of Parliament in the House of 
Commons181.  The importance for both the Labour Party and socialist political ideas was immense182.  
For one political thinker in particular, Anthony Crosland, this represented a huge shift in both the 
political and ideational landscape, which therefore required a fresh analysis and an acknowledgment of 
new problems183.  Both the election result and the subsequent reforms which were instigated amounted 
to events of epoch-making significance.  Crosland argued that in the light of such momentous change, 
socialism had to re-cast itself.  Although this would immediately appear to represent a very different 
analysis from the ethical socialist tradition, this was not in fact the case, for crucial continuities 
remained.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180 Ibid., p.596. 
181 For an introduction to this election see R. Eatwell, The 1945-51 Labour Governments, Batsford Academic, London, 1979, chs.1-2.   
182 The significance of this period has been captured in a recent oral history; A. Mitchell, Election '45: Reflections on the Revolution in 
Britain, Fabian Society and Bellew Publishing, London, 1995. 
183 R. Wicks, ‘Revisionism in the 1950s: the ideas of Anthony Crosland’, in C Navari (ed.), British Politics and the Spirit of the Age, 
Keele University Press, Keele, 1996, pp.200-204. 
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Socialism, the Labour Party and the political ideas of Anthony Crosland. 
 
 
Anthony Crosland’s The Future of Socialism184 stands as one of the seminal texts of the British left.  It 
was important to British and European socialism and to the development of political ideas in the Labour 
Party and in Labour governments; it was central to the nature of Labour’s political debate at the time it 
was published in 1956.  However, evaluation of The Future of Socialism remains contested.  Perhaps it 
can be seen as the first attempt by the right of the Labour Party to articulate an intellectual theory, an 
activity normally associated with the left.  For groups on the right of the Labour Party, Crosland’s work 
was, and remains, a banner around which they could gather.  Partly because of this, he is traditionally 
regarded with suspicion by the Labour left.  However, are his theoretical differences with them also 
significant?  On the one hand, this would appear to be the case: Labour’s left have the theory, while the 
right have the practice; the left is at its most confident in academia, while the right is at its strongest - 
perhaps where it really matters - in government.  This is Nicholas Ellison’s observation of ethical - or 
what he calls “qualitative” - socialism: its failure to bridge the divide between ideas and policy: “Being 
primarily concerned with the prospect of political power, technocrats and Keynesian socialists naturally 
had an eye to electoral considerations...At one remove from the political process, qualitative socialists 
were less inhibited by such matters - although the distance did not prove an advantage”185.  
 However, on the other hand, it is not clear that Crosland’s work places him on the right.  Again 
the point must be made: the ideas in The Future of Socialism are comparable in many respects to 
thinkers like Tawney and Cole.  Crosland’s text can be interpreted as one of the key works in the long-
 
184 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit. 
185 N. Ellison, op.cit., p.109. 
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established and continuing tradition of English socialist revisionism, maintaining and updating its 
radicalism.  On the other hand, it may be presented as a crucial break in this tradition: for the first time 
voices from within British socialism were arguing that the most important battles had been won, and that 
the rest was within reach.  The reaction to this, in turn, at least to some of his opponents, was that this 
amounted to the abandonment of a socialism uncompleted. 
 Crosland’s theoretical approach in The Future of Socialism was based on three strategies.  First, 
he provided an analysis of the contemporary social, economic and political scene.  Second, he concluded 
that this was marked by crucial developments that had historical implications for British socialism.  
Then, third, he elaborated his interpretation of socialism in the light of these changes.  In discussing the 
text and its significance, the five conceptual comparisons already raised, which marked earlier socialist 
political ideas, will be considered: the relationship between democratic and revolutionary socialism; the 
distinction between means and ends; the balance between the economic and the ethical in socialism; the 
relationship between the state and the market; and the relationship between the state and the individual.   
  
 The Future of Socialism is embedded in the tradition of socialist ‘revisionism’.  Furthermore, it 
extends to a revisionism which is peculiar to the British Labour Party which centres on the question of 
public ownership.  Towards the end of the 1945-50 Labour Government, after a period of extensive 
nationalization, the question arose over how much further public ownership should continue.  The 
leadership, under Attlee, backed a view of ‘consolidation’ which held that greater nationalization was 
undesirable.  A more radical group, which was led by Aneurin Bevan, held that the accomplishments of 
this Government were only the important first steps of a far greater programme186.  To Crosland, writing 
in the 1950s, many of the debates and concerns of traditional socialism, were now invalidated.  In 
 63 
 
 
 
                                                                         
particular, he believed that the great historical debate over whether to pursue a revolutionary or a 
democratic road had now been resolved.  According to Crosland, it was now clear that it was possible 
for parliamentary democracy to deliver socialist policies187.  The 1945-50 Labour Government, the first 
ever majority Labour government, illustrated that the existing state could serve socialist purposes.  
Which reforms, however, gave Crosland cause for such optimism?  
 In the first place, there was the accumulation of a by now extensive social reform programme, 
much but not all due to the recent Labour ascendancy.  It was linked to the crucial economic requisite of 
full employment188.  The results of this programme meant that for the first time in history ordinary 
people had access to decent housing with hot and cold running water; their children had the right to free 
education; and they were protected in times of unemployment, sickness, poverty and in old age, by a 
comprehensive system of state insurance and benefits189.  But perhaps the greatest prize of all had been 
the creation of the National Health Service, described by its creator, Aneurin Bevan, as “pure 
socialism”190.  The socio-economic picture of British society in the mid-1950s represented for Crosland 
a socialist victory. In essence, the historical objective, the “welfare objective”, of socialism had been 
achieved: “Primary poverty has been largely eliminated...and Britain now boasts the widest range of 
social services in the world”191.  There was also, and just as importantly, widespread consensus that 
these benefits should be maintained.  As Kenneth Morgan has pointed out, the achievements of the 
Labour Government were reverentially acclaimed by all shades of Labour Party opinion192.  Moreover, 
 
186 K. O. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945-51, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, ch.5.  
187 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., pp33-35.  
188 The war-time coaltion Government had drawn up a White Paper commiting future governments to this goal,  Employment 
Policy, May 1944, HMSO, Cmd.6527. 
189 For an introduction to the reforms of the first post-war Labour Government see D. Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State, 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1984. 
190 A. Bevan, In Place of Fear, MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1965, p.106. 
191 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., p.59. 
192 K. O. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945-51, op.cit., ch.2.  
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a broader endorsement ensued as future Conservative administrations showed a reluctance to overturn
most of these changes193.  Crosland would observe that:  
 
 “...the Conservatives now fight elections largely on policies which 20  
 years ago were associated with the Left, and repudiated by the  
 Right”194. 
  
 These developments represented a move from social Darwinism to social democracy.  Herbert 
Spencer’s social Darwinist dictum, that “a creature not energetic enough to maintain itself must die”195, 
appeared to have been superseded by a social democracy which protected citizens from William 
Beveridge’s five giant evils: “Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness”196.  In the same vein, 
Crosland would argue that an ethical-economic system of self-interest and competition had been 
replaced by social solidarity and social security197.  These developments would be repeatedly 
emphasized in The Future of Socialism, to which they served as leitmotif.  If they demonstrated that 
socialism could be achieved through existing democratic institutions, a second prevalent argument was 
that this is how it should be achieved. This was a moral imperative as well as a political possibility, a 
conception which follows on directly from Tawney.  To Crosland, Tawney’s argument, that the “rank 
and file of the labour movement...regard democracy, not as an obstacle to socialism, but as an instrument 
for attaining it”198, had been proven by post-war legislation.   
 
193 For an important study of this during the 1940s see J. D. Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition 1945-51, MacGibbon and 
Kee, London, 1964. 
194 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., p.28. 
195 H. Spencer, The Man Versus the State, Liberty, Indianapolis, 1982, p.33. 
196 W. Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services, HMSO, 1942, Cmnd.6404. 
197 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., pp.54-59. 
198 R. H. Tawney, The Radical Tradition, op.cit., p.147-8. 
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sist on alleviation”203.  
                    
 This was challenged by those on the Marxist left who interpreted these changes according to an 
altogether different analysis.  It was contended that far from representing a move towards socialism, the 
reforms of the 1945-50 Government in fact merely sustain and perpetuate capitalism, a thesis which was 
strengthened by the perceived failures of future Labour administrations.  Ralph Miliband, one of the 
principal exponents of this critique, held that: the welfare state did not “constitute any threat to the 
existing system of power and privilege.  What it did constitute was a certain humanization of the 
existing social order”199.  For Ian Gough, welfare is itself “peripheral” to the realities of a capitalist 
political economy200.  The reply by those who would, partly by way of reply, call themselves 
democratic socialists201 stood firmly within the revisionist tradition.  The rise of the Labour Party and 
evolution of socialist ideas can only be understood alongside the advent of universal suffrage.  For 
Aneurin Bevan, part of the argument put forward by Miliband and others could be accepted202.  
Nonetheless, it was contended that the extension of the franchise had radically altered the picture
socialists from Bernstein to Tawney had maintained.  “I am not asserting”, wrote Bevan, “that when 
social reformers are moved to ease the distress of poor people they are thinking of the minimum 
concession necessary to preserve the rule of wealth.  What I do contend is that the suffering of the poor 
was ignored while they lacked the power and status to in
 There is an implicit determinism in such a conceptualization of political history which almost 
comprehends the election and reforms of Attlee’s Government as an inevitability. Indeed, for Crosland, 
 
199 R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, Quartet Books, London, 1969. 
200 I. Gough, The Political Economy of Welfare, Macmillan, London, 1979. 
201 Many Labour Party members and politicians describe themselves as ‘democratic socialists’.  It has two meanings: the first, 
discussed here, aims to distinguish the democratic method from that of revolution; the second emphasizes the socialism and is 
deployed by the left of the party in response to the perceived, less radical, ‘social democracy’ of the right.   
 This is very much an internal, and wholly exclusive, party dialect, and owes little to clear meaning and consistency.  
Crosland who, as we have seen, was described in his day as on the right, indeed as the Labour right’s intellectual guru, proffered 
the most powerful re-assertion of socialism of his generation.  The answer lies in the debate over differing interpretations of 
socialism, discussed here, and not in narrow doctrinal discrimination or the search for monolithic singularity.            
202 A. Bevan, In Place of Fear, op.cit., p.24. 
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future success was guaranteed and despite the failure of the Labour Party to win office in the 1950s, 
there was a reasonable certainty that the successes of this government had been institutionalized, into 
what some were already calling a ‘political consensus’204.  There was also, and perhaps most 
importantly of all, a self-confidence in the party concerning its ability to govern - when it did - 
successfully, which had not been the case following the political crisis of 1931205.  The Attlee 
Government had demonstrated the role Labour could play in the British political system, and this was 
significant both in terms of political ideas and politically: ideationally, because it proved to the Marxist 
left that a democratic socialism could deliver; and politically, because it demonstrated to the electorate 
that the Labour Party could govern effectively.  However, in an analysis of the 1945 General Election, 
G. D. H. Cole wrote: 
 
 “The plain truth is that the electors voted in 1945, not for socialism as  
 an economic system based on public ownership of industry, but for more  
 speed in developing the social service state, for less social inequality,  
 and for full employment policies as a means to social security”206.  
 
Similarly, in his contribution to the ‘New Fabian Essays’, The Transition from Capitalism written in 
1952, Crosland argued that the achievements of the 1940s represented the development of “statism” - 
the dominance of the political arena over the economic - rather than socialism which, precisely because 
of Labour’s reforms, now lay firmly within sight.   
 
203 Ibid.  
204 It is a matter of great contention, however, as to whether or not there was truly a consensus (usually taken to be between 1951 and 
either sometime during Labour’s troubled period in office in the 1970s or following its defeat in 1979) between the two major political 
parties.  The term ‘Butskellism’ was invented by The Economist, linking the Disraelian Conservative R. A. B. Butler with Attlee’s 
successor as Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell.  Others, however, have disputed the reality of such homogeneity; see, for example, N. 
Deakin, In search of the post-war consensus, ‘Welfare State Programme’, London School of Economics, London, 1988.  We will 
return to this issue in Chapter 5. 
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 If it were held that great structural and political transformation was no longer required207, this 
was also because the instruments of greater change were already in place.  For Crosland and key Labour 
economists at the time, such as Evan Durbin and Hugh Gaitskell who became party leader in 1955, a 
year before the publication of The Future of Socialism, they were to be found in the newly defined role 
for an interventionist state in the economic and social arena.  As Michael Young has written: “Maynard 
Keynes in the background seemed just as significant for the revisionist thesis as Clem Attlee in the 
foreground”208.  Essentially, Keynesian demand-management would ensure an expanding economy; 
growth, which Crosland insisted “will continue”, would ensure expanding incomes, on top of the 
existing minimum of full employment and the welfare state209.  In many ways, therefore, Crosland’s 
work can be seen to reflect the optimism of both democratic socialism at the time and of the wider 
political system.  
 These were developments, therefore, which did not take place in a vacuum of singly socialist 
political ideas.  If the argument over socialist methodology had been settled within the Labour Party, it is 
an ironic but important point to note the impact of liberalism.  For, in many ways, the perceived success 
of Labour in office owed much to the theoretical tools of the emergent liberalism.  The period before 
1945 saw not just important developments within socialism and liberalism, but a noticeable and highly 
significant convergence between the two philosophical traditions.  This is the context of political ideas 
which is central to an understanding of both Labour’s political ideas and actions in government and in 
opposition after 1945.  Indeed, it helps to make sense of a post-war era in which economic policy and 
 
205 For an analysis of this period see B. Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s, op.cit.  
206 G. D. H. Cole, ‘The Dream and the Business’, Political Quarterly, July-September 1949, p. 203.  
207 For Peter Hennessy, Labour’s failure to enact institutional reform represents its greatest mistake over this period, Never Again, 
Britain 1945-51, Jonathan Cape, London, 1992.  The argument presented here - that the perceived success of Labour’s legislation led to 
a profound optimism vis-à-vis the political system - helps to explain this. 
208 M. Young, ‘Anthony Crosland and Socialism’, Encounter, August 1977, p.84.  
209 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., p.4. 
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social policy were shaped largely by the liberals’ John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge, and 
largely through Labour governments.  This point was recognised by Hugh Gaitskell in an essay on The 
Ideological Development of Democratic Socialism in Great Britain’ in which Keynes’ role was 
recognised, the Marxian Laski and Stachey relegated210.  Keynes and Beveridge were very much the 
inheritors of new liberalism and, more importantly, its implementors in government.  Keynesianism, 
particularly the over-riding importance it attaches to full employment, and the welfare state are both 
expressions of the new liberal belief in positive freedom and the socialist belief in greater equality.  
These ideas were, if not expressions of the same beliefs, ideas which inspired a common ethical and 
political expression.  
 The growing belief that “traditional capitalism has been reformed and modified almost out of 
existence”211 helps to explain this.  Socialism in Britain, as elsewhere in Europe, had been based on 
fundamental assumptions about the immorality of a free market which permitted widespread poverty, 
destitution and unemployment, on the grounds that it had been naturally ordained.  Crosland would write 
that “Keynes-plus-modified-capitalism-plus-Welfare-State” was not the same as socialism, but neither 
was it “pure capitalism”212.  The political climate in which Crosland wrote was one in which there was 
an increasing disposition to accept that this was true and that the traditional ills associated with the free 
market were no more.  Finally, despite the perceived, positive political outlook, Crosland perceived an 
intellectual vacuum of sorts; although there was a great intellectual inheritance that was still relevant, 
there was much that by the 1950s could be deemed irrelevant.  A reaffirmation of socialist ends had to 
be made in order to suit the changed and changing times: ‘tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis’ 
(times change and we change with them).  For Crosland, socialism was no exception. 
 
210  P. M. Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.245. 
211 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., p.61. 
212 Ibid., p.79. 
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Crosland and the values of socialism 
 
 
Crosland’s conception of socialism is founded upon his comprehension of what connects the plethora of 
“socialisms”213.  His solution to what Tawney has termed socialism’s “radiant ambiguities”214 was to 
search for a common theme, which he identified as a fundamental ethical drive: “The one single element 
common to all schools of thought has been the basic aspirations, the underlying moral values”215.  
According to Raymond Plant, in “our own day and in our own country it was Anthony Crosland who 
placed the ideals of democratic socialism at the centre of the political agenda”216.  If, like Tawney and 
Cole before him, Crosland rested his belief in democratic socialism upon an ethical foundation, he 
insisted, moreover, that this foundation united all socialists.  Even more ambitiously, but with clear 
echoes of his predecessors, Crosland argued for a core universal content to those ideals, which he 
identified as equality.  Equality, argued Crosland, was the central socialist value because without 
equality there cannot be freedom.  The strength and endurance of the Tawney tradition is clear.  The 
significance of Crosland’s analysis is the move he deliberately made from an economic to a social 
conception of equality.  Crosland’s intention was to make the idea of equality relevant for the middle of 
the twentieth century and beyond.  He did not have and did not claim a monopoly on the idea of equality 
in Labour’s ideological debate.  Many on the left, including Bevan, also put equality centre stage.  What 
differentiates Crosland, and what places him clearly in the revisionist tradition, is his willingness to offer 
 
213 This is the term used by A. Wright as the title for his work, Socialisms, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987. 
214 R. H. Tawney, Equality, Unwin Books, London, 1964.  
215 A. Crosland. The Future of Socialism, p.67. 
216 R. Plant in D. Lipsey and D. Leonard (eds.), The Socialist Agenda: Crosland’s Legacy, Jonathan Cape, London, 1981, 
p.137. 
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a critique of many traditional socialist arguments for equality, as well as dealing with objections from 
the right.  It was this which gave rise to a unique and controversial project. 
 An economic redistribution of income and wealth from the rich to the poor can in many ways be 
taken as the classic socialist argument arising from the idea of equality: “Poverty in the midst of plenty 
seemed obviously repugnant, and great wealth a disgrace because it appeared the cause of great 
poverty”217.  Crosland’s view was that the aim of redistribution was not incorrect, but that it could no 
longer serve its intended purpose.  Economic redistribution was justified for Crosland only so long as it 
met the “economic welfare argument”; that is, only so long as economic factors were the main source of 
inequality.  This was no longer the case for two reasons.  First, as we have seen, Crosland held that 
“primary poverty” could be regarded as a social phenomenon consigned to social history, due to the 
achievements of the 1945-50 Labour Government.  Second, because not only were the extremes of 
wealth “so much less marked”, there were now “too few pounds” that could be redistributed in a way 
which could be of significant benefit218.  Further redistribution of income was regarded by Crosland as 
akin to a panacea that may once have been plausible but was no longer.  Economic redistribution, in 
short, was ineffective because economic inequalities were less great.  This presented a problem for 
socialists as it implied that other strategies should be pursued in order to achieve a more equal society, 
strategies as yet undefined: “if we want more equality, the case for it must rest on statements largely, if 
not entirely, unrelated to economic welfare”219.  This demand set the agenda for The Future of 
Socialism.  The question is provocatively posed: “what is the justification for continuing to preach 
greater equality?”220.  Accordingly, the text may be looked at as a rigorous investigation into the sources 
 
217 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., p.123. 
218 Ibid., p. 124. 
219 Ibid., p.124. 
46 Ibid. 
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of inequality.  The question which might usefully be asked here is: what did Crosland take to be the 
greatest sources of inequality? 
  Crosland based his conception of social equality on a comprehension of the existing state of 
affairs, social, economic and political.  The most compelling argument for equality stemmed from what 
he took to be the class-ridden nature of British society.  He was astonished that a class structure should 
still be in place after the Second World War and the reforms which had occurred in its aftermath: 
 
 “Britain now presents an unusual paradox to the world: of a society  
 characterised by an exceptionally mature political democracy, growing 
 economic prosperity, and a social order which apparently metes out  
 social justice in a reasonable degree: yet still with an unreconstructed  
 class system”221. 
 
It was the British class system, and the rigidity and the antagonism it bred, that Crosland felt was the 
greatest threat to an equality which would enable citizens to be genuinely free. Crosland cited George 
Orwell as an important influence on his thinking, who only a few years earlier had written that once 
“civilisation has reached a fairly high technical level, class distinctions are an obvious evil”: 
 
 “They not only lead great numbers of people to waste their lives in the  
 pursuit of social prestige, but they also cause an immense waste of  
 talent...The word ‘They’, the universal feeling that ‘They’ hold all the  
 power and make all the decisions, and that ‘They’ can only be 
 influenced in indirect and uncertain ways, is a great handicap in  
 England.  In 1940 ‘They’ showed a marked tendency to give place  
 to ‘We’, and it is time that it did so permanently”222.  
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Many socialists have treated as their main concern the result of inequalities in society and the harm this 
causes to its unity.  The idea of fraternity, which in more recent times can be equated with the idea of 
community, would therefore appear to be the guiding value.  There is no explicit recognition of this 
value in Crosland’s work, but it is implicit, because it is the un-fraternal nature of what he sees in British 
society which is of pressing concern. 
 Crosland then proceeded to an interpretation of class in Britain which centred essentially on a 
series of social divisions caused mainly by differing educations and perpetuated by inheritance.  This 
was objectionable not exclusively on the grounds of merit.  Crosland also pointed to the phenomenon of 
social waste which was entailed by the immobile nature of the class divide.  “A nation is using its 
capacities to the full”, wrote Orwell, “when any man can get any job that he is fit for”223.  The outcome 
for Crosland, measured against this standard, was that Britain, and particularly its leadership, did not 
fare well: 
 
 “If social mobility is low, as it must be in a stratified society, and people  
 cannot easily move up from the lower or middle reaches to the top, then  
 the ruling elite becomes hereditary and self-perpetuating; and whatever  
 one may concede to inherited or family advantages, this must involve a  
 waste of talent”224. 
 
 
221 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., p. 103. 
222 G. Orwell, ‘The English People’, quoted in G. Brown and A. Wright, Values, Visions and Voices, Mainstream Publishing, 
Edinburgh, 1995, pp. 51-52. 
223 Ibid., p.51. 
224 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., p. 147. 
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Such an analysis entailed attention to an ‘equality of opportunity’, and clearly if a social system is being 
decried for not allowing its members to develop their potential, then this is the value that is being 
appealed to.  Here we arrive at a broader, historical dispute over the nature of a desirable equality.  
Crosland asked the question, “is equal opportunity enough?”225, and explored the meaning of the idea 
and its potential for creating greater equality.  The answer he gave is an interesting one within the 
context of socialist political ideas and was undoubtedly revisionist.  
 In the first place, Crosland neither accepted that an equal opportunity society was enough, nor 
did he deride it as a capitalist sham to be equated with the classical liberal view of negative liberty.  
Rather, he tried to offer a balance, weighing up the advantages and disadvantages, and concluded that 
the demand for equality of opportunity could well diminish inequality, although not “to the extent that 
socialists desire”226.  Its progressive potential stemmed from its ability to breach the previously 
impervious frontiers of social hierarchy.  Crosland argued that from “the moment when the Industrial 
Revolution broke up the stable pattern of eighteenth-century society”, the twin forces of working class 
politicization and the growth of education had led to a demand for equal opportunity, which in turn 
entailed a vital change in consciousness: the masses would no longer accept “that there was some divine 
ordination about the existing social hierarchy”227. 
 The problem with limiting equality policy to the achievement of an equality of opportunity, 
however, was that it could just lead to a shift from one elite to another.  An elite underpinned by 
inheritance and hierarchy might simply be displaced by an elite based on intelligence and ability.  The 
overwhelming problem Crosland identified were the factors determining, what Michael Young shortly 
 
225 Ibid., p. 150. 
226 Ibid., 162. 
227 Ibid., p. 123. 
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after called, “the rise of the meritocracy”228.  What is often taken to be a simple case of reward based on 
individual merit Crosland instead attributed, to a relatively large extent in The Future of Socialism, to the 
fortunes of genetic inheritance  and helpful family influence.  If socialists could do little to influence 
genetic inheritance, however, there was a much more important force that decisively influenced 
opportunities which could be affected: this was education.  Crosland identified the stratified education 
system as playing an integral part in structuring class divisions.  The distinction between public, 
grammar and the, then, secondary modern schools, which would lead Crosland to propose fundamental 
educational reform229, had far reaching consequences, linking not only occupation but status: 
 
 “This segregation during the formative years necessarily intensifies  
 inequalities...but because educational background is increasingly the 
  main determinant of occupation, and hence of other status criteria -  
 income, power, and occupational prestige - divergences in adult status  
 are significantly widened by being superimposed on prior divergences  
 in educational status”230. 
 
In many ways Crosland’s analysis of society pursued traditional socialist lines: both inequality and class 
feature strongly.  But both the explanations given for their existence and the choice of remedies that are 
proposed and - just as importantly - rejected, broke in fundamental ways with what had previously been 
widely accepted. 
 If an economic, income-centred notion of equality was being rejected, what of the predominance 
of the position of public ownership?  Here, Crosland put forward what is probably his most important 
 
228 M. Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy, Penguin, London, 1961. 
229 The most important elements of the proposed reforms were the abolition of the eleven-plus, the creation of non-segregated 
comprehensive schooling and the opening up of private schools. 
230 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, p. 166. 
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contribution to political ideas.  First, there was the relationship between the means and the ends of 
democratic socialism; secondly there was the relationship between the economic and the ethical.  
Crosland regarded the confusion between means and ends as one of the great weaknesses of socialist 
political ideas.  He argued that socialists misrepresent an economic analysis - the call for greater public 
ownership - as an objective in itself.  The link is made with G. D. H. Cole whose work bridges the 1945 
divide, inter-connecting the earlier ethical socialists and writers like Crosland.  As we have seen, Cole 
replied to critics of the numerous changes to his economic analysis by differentiating between these 
methods, or means, and the ends to which they were orientated: “socialisation is a means to an end”, he 
wrote, “a means towards the realisation of the ideal of human equality which lies at the basis of the 
socialist movement”231.  
 A similar analysis was being deployed elsewhere in Europe.  In 1959, just three years after the 
publication of Crosland’s work, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) had formally moved away 
from its commitment to public ownership in the Bad Godesberg Declaration.  Like Crosland its 
socialism was based on ethics, morality and equality, first and foremost; on government structure and 
economic organization, second.  Socialism was not seen as an economic structure only but also as a 
condition for living.  Crosland distinguished between two types of socialism.  One was based on “an 
ethical view of society, a belief in a certain way of life and certain moral values”232; in short, a vision of 
the good society.  Another, meanwhile, formulated an economic critique and theories of possible change 
which had its roots in Marx’s thesis that history is set on a course solely dependent upon an economic 
determinism of ownership and social class.   
 
231 N. Ellison, Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics: Retreating Visions, op.cit., p.232. 
232 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., pp. 65-66. 
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 The tradition in which economic means are subordinated to ethical values appeared to be 
marginal to the history of socialism.  Central to economic socialism was the idea of public ownership.  
Crosland argued that an obsession with public ownership was both theoretically disingenuous and 
practically unhelpful.  Did not the evidence of fascist corporatism and Soviet communism make it clear 
that public ownership was not intrinsically a good thing?  As Cole wrote, “the essence of socialism is to 
be found not in a particular way of organising the conduct of industry, but in a particular relationship 
among men”233.  Indeed, for Crosland, if it were held that the pattern of ownership “determined the 
character of the whole society”, then it could be taken that collective, or public, ownership would be 
decisive for the achievement of socialism, rather than “the ultimate social purposes which that 
transformation was intended to achieve”234.  Vic George and Paul Wilding have employed the term 
“Fabian socialists”, which contradicts this analysis, to describe thinkers like Tawney, Crosland and 
Richard Titmuss, who worked primarily within social policy, but held very similar political ideas235.  
Nevertheless, the term illustrates the existence of a collectivist tradition between Marxism and 
capitalism and distinguishes, in turn, within this tradition between the “Fabian socialists” and the so-
called “reluctant collectivists” (figures like Keynes and Beveridge)236.  Although both view public 
ownership as a means rather than as an end, the reasons behind the original analysis differ.  While 
Keynes, Beveridge and others sought to use public ownership pragmatically, for specific objectives, the 
Tawney tradition perceives its deployment as being often necessary, but always subordinate, to socialist 
objectives.  For Crosland the importance of separating the two was paramount:  
   
 “...if, for example, socialism is defined as the nationalisation of the means  
 
233 N. Ellison, op.cit. 
234 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., pp.66-67. 
235 See Chapter 1, p.27. 
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 of production, distribution and exchange, we produce conclusions which  
 are impossible to reconcile with what the early socialists had in mind when  
 they used the word: such as, that Soviet Russia is a completely socialist   
 country (much more so, for instance, than Sweden) - even though it denies  
 almost all the values which Western socialists have normally read into the  
 word.  Similarly, if socialism is defined as economic collectivism or state 
  control of economic life, then Nazi Germany would correctly have been  
 called a socialist country”237. 
 
A figure who should have been included in George and Wilding’s list is T. H. Marshall238.  He too was 
convinced that a role for the market was vital for reasons of liberty as well as efficiency:     
 
 “I am one of those who believe that it is hardly possible to maintain 
  democratic freedoms in a society which does not contain a large area  
 of economic freedom and that the incentives provided by and expressed  
 in competitive markets make a contribution to efficiency and to  
 progress in the production and distribution of wealth which cannot, in  
 a large and complex society, be derived from any other source.”239   
 
 There is little doubt that purely from the perspective of the internal battles of the Labour Party, 
Crosland gave an intellectual expression to the concerns and aspirations of many on the right of the 
party.  He did this in ways which enabled the revisionists to express how they thought the party ought to 
respond to the experience of the post-war Attlee government, while remaining firmly rooted within the 
British socialist tradition.  His willingness to confront directly the issues of public ownership and 
 
236 V. George and P. Wilding, Ideology and Social Welfare, Routledge, London, 1980. 
237 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, p. 66-67. 
238 For a recent analysis of the work of Marshall see M. Bulmer and A. M. Rees (eds.), Citizenship Today: The contemporary 
relevance of T. H. Marshall, UCL Press, London, 1996.  
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equality was welcomed not least by the [then] leader of the party, Hugh Gaitskell, in whose hands 
Crosland’s writings became an important weapon against the Bevanite left240.  John Vaizey’s memoir of 
Crosland in Encounter argues that “Gaitskell was the political embodiment of what Crosland stood 
for”241.  Indeed, Gaitskell’s statement at the 1959 Labour Conference, that “Capitalism has changed 
significantly largely as a result of our own efforts”242, accepted the Crosland thesis and demonstrated the 
influence of his ideas.  Samuel Beer would contrast “revisionists” with “fundamentalists” in his account 
of the great debate243.    
 Crosland did not in fact support wholeheartedly Gaitskell’s attempt to replace Clause IV of the 
Party Constitution in 1959, but this was at least partly because (like others since then) he thought that the 
serious risk to the unity of the party outweighed the possible benefits of rewriting its objectives.   On the 
other hand, Crosland could not deny that Gaitskell’s political revisionism was derived at least in part 
from his own emphasis on the need to move forward from economic to ethical socialism.  Partly because 
of the way in which his book came to stand for the platform of the right within the party, he was 
regarded with some distrust by the traditional left.  This was so even when his ideas were radical in their 
policy implications (his approach to education policy, for example) or when they expressed concerns 
which were shared by the left.  Indeed, Crosland could also become impatient with the right at its 
cautious approach to the pursuit of greater equality, and for this reason it is not clear where to place him 
politically within the Labour Party.  
 But, as well as providing banners around which politicians can gather or at which they can aim 
their assaults, political ideas may also give expression to complex reactions to changing social and 
 
239 A. H. Halsey, ‘T. H. Marshall and Ethical Socialism’, ibid., p.82.  
240 S. Haseler, The Gaitskellites: Revisionism in the British Labour Party, Macmillan, London, 1969. 
241 J. Vaizey, Anthony Crosland and Socialism, ‘Encounter’, August 1977, p.88. 
242 H. Gaitskell, quoted by J. Callaghan in, L. Tivey and A. Wright (eds.), Party Ideology in Britain, Routledge, London, 1989, p.36. 
243 S. Beer, Modern British Politics, op.cit., ch.VIII. 
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economic circumstances which lead to new understandings of central values.  This, or something rather 
like it, was also Crosland’s ambition.  What was new, or at least what gave his work the appearance of 
successful originality, was his attempt to reconcile the traditional socialist themes, such as equality, with 
a modern emphasis on freedom and on the emancipating effects of democracy.  Crosland’s concern in 
The Future of Socialism, one he was not able to apply in his experience in government, was to assert that 
a new, more humane practice of socialism was possible which did not rely on “total abstinence and a 
good filing-system”244 - a barb aimed not only at the totalitarian Communist regimes but also at some of 
the drier aspects of Fabian socialism and the austerity of the Attlee Government.  In this he undoubtedly 
gave expression to an important and enduring aspect of the British socialist tradition, that it should lead 
to practical, tangible improvements in the quality of life, as well as to the changes in the delivery of 
welfare which were sometimes the overwhelming concern of earlier socialists.   
 It is, however, the case that Crosland’s assumptions about the undeniability and irreversibility of 
the welfare gains of the 1950s no longer apply. The criticisms of Crosland’s work, particularly his 
predictions, are fundamental, and are well documented245.  By the mid-1970s, the Keynes-Crosland 
bubble burst into the confusion of declining growth and a failing welfare state.  In fact, the over-
optimistic nature of Crosland’s social analysis, claiming as it did that “primary poverty” had been 
“largely eliminated”, was discredited relatively soon after it was made246.  What hope was there for the 
welfare state, which socialists attached so much importance to, if it were dependent upon an economic 
prop which might give way?  It is ironic to note that Crosland can be criticized in the same way as he 
castigated Fabian socialism and Soviet communism, for relying too heavily upon an economic strategy.  
 
244 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, p.357. 
245 G. Foote provides a brief account of these criticisms in The Labour Party’s Political Thought: A History, Croom Helm, London, 
1986, pp.235-263.   
246 Perhaps the most important illustration of this ‘rediscovery’ of the poor was B. Abel-Smith and P. Townsend’s The Poor and the 
Poorest, Bell, London, 1965.  
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Furthermore, his political analysis - the argument that the existing political system could serve socialist 
ends, as demonstrated by the Attlee Government - produced a complacency about political institutions, 
and the constitution in general, that was to be increasingly challenged in the years following his death. 
 Nonetheless, many of Crosland’s concerns were to re-emerge in the 1980s.  Indeed, much of his 
analysis and many of his ideas were central to debates surrounding Labour’s political ideas.  The Labour 
Party’s shift to the left following the 1979 election defeat represented much that Crosland opposed.  An 
advocation of further nationalization in the 1983 General Election constituted for many, including those 
who would begin to turn back many of these changes at the end of the decade, an essential confusion 
between means and ends.  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: Labour and a history of ideas 
 
I have traced the political ideas of the Labour Party from its birth through to the decades following the 
Second World War.  This included the early debate between the Fabians and the ethical socialists, new 
liberalism, the significance of the first majority Labour government elected in 1945 and the impact of 
Anthony Crosland’s The Future of Socialism.  The ideas are bound together within a framework of five 
inter-connecting relationships: first, the distinction between the means and ends of British socialism; 
second, the historical divide between the revolutionary and the democratic method; third, the distinction 
between an economic-centred and an ethical-centred socialism; fourth, the interplay between the market 
and the state; and fifth, the relationship between the state and the individual.  These relationships 
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remained very much in the balance and subject to re-examination over the period. The ideas which most 
influenced economic and social policy developed to a large extent from previous arguments and 
traditions.  They were either central to an on-going debate or conceivable as “recessive themes”247. 
 There is one exception: it was already the case that the dispute between the revolutionary and 
democratic method had been decided.  As we have seen, during the inter-war years even figures like 
Attlee were countenancing the need to respond to possible establishment attempts to obstruct the reform 
programme of a Labour government248.  However, certainly after the first post-war administration, there 
was no question of Labour considering a revolutionary path.  The contention that a democratic, or 
parliamentary, socialism was a contradiction was argued powerfully; but from outside the Labour 
Party249.  Labour was keen to demonstrate its democratic credentials and, therefore, although such 
attacks were countered, they served a useful purpose.  According to Anthony Wright: “The socialist 
credentials of the social democrats might be disputed...but their democratic credentials were sound.  
They could therefore brush aside the guilt-by-association smears from the Right on this score, while the 
charge of ‘electoralism’ levelled against them from the Left could be taken as confirmation of their 
democracy sensibilities”250.  A key factor is the lack of a Marxist tradition in Britain.  As Geoffrey 
Foote has written: “British socialism had an ethic and political outlook of its own...In other countries, a 
dogmatic form of Marxism prevailed”251.  The comparison is contestable252 but not the fact of the 
 
247 R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, (second edition), op.cit., p.275.  
248 Chapter 2, p.6.  
249 The classic text in this post-war ‘Marxist’ tradition is Ralph Miliband’s Parliamentary Socialism, George Allen and Unwin, 
London, London, 1961. 
250 A. Wright, Socialisms, op.cit., p.83. 
251 G. Foote, The Labour Party’s Political Thought: A History, op.cit., p.17.  
252 In a comparative study Stefan Berger argued that, ideologically speaking, “the ‘Marxist’ [German] SPD and the ‘Labourist’ 
Labour Party were more alike than the labels would suggest”; The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 
1900-1931, op.cit., p.206.   
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marginality of a Marxist influence on the Labour Party253.  Norman Dennis and A. H. Halsey have 
identified a tradition of ‘ethical socialism’ in Britain which, they believe, rejects the “historicist view” 
that a society’s future is determined by social laws and therefore “ineluctable”254. 
 
 
 Part I provided an historical context of Labour’s political ideas.  Part II analyses the political 
ideas behind Labour’s social and economic policy between 1983 and 1992.  There is a broad issue 
concerning the relationship between economic policy and social policy.  The distinction is problematic 
for two reasons.  First, in policy terms, it is not infrequent that particular issues and favoured strategy 
bridge both areas of traditional economic and social concern.  A prime example is unemployment which 
is both a subject of economic and social policy255.  As Gavyn Davies and David Piachaud have argued, 
the “economy is indissolubly linked with social policy”256.  Second, many of the ideas discussed by 
Labour over this period are not prone to such exclusivity.  The growing discussion on the issue of child 
care, the minimum wage and the conception of ‘pathways out of poverty’ are other key examples257.  
There was recognition of this point in the Policy Review.  Its first report, which set out the broad themes 
and ideas behind the review, was entitled Social Justice and Economic Efficiency258 (discussed below).  
Nevertheless, economic policy and social policy continue to remain distinct despite any convergence, 
particularly the area of macro economic policy.  The decisions that are taken on ownership, 
 
253 This is not a comparative study, but the British Labour Party does appear to have stood apart from its West European sister 
parties in terms of a discernible Marxist influence.    
254 N. Dennis and A. H. Halsey, English Ethical Socialism, op.cit., p.5.  
255 This is demonstrated in G. Davies and D. Piachaud, ‘Social Policy and the Economy’, in H. Glennerster (ed.), The Future of 
the Welfare State: Remaking Social Policy, op.cit., esp., p.42.   
256 Ibid., p.40. 
257 Discussed in Chapter 5.  
258 Labour Party, Social Justice and Economic Efficiency, Labour Party, London, 1988.  
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employment, inflation and interest rates are influenced by many factors, one of which may be social 
policy259. 
 Each chapter will pursue two objectives: to show how ideas were re-examined and to analyse the 
ideational content of policy.  Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examine economic policy and social policy 
respectively.  Each chapter follows the same structure and is broadly divided into three sections.  The first 
will deal with historical context: the history of ideas on economic policy and social policy260.  The second 
takes the immediate context: the impact of Thatcherism.  The third, more substantive, section will analyse 
the ideas and policy on the economy and the welfare state.  This will include work by Labour intellectuals, 
thinker-politicians and official Labour Party publications.  These sections are, however, inseparable.  The 
historical context makes sense of the developments in political ideas, and the political thinking informs 
Labour’s understanding of the context in which it finds itself. 
 
 
PART TWO 
 
Labour’s Political Ideas, 1983 - 1992 
 
 
 
 
 
 
259 W. Grant and S. Nath, The Politics of Economic Policy, Blackwell, Oxford, 1984. 
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260 This will be restricted to the post- inter-war era.  There is of course an historical context which goes back much further.  
Indeed, it was the inter-war period which saw the moulding of the ideas on economic policy which would largely shape the post-
war world up to the 1970s.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Political Ideas of Labour’s  
Economic Policy 
 
 “Tawney (in common with most other socialists, including Marx) did  
 not offer a developed account of how a democratic socialist economy  
 would plausibly work...Yet this matter is now central to the  
 contemporary  democratic socialism task”. 
       - Anthony Wright (1987)261 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Towards the end of the 1980s, after three successive general election defeats, the Labour Party entered a 
period of fundamental reform.  This occurred in two ways, formally and informally.  The formal 
demonstration was in its Policy Review established following the 1987 election defeat.  It heralded the 
beginning of a process which would see the examination of all the major areas of party policy262.  More 
fundamentally, it would include a much broader re-evaluation.  At no point in its history had the Labour 
 
261 A. Wright, R. H. Tawney, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1987, pp.145-6. 
262 For an introduction to the Review, policy by policy, see M. J. Smith and J. Spear, The Changing Labour Party, op.cit.    
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Party engaged in such an explicit and self-conscious examination of the corpus of its political ideas.  For the 
first time the conceptual relationships I have discussed were raised by Labour in a way that recognises their 
centrality to the party’s political ideas.  The documents are central to our purpose here as there were 
changes of great significance.  It will be shown that the policy changes deal explicitly with political ideas 
and set Labour’s priorities within a context which views ideas as central to the party’s reconstruction.   
 Many of the most important issues for Labour, concerning ideas as well as policy, were identical to, 
or at least modern versions of, debates we have already examined.  What was different on this occasion was 
that the process263 was pioneered by the leadership.  Hugh Gaitskell, as leader of the Labour Party between 
1955 and 1963, had raised very similar questions, but was unable to achieve - even attempt to achieve - the 
intended results264.  With its powerful hold on the party, consolidated by the support it received (see below), 
the Kinnock leadership was in a position to deliver the ideas and the policies that emerged265.  Moreover, 
for the first time the party had a leadership which appeared to have a clear understanding of the relationship 
between the sets of conceptual comparisons we have been examining.  Two of these were of particular 
prominence.  First, there was a differentiation between the means and the ends of socialism.  The most 
important example was public ownership (to be discussed here), which had come to represent Labour’s 
prime objective at the beginning of the decade, as it had in the 1930s266.  Attlee’s was the only Labour 
government ever engaged in significant nationalization267, although it also formed a part of Wilson’s 
 
263 The whole issue of the policy-making process is not a subject for this study.  The best examination is Eric Shaw’s The Labour 
Party since 1979: Crisis and Transformation, op.cit.  More polemical accounts are provided by Hughes and Wintour, Labour 
Rebuilt, op.cit. (largely supportive), and Heffernan and Marqusee, Defeat from the Jaws of Victory, op.cit. (a hard left critique).   
The very important dispute and nuances of the process itself, the extent to which, for example, the Policy Review was or was not 
autonomous from the will of the leadership and its aparatchiks, are therefore not considered.  What is central to this study, and 
what remains its distinctive hallmark, is the nature of the party’s political ideas over this period. 
264 S. Haseler, The Gaitskellites: Revisionism in the Labour Party, 1951-1964, op.cit.   
265 See footnote 3 above.  
266 E. Durbin, New Jerusalems: The Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic Socialism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.  
267 A. Cairncross, Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy, 1945-1951, Methuen, London, 1985. 
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economic agenda268.  Second, and just as fundamentally, there was a growing appreciation of the need to 
redefine the relationship between the state and the market. 
 The most important Labour politicians engaged in re-thinking Labour political ideas in relation to 
economic policy were Roy Hattersley and Bryan Gould.  The fact that these thinker-politicians were both 
senior party figures adds weight to the significance of their thinking.  Hattersley was elected to the party’s 
deputy leadership in 1983 in partnership with Neil Kinnock elected leader at the same election269.  This 
signified the formation of a new alliance between the party’s right-wing, represented by Hattersley, and the 
newly formed ‘soft left’ which had only recently broken from the Bennite ‘hard left’.  After the 1987 
General Election, Bryan Gould was  regarded as both an intellectual force and a successful campaigner270.  
He co-convened the key economic Policy Review group on a ‘Productive and Competitive Economy’.   
 The informal re-examination of Labour’s ideas was just as important.  For the Policy Review 
process was not an isolated affair.  It was part of the wider intellectual community, which saw academics, 
commentators and journalists similarly engaged.  The most important example of the work of Labour 
intellectuals is the market socialists (see below) who made a critical contribution to re-thinking Labour’s 
political ideas.  Although academics and journalists were often frustrated by a seeming lack of input, there 
was collaboration on a personal level271.  Raymond Plant, perhaps the most prominent academic engaged 
with Labour’s political ideas, and also a market socialist, had many contacts with Roy Hattersley272.  The 
Shadow Cabinet minister David Blunkett collaborated with the academic Bernard Crick to produce a 
pamphlet on Labour’s political ideas in the run up to the Policy Review.  Kinnock’s allusion to Eric 
 
268 W. Beckerman (ed.), The Labour Government’s Economic Record, Duckworth, London, 1972. 
269 D. Kogan and M. Kogan, The Battle for the Labour Party, Kogan Page, London, 1983.  
270 He master-minded the 1987 campaign, regarded for its “quality and professionalism” and viewed as successful despite the 
result (E. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, op.cit., p.81).  It broke much ground in its adoption of new techniques, largely 
inspired by the United States.  It was also notable for the praise it drew from Tony Benn, quoted in C. Hughes and P. Wintour, 
Labour Rebuilt, op.cit., p.37.  
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Hobsbawn as his “favourite intellectual” personified a remarkable convergence between the Labour Party 
and the Communist Party of Great Britain.  The work of the CPGB’s organ Marxism Today was prominent 
in analysing the emerging political landscape of Thatcherism, and Labour’s role within it.  Likewise, 
analyses on psephology and the relationship between social class and the electorate appeared to have 
important implications for Labour.  The Policy Review was only one part of more broad developments 
within British socialism.  There were specific attempts to modify policy, but of more importance was the 
thinking on political ideas which lay behind them.  The examination of policy was greatly influenced by 
ideas.       
The changes in the Labour Party from 1987 are not explicable solely in terms of contemporary 
phenomena.  There is a necessary ideational elucidation which intertwines an analysis of recent political 
history.  The fact that Labour had lost three general elections in a row meant much more than simply 
attempting to redress this political disaster.  As Eric Shaw has observed, the Policy Review was not a 
standard Labour response to electoral defeat:  
 
 “Previously its leadership had supposed that electoral losses had been  
 caused largely by short-term, political - and therefore reversible -  
 factors.  Now it had to confront the prospect of relentless attrition set  
 in motion by powerful social and cultural forces - unless it took drastic  
 action”273.   
 
Now the predicament for Labour was “how to respond to cultural patterns which fit uneasily with traditional 
collectivist ideals - whether to adapt or resist”274.  The most important perhaps of these “cultural patterns” 
 
271 There will be no attempt here to theorize the relationship between ‘outsiders’ (academics, journalists) and ‘insiders’ 
(politicians and party officials). 
272 N. Ellison, Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics: Retreating Visions, op.cit., p.209. 
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was a dominant analysis in political science of fundamental socio-economic change, particularly in relation 
to class.  An analysis of partisan dealignment argued that a traditional relationship between class and 
party275 had been breaking apart from the 1970s276.   
 Various political and social phenomena were cited to illustrate a paradigmatic shift: the decline in 
numbers of the working class; the growing prosperity of the working class; the increase in owner-occupiers; 
and the decline in the influence and membership of trade unions277.  Such analysis was disparate and deeply 
contentious, but it was united by one major contention which these factors were said to indicate: that a 
resultant change in cultural values altered political allegiance to the detriment of Labour’s electoral support. 
 The argument - very much prevalent in the literature - focused on the assertion that most affected were the 
foundations of Labour’s core support because of the decline in the social and political homogeneity of the 
working class.  John Goldthorpe, David Lockwood et al argued in the 1960s that a process of 
‘embourgeoisement’ produced a decline in traditional solidarity among Labour supporters and a more 
instrumental voter outlook278.  This analysis was challenged, notably by Heath, Jowell and Curtice in How 
Britain Votes279, but the thesis left a powerful imprint on British politics and Labour thinking.  
 If such deep-seated social and cultural change had occurred, this would be reflected in voters’ 
response to Labour Party policy and economic policy in particular.  Labour, unlike the Conservatives, were 
 
273 E. Shaw, The Labour Party since 1979, op.cit., p.84. 
274 Ibid., p.224. There is a problem here, however, as “collectivist ideals” is in many respects contradictory.   Collectivism is a 
means not an end or ideal.  It is certainly a political idea but one which conceptualizes the means to an end - be it community or 
greater equality - through the mechanism of the state, public ownership being one particular example.   
275 The classic text on the link between party and class is D. Butler and D. Stokes, Political Change in Britain, Macmillan, 
London, 1974.  
276 The basis of the theory of dealignment can be found in B. Sarlvik and I. Crew, Decade of Dealignment, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1983.    
277 For a discussion of the relationship between demographic change and Labour’s support, see A. Heath et al, Understanding 
Political Change, Pergamon, Oxford, 1991.  For a more detailed examination of  changes in the trade union movement, see D. 
Marsh, The New Politics of British Trade Unionism, Macmillan, London, 1992.  
278 J. H. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt, ‘The Affluent Worker’, vol.ii, Attitudes and behaviour, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1969. 
279 A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice, How Britain Votes, Pergamon, Oxford, 1985. 
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not trusted by the electorate on economic management280.  The voters indicated a clear preference for 
Labour on education, health and the welfare state broadly281.  However, on the nebulous issue of ‘trust’ vis-
à-vis the economy, the perception of the Conservative Government as a ‘safe-pair-of-hands’ could be 
clearly contrasted with the image many voters had of Labour as representing higher taxes, higher spending 
and rising inflation282.  The economic predicament for Labour appeared to indicate the prospect of perpetual 
electoral failure.  It was one which the leadership believed required a response that matched both the 
quantitative (‘tax-and-spend’) and qualitative (trust) implications of the psephology.  To secure both turned 
out to be problematic, but for two different reasons.  The first saw Labour drop particular key policies which 
were in the 1987 General Election Manifesto283, namely commitments to extend public ownership284 and a 
reduction of its redistributionist intent285.  The second was less clear-cut, and while certainly connected to 
party policy, it entailed deeper notions concerning the symbolic politics286 of the party’s image and 
perception287.  The Labour leadership believed that the electorate’s perception of the party on economic 
policy was central to a decisive electoral deficit288. 
 The opinion poll data is not, however, clear289.  Throughout the 1980s, to the dismay of Thatcherites 
and in contradiction to those on the left who talked up what they took to be an all-pervading political 
ideology290, there was continual majority support for higher taxes and public expenditure.  The proportion, 
 
280 For a broad outline of the opinion poll data in regard to Labour’s search for ‘electability’, see D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, 
‘Labour: Seeking Electability’, in The British General Election of 1992, Macmillan, London, 1992. 
281 See Chapter 5.  
282 A. Gamble, ‘The Labour Party and economic management’, in M. J. Smith and J. Spear, op.cit., p.62. 
283 Labour Party, Britain will win, Labour Party, London, 1987.   
284 Ibid., p.6. 
285 The 1987 Manifesto showed how tax increases on the wealthiest could pay for job creation; p.5.  
286  S. McAnulla developed this concept in ‘Fade to Grey?  Symbolic Politics in the Post-Thatcher Era’, Contemporary Political 
Studies, vol.1, Political Studies Association, 1997, pp.315-324.    
287 C. Hughes and P. Wintour, Labour Rebuilt, op.cit., ch.2. 
288 The internal party analyses of the 1987 General Election failure shows that this attitude predominated; see Hughes and 
Wintour ibid., ch.1. 
289 I. Crewe, ‘Values: The Crusade that Failed’, in D. Kavanagh and A. Seldon (eds.), The Thatcher Effect, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989. 
290 This was the thesis of Marxism Today, discussed below. 
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furthermore, of those who wanted lower taxes and spending fell291.  There was thus a discrepancy of data, 
the resolution of which as far as Labour went was certainly one-sided.  The overall voter impression of 
Labour’s economic competence was seen as critical and was identified as the root cause of Labour’s 
electoral malaise.  A key reason the party appeared to ignore research which appeared to demonstrate public 
confidence in the socio-economic framework of the post-war state - progressive taxation and the welfare 
state (the structure for Tawney’s strategy of equality292) - and even its extension, was that this did not 
translate into electoral success.    
 
 
 
1. Economic policy and a history of ideas 
 
 
Adam Przeworski has written that before the party’s adoption of Keynesianism Labour did not have an 
economic policy.  Indeed, beyond “some distributional bias toward their own constituency” their thinking 
was “full of respect for the golden principles of the balanced budget, deflationary anti-crisis policies, gold 
standard, and so on”293.  Such a critique was matched at the time by socialist thinkers such as Tawney who 
damned the “exaggerated discretion” of Labour governments294.  Although accurate in its description, 
Przeworski does not explain why Labour was predisposed to Keynes’ prescriptions.  The extent of the 
impact of Keynesianism on the Labour Party is undeniable.  The role of Keynesianism in Anthony 
Crosland’s The Future of Socialism was virtually as a panacea.  It is comparable to the impact of William 
 
291 P. Wilding, ‘The Welfare State and the Conservatives’, Political Studies, September 1997, vol.45, no.4, p.725.  
292 R. H. Tawney, Equality, op.cit., ch.4. 
293 A. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, CUP, Cambridge, 1985, p.35. 
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Beveridge on Labour’s social policy (Chapter 5), and demonstrates the inter-connection of a liberalism and 
socialism based on similar political ideas (traced in Chapter 2).  As the inheritors of the ‘new liberal’ 
tradition established by Hobhouse and Hobson, Keynes and Beveridge were able to play a decisive role in 
fermenting and instigating ideas and policy that were to dominate the post-war political settlement.  There 
ideas were fused together with socialism by Crosland.   
 While in the Treasury at the time of the Coalition Government295, Keynes produced a White Paper, 
Employment Policy, which set full employment as the prime economic goal of government296.  Full 
employment was as important for social policy as it was for economic policy297.  Beveridge’s Full 
Employment in a Free Society represents a pivotal resolution of the need to secure mass prosperity while 
retaining liberal freedoms298.  The Labour Party did not simply co-opt Keynesianism.  Economic laissez-
faire was the economic expression of negative liberty, and thereby in opposition to equality.  The set of 
ideas that surrounded the Labour Party lent it, quite naturally, to search for an economic policy which was 
bound - to a greater or lesser extent - to intervene in the market.  The political ideas of the Labour Party, in 
particular equality and positive liberty, made Keynes’ thinking conducive to the kind of economic tools 
Labour could use.  Keynesianism had been central to Crosland’s future of socialism.    
 There are two further points of necessary historical context.  The first concerns the nature of the 
economics discipline itself; the second, the predicament of the economic climate. If there was a vacuum in 
Labour’s economic thinking, pre-Keynes, it should be set within the broader context of the nature of 
economics itself.  Until the Second World War, according to Peter Clarke, “no government professed to 
 
294 R. H. Tawney, Equality, op.cit., p.204. 
295 Simon Clarke has shown the impact of Keynes’ thinking within the Treasury, resulting in the “adoption of Keynesian 
budgetary principles” by 1941; Keynesianism, Monetarism and the Crisis of the State, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1988, p.246.  
296 Employment Policy, HMSO, op.cit. 
297 For a powerful assertion of the importance of full employment for both social policy and economic policy, see G. Davies and 
D. Piachaud, ‘Social Policy and the Economy’, in H. Glennerster (ed.), The Future of the Welfare State: Remaking Social Policy, 
op.cit.   
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have a macro-economic policy”299.  Although governments did assume a responsibility for the economy in 
some general sense, the idea of what we now call macro-economic policy “simply did not exist”300.  
However, the perceived need for a macro-economic policy arose out of the particular economic situation of 
the 1930s301.  The major economic and social problems of the Depression provoked a re-thinking of the role 
of the state in relation to the economy302. There was a recognition that government policies were ill-
equipped to deal with the scale of the problems that faced the country, especially mass unemployment and 
poverty303.  Keynes’ solution was not that which many others were proposing, that of planning304, but, 
rather, demand management.  As Peter Clarke has noted, the pre-eminent feature of British Keynesianism is 
“a policy aimed at the management of demand, with an increasing emphasis on consumer demand; a policy, 
moreover, to be implemented not only through fiscal means but also through credit regulation”305. 
 It is not clear, however, that the often cited tale of transposition - that having displaced free market 
liberalism, Keynesianism was itself replaced by its rival under the Conservatives in the 1980s - is a realistic 
academic depiction.  Milton Friedman has described three great waves which he claims have dominated the 
last two hundred years, the Age of Adam Smith, the Age of Keynes and, more recently, the Age of 
 
298 W. Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society, Allen and Unwin, London, 1944. 
299 P. Clarke, ‘The Keynesian Consensus and its Enemies: The Arguments over Macroeconomic Policy in Britain since the 
Second World War’, in D. Marquand and A. Seldon (eds.), The Ideas that Shaped Post-War Britain, op.cit., p.67.   
300 Ibid., pp.67-68.  Clarke traces the term ‘macro-economic’ to an article by P. De Wolff in 1941 in the Economic Journal, of 
which Keynes was the editor.  Keynes never himself used the term.  
301 E. Durbin, New Jerusalem’s: The Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic Socialism, op.cit., ch.3.  
302 Discussed in Chapter 2.  The classic account is B. Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1977. 
303 D. Winch, Economics of Policy: A Historical Survey, Fontana, London, 1972.  
304 The strange coalition that existed in favour of planning on the far right (Mosley) and far left (Strachey) did not meet with 
Keynes’ approval; see, for example, E. Durbin, New Jerusalems: The Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic Socialism, 
op.cit.  
305 However, Clarke offers a corrective to this commonly held definition by adding that “in the General Theory the concept of 
effective demand had been defined as investment plus immediately prospective consumption, consistent with Keynes’ long-
standing record of wishing to regulate investment so as to make full use of resources.  Consumer demand was thus only one side 
of Keynes’ story - and not the one which he himself chose to emphasize”, ‘Keynes and Keynesianism’, Political Quarterly, 
vol.69, no.3, pp.303-4.  
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Hayek306.  This was expressed by W. H. Greenleaf as an alternation between individualistic and collectivist 
emphases in the evolution of politics307.  This is similar to Albert Hirschman’s conception of swings back 
and forth between the public and the private sphere308.  Such conceptualization is contestable here on two 
counts.  First, it is arguable whether the economic policy of the governments that preceded Thatcher was in 
fact Keynesian309.  Second, the point has been made that the Thatcher governments, while adopting for a 
time the economics of monetarism, never totally abandoned the demand-side policies associated with 
Keynesianism.  There is, nonetheless, a valid distinction between the post-war years, when governments co-
opted Keynesian economic methods - and objectives, such as the maintenance of full employment set out in 
the 1944 White Paper - and the reversion to, at the very least, a perspective which did not share these 
methods and objectives.  There was though a very clear alternative agenda being put forward.  In his Mais 
lecture in 1984, Nigel Lawson argued that the correct role of macro-economic policy is “the conquest of 
inflation, and not the pursuit of growth and employment”310.  This represents, as Andrew Gamble observes, 
a return to the political ideas of classical liberalism, specifically negative freedom and laissez-faire.  Jim 
Tomlinson offers an historiography: 
 
 “In the middle decades of the twentieth century the rise of full  
 employment as a central concern of economic policy coincided with  
 a seemingly enhanced capacity of national governments to manage  
 their economies to achieve such a goal.  In the 1970s and 1980s the  
 political commitment to full employment eroded at the same time as  
 the constraints on national economic management tightened  
 
306 See A. Gamble, ‘Ideas and Interests in British Economic Policy’, Contemporary British History, vol.X, no.2. 
307 W. H. Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition, Volume Two: The Ideological Heritage, Methuen, London, 1983. 
308 A. O. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action, Martin Robertson, 1982. 
309 C. Pierson, ‘Social Policy’, in D. Marquand and A. Seldon (eds.), The Ideas that Shaped Post-War Britain, op.cit., p.153. 
310 N. Lawson, The View from No.11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical, Bantam, London, 1992, pp.414-15. 
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 substantially”311.      
 
 The difficulties facing the Labour governments of the 1970s312 which preceded Thatcher were 
numerous and are subject to dispute over interpretation313.  The break with Keynesianism came in two 
phases.  The first was the 1975 budget which saw a cut in public expenditure.  The second occurred one 
year later, the events surrounding the Treasury’s application for a loan to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  The key issue for a deeply divided cabinet was, according to Sassoon: “Whether or not the 
government should cut public expenditure to meet the conditions demanded by foreign leaders in order to 
placate the foreign exchange markets”314.  Opposition from within the cabinet was led by Anthony 
Crosland, as Tony Benn’s diaries make clear315, and by others including Roy Hattersley.  But it was clear 
that the economic strategy of  public expenditure and full employment, funded through a combination of 
growth, borrowing and progressive taxation, which Crosland had heralded twenty years earlier, was at an 
end.  The strategy of borrowing - a central tenet of Keynesian policy - was described as “living on borrowed 
time” by Callaghan at the 1975 Labour Party conference: 
 
 “We used to think that you could spend your way out of recession 
 and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting  
 government spending.  I tell you in all candour that option no  
 longer exists”316. 
 
 
311 J. Tomlinson, ‘Full employment and national economic management in the 1990s, Renewal, vol.1, no.2, April 1993, p.20.   
312 Harold Wilson headed the first government from March 1974 to April 1976, whereby James Callaghan resumed the 
premiership up to the General Election defeat in May 1979.    
313 For a concise account of these developments see D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the 
Twentieth Century, op.cit., pp.499-509.   
314 Ibid., p.503. 
315 T. Benn, Against the Tide: Diaries, 1973-76, Arrow Books, London, 1989, p.674. 
316 J. Callaghan, Labour Party Conference Annual Report, Labour Party, London, 1976, p.188. 
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So Keynesianism was abandoned first by Labour.  But as Donald Sassoon wrote, “when the tocsin of 
Keynesianism rang throughout Europe, it was to herald the advent of so-called monetarism, not the surge of 
a new radical economics”317.  Members of the New Cambridge School, like Nicholas Kaldor, Wynne 
Godley and Francis Cripps, who continued to argue its efficacy lost influence both in government and in the 
country to journalists like Peter Jay and Samuel Brittan318 who advocated monetarist ideas319.  Both had 
served as Keynesian economists at the Treasury in the 1960s320.  Richard Cockett’s Thinking the 
Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983 outlines the evolution of 
monetarism, stressing the impact of the Institute of Economic Affairs and its key pamphleteers, the 
economists’ Milton Friedman and Alan Walters321.  Cockett argues that monetarism’s rise to political 
supremacy was necessarily preceded by the intellectual revival of the ideas of economic liberalism322. 
 There were essentially two responses by Labour to the erosion of Keynesianism, the apparent failure 
of the Wilson and Callaghan cabinets and the advent of Thatcherism.  The first was the design of the 
Alternative Economic Strategy (AES), based broadly on an analysis of industrial democracy and a central 
role for public ownership.  Associated with the left of the party, it was formulated in the 1970s but rose to 
the fore of the party in the early 1980s.  The second is symbolised by the Policy Review at the end of the 
decade and can be seen as a rejection of the AES but, more importantly, as a much broader attempt to recast 
Labour’s economic ideas and policy.     
  The Labour administrations of the 1970s, and to a lesser degree the 1960s, were attacked on many 
fronts, and from within and without the party.  Its policies on the welfare state, so conditioned by economic 
 
317 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, op.cit., p.501. 
318 Ibid., pp.500-1.  
319 Although Peter Jay was “unusual in being one of the very few converts to monetarism who did not embrace Thatcherism or 
Conservatism, but instead tried to fit monetarism into a specifically Labour political context”; quoted in R. Cockett, Thinking the 
Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983, Harper Collins, London, 1995, pp.185-6.  
320 Ibid., p.185.   
321 Ibid., ch.4.  
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requisites, and a failure to reduce inequalities brought much criticism (Chapter 5).  Barbara Castle’s 1969 
White Paper, In Place of Strife, aimed to create a structure for industrial relations based on centralized  trade 
unions.  The proposals to require unions to hold a ballot on official strikes which were deemed contrary to 
the public interest or the economy, and to give government the power to impose a solution on inter-union 
disputes over  recognition, were opposed by many union leaders and Labour MPs, and subsequently 
defeated in the House of Commons323.  For some on the left, the critique was based on a failure to continue 
along the road of public ownership324.  The core of Labour’s economic policy at both the February and 
October general elections325 was an industrial strategy.  In particular, the manifestos proposed the creation 
of a state holding company, the National Enterprise Board.  In government, the NEB was assigned the 
power to extend public ownership into profit-making sectors of the economy326.  However, the most radical 
document was Labour’s Programme of 1973.  Its commitment to nationalize the top twenty-five companies, 
bringing them under NEB control, was omitted from the manifestos of the following year327.  Tony Benn’s 
Arguments for Socialism is representative of many on the left’s verdict on the non-event of a real extension 
of public ownership328.  There was real debate over the role of the National Enterprise Board, the extent for 
instance to which it should seek bi-partisan agreement between government and companies329, but with 
Britain entering a period of severe economic crisis, an agenda of public ownership was viewed by most 
Cabinet ministers as patently unfeasible330.   
 
322 Ibid., p.2. 
323 For a detailed account of these events, see L. Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party, 
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1991, p.114-17.  
324 The most influential work pursuing this argument was S. Holland, The Socialist Challenge, Quartet Books, London, 1975, esp. 
pp.211-220. 
325 Labour Party, Let Us Work Together, the Labour Party, London, February and October, 1974.   
326 Labour Party, Let Us Work Together, the Labour Party, London, February 1974, pp.10-11. 
327 M. Hatfield, The House the Left Built, Gollancz, London, 1978, ch.8. 
328 T. Benn, Arguments for Socialism, Jonathan Cape, London, 1979, ch.2.  
329 N. Ellison, Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics: Retreating Visions, op.cit., pp.168-9. 
330 Ibid., p.169. 
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 Following the 1979 election defeat the left came to dominate the party, in constituencies and the 
NEC331, although not in the major trade unions332.  The left, led by Tony Benn, advocated the Alternative 
Economic Strategy devised by Stuart Holland333.  Extensive central planning and ownership were 
fundamental.  The state should “ensure direct control of the strategic decision making in a range of leading 
companies” and, wrote Holland, “coordinate the planned expansion of such firms to fulfil new economic 
and social objectives”334.  For Nicholas Ellison, in his study of the relationship between ideas and Labour 
politics, it represented the “re-emergence of the technocratic left”335.  Yet it was a strategy that could only 
have been born out of the era in which it was framed.  It was a response to the problems facing Labour in 
power based on an analysis of political economy.  It set demands for greater industrial democracy alongside 
“an early faith in state-directed technology”336.  Its underpinning, as Ellison correctly writes, is a “class 
analysis which would have been foreign to Tawney or Titmuss - if rather less to Cole”337.  There is another 
reason why the AES should be understood in the context of its age.  Its analysis of economic policy in 
relation to Britain’s place in the world was an early response to a new phenomenon - or, at least, an old 
phenomenon now described as globalization338.  Tony Benn in 1970 described the multinational firm as an 
“entirely new type of economic organism” and “a new source of economic power no longer anchored to the 
geography of the nation state”339.  The solution, a strategy based on import controls and other restrictions, 
was raised but defeated in the Labour Cabinet in July 1976340.  It was, as Leonard Tivey has argued, “highly 
 
331 P. Seyd, The Rise and Fall of the Labour Left, Macmillan, London, 1987, ch.7. 
332 L. Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party, op.cit., p.407.  
333 S. Holland, The Socialist Challenge, op.cit.  
334 Ibid., p.159. 
335 N. Ellison, Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics: Retreating Visions, op.cit., p.152. 
336 Ibid., p.155. 
337 Ibid., p.155. 
338 Discussed below. 
339 T. Benn, Office Without Power: Diaries 1968-72, Arrow Books, London, 1989, p.507.   
340 For an objective account of the events following the publication of the AES, see N. Ellison, Egalitarian Thought and Labour 
Politics: Retreating Visions, op.cit., pp.156-187.  
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nationalist in implication” but more significantly it illustrated “the non-viability of any domestically 
centered economic policy”341.   
 
 The Labour left fractured in the early 1980s.  Different reasons are cited for the split which saw the 
formation of ‘soft left’ and ‘hard left’ groupings342.  These concern the type of response Labour should have 
offered to defeat Thatcherism343, the nature of Tony Benn’s quasi-official leadership of the left344 and the 
extent to which the party should have tolerated entryist organizations345.  More important was the analysis 
of the soft left - who had forged the divide - over fundamental questions of economic ideas and policy.  The 
formal break in 1981 is indicative of why Labour was to engage in an official examination of its policy, and 
economic policy in particular.  Key figures on the left led by Neil Kinnock publicly declined to vote for 
Benn, by abstaining in a deputy leadership contest resulting in victory for Dennis Healey, the former 
Chancellor346.  The soft left under the leadership of Kinnock formed a compact with the right of the party 
which saw it wrestle control of the party away from the hard left, and move decisively away from the AES.  
There were various reasons for this, but not least among them were the impact of Thatcherism and an 
analysis of fundamental economic, social and cultural change which had critical implications for the Labour 
Party. 
 
 
341 L. Tivey, ‘Economic and Industrial Policy’, in L. Tivey and A. Wright, Party Ideology in Britain, op.cit., p.145.  
342 A concise account of this episode can be found in, D. Kogan and M. Kogan, The Battle for the Labour Party, Kogan Page, 
London, 1983.  
343 Discussed below.  
344 P. Seyd, The Rise and Fall of the Labour Left, op.cit. 
345 The Trotskyite organization, Militant, had began a strategy of infiltration, or entryism, into the Labour Party in the early 1970s 
(although the history of similar attempts begins from the time of the party’s formation).  It was a striking ambition of the Kinnock 
leadership, supported by the soft left, to expel its members from the party (the story is told in M. Crick, The March of Militant, 
Faber and Faber, London, 1986). This was viewed by the hard left as undemocratic, as part of a wider attack on the left and a 
threat to the vibrancy of local constituency parties.  See R. Heffernan and M. Marqusee, Defeat from the Jaws of Victory: Inside 
Kinnock’s Labour Party, op.cit., ch.10.    
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2. Thatcherism and the economy 
 
 
Much of this debate took place in circles formally outside the Labour Party, notably in the publication 
Marxism Today347.  It is not a straightforward task to state which publications are linked to the Labour Party 
or exist within the same broad political parameters.  The  Fabian Society has an historical relationship with 
the labour movement, pre-dating the party itself.  It is a component part of Labour’s federal constitution and 
a key arena for the expression of the party’s political ideas.  The New Statesman, established by the Webbs, 
has played an equivalent role in the contribution to debate over Labour’s policies and ideas.  Its writing is 
marked by broader social and political concerns and it is not formally connected to the Labour Party.  But 
its editorial allegiance is with Labour, whom it endeavours to influence.  In contrast, Marxism Today was 
associated with a number of Marxist intellectuals.  Its roots are in the ‘Eurocommunist’ Communist Party of 
Great Britain.  But it proved to be the most influential.   
 The magazine’s editor, Martin Jacques, and Stuart Hall pioneered the analysis of Thatcherism.  Hall 
observed the radicalism of Thatcher’s “commitment to break the mould and not simply to rework the 
elements of the prevailing ‘philosophies’”348.  The success of Thatcherism as a political project, as claimed 
by Marxism Today, was its ability to “outflank Labour and appeal directly to working class support”, 
 
346 For a detailed account of the manoeuvring behind the 1981 deputy leadership contest see R. Harris, The Making of Neil 
Kinnock, Faber and Faber, London, 1984, ch.15. 
347 Marxism Today was published for fourteen years between 1978 and 1992; for an ‘autobiography’ from the editor’s chair see 
M. Jacques’ article in the final issue, ‘The Last Word’, Marxism Today, December 1991-January 1992, pp.28-9.  
348 S. Hall, ‘The Great Moving Right Show’, in S. Hall and M. Jacques, The Politics of Thatcherism, Lawrence and 
Wishart/Marxism Today, London, 1983, p.25. 
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undermining the party’s traditional electoral base349.  Thatcherism’s appeal was ideological: by combining 
“the aggressive themes of a revived neo-liberalism - self-interest, competitive individualism, and anti-
statism” with conservatism’s appeal to “nation, family, duty, authority, standards and traditionalism”350.  
Hall and Andrew Gamble, another key contributor, contend that Thatcherism signified the welding of two 
ideological strands which, axiomatically, are viewed as distinct.  Thus, classical liberalism and conservatism 
came together in the form of the ‘free economy and the strong state’351.  There are tensions between the 
two, Gamble argued in 1984, yet “it is precisely what makes Thatcherism an indispensable construct
analysing recent British politics that so far they have been successfully reconciled through the political 
strategy and practice of the present Conservative leadership”352. 
 The work of many of these intellectuals culminated in the publication of New Times353, which 
sought to unite many of the arguments which were first published in Marxism Today between 1985 and 
1989.  The central theme of this work is that both society and political economy had undergone dramati
change.  Capitalist societies “are increasingly characterised by diversity, differentiation and fragmentation”
wrote Hall and Jacques, “rather than homogeneity, standardisation and the economies and organisations of 
scale which characterised modern mass society”354.  This thinking owed much to Andre Gorz’s Farewell to
the Working class, published in 1982, which sought to demonstrate how changes in the labour market ha
weakened the power of skilled, industrial workers. For Perry Anderson, not only had working class 
identification declined, work itself had been “feminized”355.  The degree of social change in the labour 
market through the 1980s was extensive.  This particularly concerned the numbers of women in part-time 
 
349 Ibid., p.27. 
350 Ibid., p.29. 
351 A. Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State, Macmillan, London, 1988.  
352 A. Gamble, ‘The lady’s not for turning: Thatcherism mark III’, Marxism Today, June 1984.  
353 S. Hall and M Jacques, New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1989. 
354 Ibid., p.11. 
355 P. Anderson, English Questions, Verso, London, 1992, p.324. 
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work and the rise of the dual-worker family.  Again, in terms of policy areas, this trend illustrates a cross-
over between economic and social policy.  The change in composition of the labour market and the role of 
women had vital implications not only for work patterns, but for child care policy and social security (see 
Chapter 5). 
 What these developments represent to Hall and Jacques is no less than a transformation of capitalism 
itself, from ‘fordism’ to ‘post-fordism’.  The implication was plain for left and right.  The left, it was 
argued, had failed to comprehend the significance of the change and was still wedded to the past.  This 
produced a political vacuum filled by a radical free market project which rested easily with such a 
transformation.  The writing of Marxism Today accepted the conventional electoral analyses about social 
class356 and its implications for the Labour Party.  The conception, however, of post-fordism was a 
generalisation of which Labour was a part.  David Marquand put the implication of these changes for 
Labour most brutally: “Labour’s prison is almost palpable.  In ideology and interest it is the child of 
‘Fordist’ mass production, shot through and through with the assumptions, myths and values of the 
industrial order which is breaking up before our eyes”357.    
 For many on the left of course, Marxism Today came close to ideological blasphemy358.  In a cutting 
critique of the New Times project, Gregory Elliott notes: “Lenin had envisaged the possibility of 
communists without a party.  He had not conceived of the CP’s invention: a Party without Communists”359. 
 The basis of the critique was that the cited hegemoic power of Thatcherism was not countered but accepted 
and, thereby, legitimized; Marxism Today was “mesmerized” by Thatcherism360.  Heffernan and Marqusee 
 
356 Discussed above, pp.94-5.   
357 D. Marquand, ‘Spot the Radical’, Marxism Today, July 1988. 
358 A number of articles in New Left Review accused the writers of moving towards economic liberalism.  It is described by Ralph 
Miliband, in the title of an article, as ‘The New Revisionism’, New Left Review, no.150, March-April 1985.  See also B. Jessop, 
‘Farewell to Thatcherism?  Neo-liberalism and “New Times”’, New Left Review, no.179, January-February 1990.  
359 G. Elliott, Labour and the English Genius, Verso, London, 1993, p.149. 
360 Ibid., p.149. 
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argued that despite the opinion poll evidence to the contrary, the magazine agreed that “working people had 
succumbed to Tory ideology”361.  This amounts to a realignment between the Communist Party and the soft 
left: 
 
 “In a display of crude economism, the leadership and its apologists  
 on the ‘soft left’ accepted that the Lawson economic boom was a  
 permanent feature and that the ‘success’ of the Thatcher government  
 had enabled the Prime Minister to implant her values within a  
 significant section of the working class.  These values could not  
 therefore be contested by the labour movement”362.   
  
The work of the key protagonists of the Marxism Today analysis came from the Communist Party but ended 
up not too far away from Kinnock’s Labour Party.  However, if the inception was different, the perception 
of Hall, Jacques and others, on social, economic and political change, is broadly comparable.  There was a 
shared critique both of Thatcherism and former Labour governments.  In this sense, the publication played 
its own role in the history of revisionism.  In the final ever issue of Marxism Today, Bryan Gould played 
tribute to its insistence that “the Left always need to keep an open mind and be prepared to grapple with 
changed circumstances”363.  Towards the end of its 14 year life, the editor of Marxism Today, Martin 
Jacques, announced that the Communist Party of Great Britain made “much of the intellectual running for 
Labour’s Kinnockite revolution”364.  In this, it had been the “ideological protagonist against the hard left” 
 
361 R. Heffernan and M. Marqusee, Defeat from the Jaws of Victory, op.cit., p.63. 
362 Ibid., p.95. 
363 B. Gould, ‘What Marxism Today has Meant to Me’, Marxism Today, December 1991-January 1992. 
364 M. Jacques, The Times, 13 September 1990. 
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and “acted like the Labour revisionists of the fifties”365.  Certainly, critics of both institutions have noted the 
convergence. 
 
 
 
3.  Political ideas and economic policy 
 
 
The central issue for Labour in the 1980s, in terms of political ideas and policy, concerned the balance 
between the state and the market.  The period can be viewed, in terms of the development of political ideas, 
as representing the democratic socialist appropriation of the market.  This entailed an attempt to bridge the 
traditional polarisation between the public and private sectors.  However, it is not correct to argue, with 
Colin Hay, that at some point in the late 1980s Labour accommodated itself to the market366.  Since the 
Second World War, discounting the AES challenge, Labour have accepted the framework of the ‘mixed 
economy’; that is, an economy with both public and private provision.  Indeed, the national wealth produced 
from the market economy would provide the basis of social welfare367.  The acceptance of the mixed 
economy is held, for instance by Dennis Kavanagh368, as one of the central tenets of the post-war years, 
even if this cannot be described as consensus369.  What was new about the party’s thinking in the 1980s was 
the attempt to define what was meant by the state and the market: what were the parameters of each?  This 
took the form of two imperatives, intellectual and political, although the two are not wholly separable.  The 
 
365 Ibid. 
366  C. Hay, ‘Labour’s Thatcherite Revisionism: Playing the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’, pp.700-7. 
367 S. Padgett and W. E. Patterson, Social Democracy in Postwar Europe, Longman, London, 1991, p.24.   
368 D. Kavanagh and P. Morris, Consensus Politics form Attlee to Thatcher, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989. 
369 N. Deakin, The Politics of Welfare: Continuities and Change, op.cit., ch.2. 
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political necessity originates from an intellectual concern that Thatcherism appropriated the idea of 
freedom, with huge political resonance, and that Labour needed to re-engage with political ideas in order to 
affirm, or re-affirm, freedom as a socialist idea.  Anthony Wright claims that the central question for 
contemporary socialism is how to have a more equal society in which freedoms are retained370.  As we have 
seen this question resonated throughout the century; now it was to be tackled head-on.    
 In the 1980s the market was central to this equation.  Labour politicians, including the more 
intellectual figures like Bryan Gould, Roy Hattersley and Giles Radice, ventilated what they understood to 
be the value and utility of certain aspects of the market.  In 1989, Gould wrote that the question for Labour 
was no longer whether or not to embrace the market, but how to use it371.  It was not seen as convincing to 
allude to the market as a tolerable, but subordinate, arena.  If Labour could be more confident about where 
the market was efficient and morally justified, then the arguments about where the market’s operations 
should cease, and that the state’s hand would be fairer, would be more convincing and coherent.  The work 
of Bryan Gould was particularly important: 
 
 “Any consideration of the market as an instrument of socialist  
 policy must begin with the recognition that it is likely to be in many  
 areas a more efficient and acceptable allocator and distributor of  
 scarce resources, and a more sensitive means of meeting consumer  
 preferences, than any system of planning could conceivably be”372. 
 
It is argued that a polarisation between the market and the state is ill founded: a transpositional agenda is a 
false one.  Gould argued that to present the state and the market as two irreconcilable and distinct entities 
 
370 A. Wright, Socialisms, op.cit., p.133. 
371 B. Gould, A Future for Socialism, Jonathan Cape, London, 1989, p.95.  
372 Ibid., p.95. 
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was false.  In the first place he argued that they could never exist as alternatives in the first place: “The 
invitation we are sometimes offered, to debate the question of whether socialists in Britain should accept or 
reject the market concept in its entirety, is...a ludicrous piece of self-delusion.  By pretending to ourselves 
that there is a real option - of doing without the market altogether, we engage in a debate that has no 
meaning anywhere else in the world”373.  Rather:  
  
 “We should do much better to acknowledge that the question  
 for us, as for virtually every other society and economy, is not  
 whether or not the market, but where, how, and for what  
 purposes?  What tasks can the market perform better than other  
 social and economic mechanisms?  Where are markets  
 inappropriate and better replaced - and by what?  When and  
 how should they be monitored and regulated?  These are the  
 real questions - the questions that matter to socialists and that  
 have to be answered in modern politics”374. 
 
 All of this led to a more theoretical attempt to place the market within socialism.  A number of  
political thinkers collaborated, adopting the notion of market socialism to describe their project.  The 
‘market socialists’ were thinkers associated with the Labour Party (as political parties are always 
surrounded by political thinkers - academics, journalists and intellectuals - of greater and lesser influence).  
They rose from the ‘Socialist Philosophy Group’ of the Fabian Society which was set up following the 1983 
General Election.  Their discussions resulted in collaboration in a work which featured chapters by all key 
participants.  Primarily, these were: Raymond Plant, David Miller, Julian Le Grand, Saul Estrin and David 
Winter.  The text was published to controversy and acclaim in 1989, right in the middle of the Labour 
 
373 Ibid., pp.94-95. 
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Party’s Policy Review period375.  It was the nearest social democracy came to a school of thought in the 
1980s.     
 Market socialism was based on two imperatives: the paucity of thinking within socialism on the 
market and the apparent success of Thatcherism.  Further, it was noted that the two were not unrelated.  As 
such, it was conducted as an explicit exercise in political ideas because it involved a critical analysis of the 
traditional socialist values of liberty and equality, and their relationship to the balance between the state and 
the market.   The two were connected because it was held that the historical displacement of the market 
from socialist thinking was deeply problematic and posed fundamental problems for Labour in office. 
 
 
 
Market socialism 
 
 
The market socialists sought to transcend the state and the market.  The central values of liberty and 
equality are re-evaluated within this context.  They argued that to speak of either wholly public - always 
defined as state - services or the private sector is problematic and unhelpful.  Nicholas Ellison has defined 
the term market socialism as: “a variety of possible forms of political and economic organization where 
social or cooperative systems of ownership are integrated with the market, suitably reformed and 
‘democratized’, as the most efficient system of allocation”376.  Hattersley, though he does not use the term 
 
374 Ibid., p.95. 
375 J. Le Grand and S. Estrin (eds.), Market Socialism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.   
376 N. Ellison, Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics: Retreating Visions, op.cit., p.277. 
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market socialism, advocated the expansion of consumer and worker cooperatives, including public 
investment of private initiatives, as a means of social ownership377. 
 On one level, and most acutely in relation to the history of political ideas, this would appear, at the 
least, highly contentious and, at the most, highly confused.  This is because the market and the socialist 
values of liberty, equality and community are widely thought to be at different ends of an ideational 
continuum.  Socialism’s very conception can be portrayed as a reaction against the perceived ethical 
injustices and economic inadequacies of the market.  Both these critiques came from different socialist 
traditions; one from ethical socialism, the other from Fabianism378.  Fabianism, the dominant form of 
socialism in Britain, was very much a product of the Enlightenment, destined to reform or even replace an 
‘unplanned’ and ‘disorganized’ market economy, representing a victory for rational thought over such 
irrationalities as the market379.  The ‘ethical’ tradition, personified by the writing of William Morris, but 
originating from the pre-Marx ‘utopian’ writing in France, argued against a process of industrialization 
whose own ethic, based on greed and competition, debased human relations380.  The market socialists did 
not disagree with either of these traditions, but they sought to demonstrate that the market and capitalism 
were two different entities.   
 The “decoupling” of the market and capitalism was central to a work by Julian Le Grand and Saul 
Estrin, Market Socialism381.  The analysis presented is the familiar one about means and ends, and the 
importance of rigorously maintaining this contradistinction, examined earlier.  But it is taken further in 
order to enable a socialist understanding of the market.  Alec Nove’s The Economics of Feasible Socialism 
 
377 R. Hattersley, Economic Priorities for a Labour Government, Macmillan, London, 1987, pp.162-3.  
378 Chapter 2. 
379 A. Wright, Socialisms, op.cit., pp.24-5.  
380 B. Crick, Socialism, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1987, ch.3.   
381 J. Le Grand and S. Estrin (eds.), Market Socialism, op.cit. 
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tried to attach markets with socialism as a means of attaining economic efficiency382.  Le Grand and Estrin 
ascribe to Crosland’s revisionist argument that public ownership is a means but not a socialist end.  It is 
asserted that markets may or may not be a means for capitalist ends, that the mechanism of the market can 
be co-opted for socialist ends.  This argument is novel and deeply contentious: 
 
 “There is nothing intrinsic in planning that implies equality or in  
 nationalization that eliminates exploitation.  Nor, by extension, is  
 there anything intrinsic in markets that prevents them from being  
 used to achieve those ends”383. 
 
This is similar to the kind of analysis which was coming from inside the Labour Party.  Bryan Gould, for 
instance, points out that the market may entail a “decentralization of economic power” in contrast to the 
centrally planned economy384.  Such decentralization encourages the possibility of innovation.  The subtle 
but crucial difference with this analysis and that of the advocates of the free market is that this is a matter of 
potential and cannot be presumed385; that is to say that the market economy may create opportunity, 
freedom and innovation, but this is not inevitable.  Again, a distinction is being made between the market 
and capitalism. 
 For Raymond Plant, what is critical about the relationship between the market and socialism is that 
the market is seen as a procedural mechanism and socialism is defined in terms of particular end states386.  
Chapter 3 examined how socialist thinking is often dominated by the debate about socialist means and 
 
382 A. Nove, The Economics of Feasible Socialism, Allen and Unwin, London, 1983.  
383 J. Le Grand and S. Estrin (eds.), Market Socialism, op.cit., p.2. 
384 B. Gould, A Future for Socialism, op.cit., p.96. 
385 Ibid. 
386 R. Plant, ‘Socialism, Markets and End States’, in J. Le Grand and S. Estrin (ed.), Market Socialism, op.cit., pp.50-53. 
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socialist ends, and the contention that the former, mistakenly, has been taken more seriously than the latter, 
even confused with the latter.  Market theorists argue that the market is neutral and therefore its results, 
unintended and non-arbitrary, are neutral.  That this is regarded as fair is precisely because it does not 
envisage an end state.  As Plant reminds us, Hayek deployed the term “fatal conceit” to describe the attempt 
to coalesce the market with various such end states, be it social justice or equality387.   
 For Jim Tomlinson, market socialism added little more than a “socialist gloss” to the ideas of 
Hayek388.  The observation that appears to follow from this point is that market socialism is the 
contemporary incarnation of the ‘mixed economy’ or ‘welfare capitalism’.  At the level of structure it is 
hard to dispute the comparison.  Market socialists do advocate a mixed system, although not just a 
combination of public and private ownership, but a more sophisticated variety of forms of social ownership. 
 Likewise ‘welfare capitalism’, a term employed by post-war Marxists, appears to be comparable in its 
assessment.  The welfare state, wrote Ian Gough, is a “constituent feature of modern capitalist societies”389. 
 Market socialists would not disagree.  To Rodney Barker this may be a source of strength: “by taking 
seriously some of the arguments of the New Right, Raymond Plant was able to place on new foundations 
the case for equality which earlier socialists had placed on an ethical base”390.  Plant deploys the economic 
liberal argument that there is no criteria by which goods can be distributed to show that “no individual 
merits more or less in the distribution of those basic resources which are necessary to enter the market on a 
fair basis and thus those resources should be distributed as equally as possible”391. 
 On one level, this analysis grew out of a disillusionment with a traditional statist socialism: “in its 
most radical form market socialism will go a long way towards accepting the neo-liberal critique of 
 
387 Ibid., p.53. 
388 J. Tomlinson, in B. Hindness (ed.), Reactions to the Right, Routledge, London, 1990, p.45. 
389 I. Gough, The Political Economy of the Welfare State, Macmillan, London, 1979, p.3. 
390 R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain: In and After the Twentieth Century, second edition, op.cit. p.268.  
391 R. Plant, ‘Socialism, Markets and End States’, op.cit., p.67.   
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traditional socialism, based as it is upon end states and a conception of the good”392.  On another level, the 
basis of the market socialist case is a critique of the free market.  David Miller disputes the New Right 
argument that the free market can be compared with a democratic voting system, that “the market is a kind 
of permanent plebiscite in which the consumer registers a vote each time he or she purchases one item 
rather than another” 393.  Miller counters that preferences in a voting system have equal weight, whereas in 
the market they depend upon peoples’ talents and abilities, as well as their resources.  In turn, these can be 
divided and distinguished between factors which are natural in that the individual bears no responsibility 
for their making, such as genetic endowment and fortunate home background: “On the market socialist view 
these should be compensated for so as to enable people to enter the market on the fairest possible terms”394. 
 There is a deep historical echo when Plant argues that “in order to realize what is valuable about liberty, we 
have to be able to pursue values of our own, and to do this we have to have abilities, resources, and 
opportunities”395.   
 
 Thus it may be argued that the market socialists are the inheritors of the new liberal tradition as 
much as any socialist one.  The conception of positive liberty is central to both.  The cross-over between the 
ideas of the new liberals and the ethical socialists was examined in Chapter 2.  From such a perspective, it 
can be seen how it is then possible for the market socialists to argue in favour of the redistribution of 
resources.  This is because Plant, like Miller, tackles the argument that markets are not unfair or coercive 
because their outcomes are not intended396.  He equates responsibility with foreseeability.  Thus, even 
though a particular outcome may not be intended, if the result of one’s actions can be anticipated then the 
 
392 Ibid., p.63.  
393 D. Miller, ‘Why Markets?’, in J. Le Grand and S. Estrin, (eds.), Market Socialism, op.cit., p.35 
394 Ibid., p.64. 
395 R. Plant, ‘Socialism, Markets and End States’, op.cit., p.65. 
396 Ibid., p.65-68.  
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actor is responsible for them.  Plant then applies this argument to the market.  If it is foreseeable that the 
operation of a free market will entail poverty, and it is known that some alternative exists (such as 
redistribution), then it is “difficult to evade responsibility for this outcome even if it was not part of any 
individual’s intention”397.  Plant’s faith in the market, however, is retained because his positive conception 
of liberty is still a starting-gate theory, not an end-gate one.  It endeavours to create fair starting points prior 
to participation in the market.  The historical roots of this analysis are in the conception ‘equality of 
opportunity’.  This is a notion which for socialists has always been cast in a less radical light to equality of 
outcome398, but whose radical implications - particularly in education - were elucidated by Crosland399.  It 
is quite clear in the work of the market socialists, particularly Plant, that equality of opportunity is precisel
what is being advocated. 
 However, a fundamental question must now be asked.  Does there remain a contradiction between 
the advocation of an improved market economy and a greater starting-gate equality?  The dilemma of social 
democracy, according to Tim Tilton, has always been “how to abolish the negative effects of the capitalist 
system without, at the same time, injuring the laws and mechanisms of the system itself”400.  Plant 
recognises this dilemma explicitly401.  He states that he is not dismissing end-state principles altogether, 
because the initial redistribution will involve very traditional assessments of “need, effective liberty, and 
social justice”.  He cites an earlier article by Miller and Estrin in which they make this very point: 
 
 “It is quite feasible to think of a division of social resources between  
 those earmarked to satisfy needs and those serving to reward merit,  
 
397 Ibid., p.66. 
398 B. Crick, Socialism, op.cit., pp.88-98.  
399 See Chapter 3.  
400 T. Tilton, The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through Welfare State to Socialism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1990, p.234. 
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 and to provide the incentives necessary to make a market sector  
 function effectively”402.  
 
 
 
4.  The Policy Review: market failure and market socialism? 
 
 
There was significant congruity between the thinking of the market socialists and key Labour figures.  
Although market socialism was the explicit agenda of self-professed advocates, the ideas of many within the 
Labour Party were very similar.  They shared the same analysis of the primacy of asserting the values of 
socialism and the importance of asserting the significance and role of the market.  It has been observed that 
Hattersley’s ideas “owed much to discussions with Raymond Plant and others who were attempting to 
rethink socialist attitudes to liberty and markets”403.  The extent to which Labour  intellectuals influenced 
Labour Party policy demands an examination of the Policy Review.    
The Policy Review was structured as seven Policy Review Groups, three of which in broad terms 
concerned economic policy: A Productive and Competitive Economy, People at Work and Economic 
Equality404.  Their reports were published in the document, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change405.  Their 
proceedings were marked by internal disputes as much as rigorous policy appraisal406.  But there is no doubt 
that their work represents a key development in Labour history.  It is clear that, fundamentally, the market 
 
402 D. Miller and S. Estrin, ‘Market socialism: a policy for socialists’, in I. Forbes, Market Socialism: Whose Choice?, Fabian 
Pamphlet no.516, Fabian Society, London, 1987, pp.3-12.   
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socialist case was very much in tune with the thinking behind Labour’s policy revision.  It is this interaction 
that demonstrates how, by the end of the Policy Review, Labour could advocate the actual improvement of 
the market in some areas.  The Review concluded: “The single most important requirement of economic 
policy is to make Britain internationally competitive”407.   
 This is revisionism writ large.  Donald Sassoon’s monumental One Hundred Years of Socialism408 
demonstrates how it is possible for a party of the left to criticise the right for failing to manage the capitalist 
economy properly.  Such an analysis was indeed central to the Policy Review documents, reaching its 
fruition in Looking to the Future which followed in 1990409.  The ‘market failure’ critique was based on an 
analysis of three successive Conservative governments’ economic policy.  They are attacked especially on 
the economy’s supply-side; for their record of under-investment in education and training and 
technology410, and on the level of exports and industrial investment411.  A multitude of league tables 
involving Britain’s major competitors were employed to illustrate gross economic failure412.    
 The Labour Party has often played the role of the party of economic modernization.  A similar 
analysis and response was offered by Harold Wilson in the 1960s413.  In an era of  a comparable political 
predicament (a period of three consecutive Conservative administrations), Labour produced a similar 
critique of economic decay and stagnation, and the alternative prescription of economic renewal forged 
through the “white heat of the technological revolution”414.  Like the Policy Review, Signposts for the 
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407 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, op.cit., p.9. 
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1960s  aimed to narrow the gap between Britain’s economic performance and that of its competitors415.  It 
also described the importance of collaboration between the state and the private sector416.  Sassoon explains 
this within the European context in which his book is pitched.  For him the evocation of the term 
modernization delineates the direction of revisionism, referring to the priority of  “the modernization of the 
country itself”417, as well as the revision of ideas.  This explains why socialists should advocate market 
socialism at the same time as offering an analysis of market failure. 
 A discussion of the relationship between the state and the market necessitates a discussion of one of 
Labour’s more significant policy shifts: its commitment to the European Community (EC)418.  This is 
directly linked to economic policy because the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which Labour supported, singled out 
inflation, and not unemployment, as the main enemy.  The party’s commitment to withdraw from the EC in 
the 1983 General Election419 was not mentioned in the 1987 manifesto420.  In 1988 Kinnock spoke of the 
need for a “social Europe” and described the argument for withdrawal as “politically romantic and 
economically self-defeating”421.  The EC was now viewed as vital to a modernized economy.  It also 
represented an understanding that Britain should now be correctly termed a medium-sized power422.  It was 
argued that in order to compete with the United States and Japan, Europe must combine its industrial 
strength423.  In Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, Labour contrasted the Government’s policy of 
creating a single market geared towards multinationals but with “no government intervention at either 
 
415 Labour Party, Signposts for the 1960s, Labour Party, London, 1961.   
416 Ibid. 
417 Ibid., p.736.  
418 S. George and B. Rosamond, ‘The European Community’, in M. J. Smith and J. Spear, The Changing Labour Party, op.cit.  
419 Labour Party, The New Hope for Britain, General Election manifesto, London, 1983, p.33.  
420 There remained hostility to the EEC: “We shall, like other member countries, reject EEC interference with our policy for 
national recovery and renewal”.  Yet there was clear movement as well, as the following demonstrates: “Labour’s aim is to work 
constructively with our EEC partners to promote economic expansion and combat unemployment”; The Labour Party, Britain 
Will Win, General Election manifesto, London, 1987, p.15. 
421 N. Kinnock, in preface to D. Martin, ‘Bringing Common Sense to the Common Market’, Fabian Society, London, 1988, 
no.525. 
422 G. Radice, Path to Power: The New Revisionism, Macmillan, London, 1989, pp.188-9. 
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national or European level to ensure that the market works fairly and efficiently.  We, on the other hand, 
recognise that intervention is necessary.  Without European co-operation between both governments and 
trade unions, we shall be at the mercy of multinationals intent on social dumping and playing one country 
off against another”424.  Finally, by 1989, Labour fully supported membership of the EU at the European 
elections; and not just the social dimension, but more significantly monetary union425.  In Looking to the 
Future, published one year later, Labour pledged itself to join the Social Charter and the exchange rate 
mechanism426.  Martin Smith summarised these changes and concluded that they have transformed Labour 
into a European party of social democracy427. 
 This is another reason why an analysis of the state and the market must include Europe, because the 
social democratic conception of Europe428 perceives Europe as a counter-weight to globalization429.  In 
trying to understand globalization, one analysis suggests: “Although the privatisation of state institutions, 
the ‘internationalisation’ of capital and the creation of the EU pose a problem for state ‘intervention’ 
formulated on the basis of Keynesian economic policy, these developments do not alter the indispensability 
of a state apparatus in the management of labour power and money”430.  However, most of the debate 
solidifies around one of either political-economic construct: nation-state autonomy or globalization.  For 
 
423 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, op.cit., p.14. 
424 Ibid., p.14.   
425 S. George and B. Rosamond, ‘The European Community’, op.cit., p.181. 
426 Labour Party, Looking to the Future, op.cit., p.45.  
427  M. J. Smith, ‘Continuity and Change in the Labour Party’, in M. J. Smith and J. Spear (eds.), The Changing Labour 
Party, op.cit., p.223.  
428 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, op.cit., pp.769-70.  
429 The dominant ‘international political economy’ and the ‘interdependence’ school are discussed in W. Bonefield, A. 
Brown and P. Burnham, A Major Crisis?: The Politics of Economic Policy in Britain in the 1990s, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 
1995, p.7. 
430 Ibid., p.13.  
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Bob Jessop, the reality of the future will be a more complicated combination of different sets of 
relationships, involving local, regional, pan-regional, national and international bodies431.   
 An integral part of Labour’s thinking on economic policy concerned an analysis of the nation-state.  
It was argued that previous economic policy was wholly national - an implicit critique of Keynesianism.  
For Sassoon, a “national road to social democracy - or even modernization - was no longer possible”432.  
This, he believed, represented the “authentic neo-revisionism” of the period433.  Likewise, globalization is a 
phenomenon with profound implications for the left, as Eric Shaw has summarised: “the globalization of 
capitalism had created an environment far less conducive to social democratic policies: capital and currency 
movements had been freed throughout most of the Western world as governments pursued policies of 
liberalisation and deregulation”434.  Exchange controls were abolished in 1980 and five years later the City 
was deregulated435.  Similar so-called post-industrial developments occurred throughout the developed 
world, effectively ending the existing link between the financial market and the nation state.  It is not clear, 
however, if the issue received the attention it perhaps should have done in the Policy Review436.   
 Yet it does represent one part of the analysis of market failure: “The case for a socialist economic 
policy has always been that the free market, although possessing great strengths which must be utilised, is 
ultimately incapable of building unaided a strong and modern economy”437.  The solution was one of 
partnership in which the market required the state as much as the state required the market.  The Policy 
Review argued that “in very many areas of the economy the market and competition are essential in meeting 
 
431 B. Jessop, Towards the Schumperterian Workfare State, Lancaster Regionalism Group Working Paper, University of 
Lancaster, Lancaster, 1992. 
432 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, op.cit., p.739.  
433 Ibid. 
434 E. Shaw, The Labour Party since 1979: Crisis and Transformation, op.cit., p.104-5. 
435 J. Coakley and L. Harris, ‘Financial Globalization and Deregulation’, in J. Michie (ed.), The Economic Legacy, 1979-
1992, Academic Press, London, 1992. 
436 This point was made by Eric Hobsbawm; ‘Rethinking Labour: no sense of mission’, Marxism Today, London, April 
1988, pp.14-19. 
437 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, op.cit., p.10. 
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the demands of consumers, promoting efficiency and stimulating innovation”.  This, however, is only 
possible if the market is “directed and managed within an industrial strategy developed in consultation with 
government”438.  This version of the developmental state439 entailed a different approach from the 
traditional choices along the spectrum of public ownership and private ownership.  The Policy Review 
confirmed regulation as the party’s preferred strategy for dealing with the utilities which were privatized in 
the 1980s440.  After the nationalization programme of the late 1940s, and despite the stipulation in Clause 
IV of the party’s constitution, Labour had long preferred the half-way house of regulation to either 
wholesale public or private ownership. This was not a matter of sheer pragmatism or decided compromise,
although these were important.  Leonard Tivey has shown how the relationship between nationaliza
privatization should only be partly understood as ideological conflict, but also as pragmatism and 
fluctuations in the political culture441.  However, the tradition of socialist revisionism in Labour Party 
thinking, most strikingly Crosland’s The Future of Socialism442, argued that ownership was not of 
overriding concern, but should be taken as one possible economic tool.   
 The Policy Review cannot, however, be taken as one further promulgation of regulation and the 
‘mixed economy’, its stable-mate.  The developmental state is a particular interpretation of regulation and 
the relationship between the state and economic policy more generally.   
 
 “It is not possible to lay down any strict and simple rule which  
 governs the way in which the output of the mixed economy should  
 be distributed.  There are some areas of economic activity which  
 are wholly inappropriate for the application of market forces.  In  
 
438 Ibid. 
439 E. Shaw, The Labour Party since 1979, op.cit., pp.89-92. 
440 For an assessment of the privatization of the 1980s see B. Fine and C. Poletti, ‘Industrial Prospects in the Light of 
Privatization’, in J. Michie (ed.), The Economic Legacy, 1979-1992, op.cit.  
441 L. Tivey, ‘Nationalization, Privatization and the Zeitgeist’, op.cit. 
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 the case of the allocation of most other goods and services the  
 operation of the market, where properly regulated, is a generally  
 satisfactory means of  determining provision and consumption, and  
 where competition is appropriate, socialists must ensure that it is   
 fair and that consumers, workers and investors are protected from  
 commercial and financial exploitation”443.  
 
Neil Kinnock spoke of the need to recognise the best product, or result, rather than deciding dogmatically 
upon one single way of achieving it.  The most important point, it was argued, was the quality of the 
produced good or service, rather than whether it came from the public sector or the private sector.  This was, 
of course, a double critique, both of the then Conservative Government’s free market stance, and the 
perceived reverence of state control and nationalization found in the Alternative Economic Strategy.  In the 
party’s 1988 conference, Kinnock attempted to form a position between the two, warning of polarisation: 
 
 “The Government simply say ‘private good, public bad’.  Others in  
 mirror image say ‘public good, private bad’.  Neither of them are  
 dealing with the realities.  Neither are applying the real test, the shape  
 and the performance of industry, asking the real question: ‘Does it  
 work?’ ”444. 
 
This is the test he saw being applied in countries like Japan, France, Germany and Sweden: “they 
appreciated long ago that public and private sectors, government and market, had to work in combination if 
the strength of the economy was to be developed and potential maximised”445. 
 
442 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit.  Discussed above in Chapter 3.   
443 C. Hughes in Hughes and Wintour, Labour Rebuilt, op.cit., pp.72-73. 
444 N. Kinnock, 1988 Labour Party Conference, quoted in The Guardian, 5 October 1988. 
445  Ibid.  
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 In his analysis of these changes in Labour’s economic policy, Andrew Gamble made the comparison 
with Anthony Crosland:   
 
 “Seeing the private sector and the public sector as equally capable  
 of serving the public has been a major change.  Again, it was  
 foreshadowed by Crosland.  Its practical consequence, as the Policy  
 Review makes plain, is that the delivery of a particular service can be  
 discussed pragmatically in terms of whether public or private  
 provision is best in a particular case, rather than in terms of  
 ideological principle”446.   
 
In Choose Freedom, Hattersley put this in even stronger terms in an attempt to relate these changes to 
Labour values: “In large parts of the economy, the obligations to freedom from state control and to 
efficiency oblige democratic socialists to support the operation of the market”447.  Further, even when state 
control was the order of the day, there was a new interpretation.  In an internal paper drawn up for his 
economic review group, Gould wrote:  
 
 “When we talk of social ownership, we are not necessarily referring  
 to who owns the equity, but the extent to which control over the  
 enterprise is socially regulated”448. 
 
Neil Kinnock argued at the 1989 party conference that the review accepts what is taken to be the reality of 
the market449.  This is quite different from the criticism that came from both the left of the Labour Party and 
 
446 A. Gamble, ‘The Labour Party and economic management’, in M. J. Smith and J. Spear, op.cit., p.66. 
447 R. Hattersley, Choose Freedom, op.cit., p.131. 
448 B. Gould, quoted in Hughes and Wintour, Labour Rebuilt, op.cit., p.131. 
449 N. Kinnock, 1988 Labour Party Conference, op.cit.    
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the Conservatives that Labour had found a new faith in the market economy.  If Labour was arguing against 
what it saw as the fallacy of aiming to abolish the market, and pointing to its positive advantages in some 
areas, they also made clear what they considered its weaknesses to be.  In Looking to the Future, it is argued 
that the difference between Labour “and the Conservatives is not that they accept the market and we do not, 
but that we recognise the limits of the market and they do not”450.  The final report of the Policy Review 
drew a clear line beyond which the market should not be stepping: 
 
 “The market will not - left to itself - produce adequate investment  
 in education and training, in science and technology, in new  
 products and new capacity.  The market will not reverse the  
 short-term bias to favour productive  strength in the long-term.   
 It will not secure equal rights for disadvantaged groups, regional  
 balance or a safe and  healthy environment”451. 
 
 From Meet the Challenge, Make the Change452, to the ‘mid-term manifesto’, Looking to the 
Future453, to the final manifesto for the 1992 General Election, It’s Time to Get Britain Working Again454, 
the most repeated positive - that is, not anti-government - theme was that Labour would only spend what the 
country could afford.  Britain’s political culture no longer seemed to accept a strategy of higher taxes to 
achieve wider collective social objectives455, despite what the opinion polls said456.  An analysis of general 
economic post-war decline and then the recession of the early 1990s for many called for prudence, and a 
 
450 Labour Party, Looking to the Future, London, 1990, p.6. 
451 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, op.cit., p.9. 
452  Ibid. 
453 Labour Party, Looking to the Future, London, 1990, op.cit. 
454 Labour Party, It’s Time to Get Britain Working Again, London, 1992. 
455 At the end of the period we are examining here, J. K. Galbraith described this as a ‘culture of contentment’.  It was a 
culture whereby an economically satisfied majority exist alongside a massive minority of 30 per cent of the population who 
had become so marginalized that they cease to participate in the democratic process; The Culture of Contentment, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1992.  
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message of “making comes before taking” was aimed at the electorate457.  The approach was one of 
balance: social targets could only be reached when economic growth allowed.  That is, society would on
grow socially, when the country grew economically.  Thus the emphasis turned to growth; and this was 
certainly the headline - at least in the broad-sheet press - that followed the publication of the Looking to the
Future policy document.  ‘Labour puts emphasis on growth’ was the title of The Independent’s main
following its publication458.  Economic growth, which could only be achieved by long-term planning, and 
investment in training and industry, was the only means to guarantee increased expenditure on the welfare 
state.  This inter-connection of the economic and social spheres is implied in the title of the first report of 
the Policy Review, reflecting this new understanding, Social Justice and Economic Efficiency459.  Kinnock, 
moving from ideas to party politics, put it in terms of a paradox: 
 
 “There are those of course - like the present Government - who consider  
 social justice to be an impediment to economic efficiency.  And there  
 are some - including a few within our movement - who consider  
 economic efficiency to be a threat to social justice.  Both are wrong.   
 The simple fact is that sustained social justice depends upon a  
 foundation of economic prosperity and economic success cannot be  
 achieved without social justice”460.   
 
This essentially meant that acquired economic growth would be directed into public expenditure, although 
there was to be no ‘dash for growth’.  “Sustained and balanced economic growth” was the objective: 
 
 
456 I. Crewe, ‘Values: The Crusade that Failed’, op.cit.  
457 N. Kinnock, in The Independent, 25 May 1990, op.cit.  
458 Ibid.  
459 Labour Party, Social Justice and Economic Efficiency, op.cit.  
460 N. Kinnock, 1988 Labour Party Conference, op.cit.   
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 “Government’s spending and taxation policies should play a major  
 role in creating the stable framework needed for investment and  
 growth.  A buoyant economy will automatically increase public  
 revenues.  Where there is extra growth, we believe that investment  
 must have a greater priority than tax cuts.  The first priority is the  
 restoration of public investment and services”461. 
 
 There are echoes here with Crosland’s The Future of Socialism, but there is also much that is distinct 
and breaks with this tradition.  The core of Labour’s new economic thinking distinguished between the 
supply side of the economy and the demand side.  Each signal an interventionist intent, but each aim to 
intervene in a different way, from a different angle.  Whereas measures to influence demand involve 
expenditure programmes, and more short-term ejections of expenditure into the economy, the economy’s 
supply side is the nature and strength of its labour, skills and equipment.  What is novel here is that Labour 
made the distinction for the purpose of shifting to the supply side for its focus.  The Labour Party’s 
economic strategy was described as supply side socialism and should be understood, at least in part, as a 
reaction to the economic problems Labour faced in office from 1975.  In short, if there was no or little 
growth, a future Labour government would not be immobilised.  What is problematic, however, with such a 
strategy is that supply side measures are essentially long-term remedies.  Their benefits would not be 
immediately clear; neither therefore would any electoral dividend.    
 The Policy Review’s work on the issue of ownership, however, was firmly in the Crosland mould 
and also highlights the influence of the market socialists.  In a section headed ‘Economic Democracy’, the 
Report of the Policy Review Group on A Productive and Competitive Economy stated the intention to 
increase the degree to which employees owned and controlled their company: 
 
461 Labour Party, Looking to the Future, op.cit., p.8.    
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 “Socialism is about diffusing power and giving people more control over  
 their lives.  Extending democracy to the workplace will, we believe, both  
 serve those purposes and also strengthen the supply-side policies which  
 are crucial to our economic future.  There is now a great deal of research  
 to show that enterprises owned by their employees are more efficient  
 then traditional firms”.462  
       
This did not represent a re-affirmation of public ownership but “the extension of new and more flexible 
forms of common ownership rights across the economy”463.  This passage bears a direct resemblance to the 
thinking of the market socialists, who advocate a variety of forms of ownership in response in part to the 
New Right attack on state-based collectivism.  David Miller affirms the New Right critique of public 
ownership though not the solution464.  However, market socialism is more precise than an advocation of a 
mixed economy.  The market socialists propose an integrated system whereby firms exist as co-operatives 
within a market economy.  This is the economic extension of political democracy and social democracy.  
 The most typical riposte to such thinking, from the left as well as the right, challenged the 
commercial viability of co-operatives.  Alan Ryan put it like this: “How socialist self-government can work 
without succumbing either to inefficiency on the one hand or erosion in the face of expertise on the other is 
a difficult empirical question”465.  The market socialists tackle this question head-on.  Saul Estrin offers a 
 
462 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, op.cit., p.13.   
463 Ibid. 
464 D. Miller, Market, State and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism, Clarendon Press, London, 1990, 
chs.1-4.   
465 For Ryan this “is precisely the sort of question which socialist economists and sociologists ought to think about in a grimly 
realistic frame of mind”; see his ‘Liberty and Socialism’, in B. Pimlott, Fabian Essays in Socialist Thought, op.cit.  
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blue-print for an economy based on the contention that democracy in the workplace eradicates discontent 
and alienation, strengthens commitment and loyalty and, in turn, increases efficiency and productivity466: 
 
 “The shift of emphasis on the Left from plan to market has brought  
 to the fore the issue of how best to organize enterprises in a socialist  
 society”467.   
 
This thinking is a direct resurrection of an earlier tradition, discussed in Chapter 2, of ethical socialism468.  
It illustrates the broader point that the 1980s marked a return to the political thinking of this earlier age.  It 
was set in a different political, social and economic context and couched in a different language.  But it 
stood upon similar intellectual ground: a critique from within socialism of a Fabian-inspired socialism 
which stood sharply on the former side of the economic-ethical and centralised-pluralist axis.  Alan 
emphasizes the significance of this argument:       
 
 “Capitalist management has been chronically non-democratic and non- 
 participatory.  The view that workers can sign away their industrial  
 citizenship while they cannot sign away their political citizenship has  
 needlessly gone unchallenged.  Yet any defence of socialism’s greater  
 potential for freedom ought to make much of it”469.  
 
The extension of political democracy to the economic sphere, as Saul Estrin is fully aware, is embedded in a 
“long-standing socialist tradition” which argues that “fundamental changes in society must be intimately 
 
466 S. Estrin, ‘Workers’ Co-operatives: Their Merits and their Limitations’, in J. Le Grand and S. Estrin (eds.), Market Socialism, 
op.cit. 
467 Ibid, p.165. 
468 Chapter 2, pp.53-60.  
469 A. Ryan, ‘Liberty and Socialism’, in B. Pimlott, Fabian Essays in Socialist Thought, op.cit.   
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bound up with changes in the way that work itself is organized”470.  The new thinking, however, combined 
Crosland’s The Future of Socialism471 with Cole’s Self-Government in Industry472.  Estrin argues that 
market socialism is consistent with “the Croslandite view” that capitalist firms can exist within a socialist 
economy provided “that taxes and subsidies exist to eliminate inequalities473.    
 
 “By the early twentieth century, socialists such as Beatrice Webb were 
 highly dismissive of producer co-operatives.  The exception, of course,  
 was G. D. H. Cole, with his endorsement of a British system of 
 workers self-management - Guild Socialism.”474 
 
 The ideas of the market socialists went further than anything that the party deemed politically 
desirable and practicable - in terms of the party itself and the wider electorate.  But there were hints of some 
of these ideas being aired.  During the 1987 Labour Party Conference, Bryan Gould advocated the adoption 
by Labour of the share ownership democracy, a notion more familiarly viewed as a Thatcherite 
invention475.  Gould argued that this could also be a tool for the achievement of socialist ends: the dispersal 
of power and decentralization.  This was argued to be completely different from the Thatcherite initiative, 
which was perceived as being based on a very different set of political ideas: a notion of individual freedom 
based on the market and economic accumulation476.  Two years later another senior party figure, Giles 
Radice, argued that “Labour should champion the concept of citizen rights - in politics, in welfare, at work 
 
470 S. Estrin, ‘Workers’ Co-operatives: Their Merits and their Limitations’, op.cit. 
471 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit. 
472 G. D. H. Cole, Self-Government in Industry, op.cit.  
473 S. Estrin, ‘Workers’ Co-operatives: Their Merits and their Limitations’, op.cit.  
474 Ibid., p.169. 
475 For a political analysis of the impact of Gould’s speech, see C. Hughes and P. Wintour, op.cit., pp.44-45. 
476 Gould expounded upon this analysis in A Future for Socialism, Jonathan Cape, London, 1989, pp.139-143.  
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and in the market”477.  This is similar to - although does not go as far as - the arguments of the market 
socialists for greater democracy in the work-place478.            
 Neither was such thinking confined to particular Labour individuals479.  In the Policy Review, there 
was no grand project to create a market socialist economy but there was the intent to co-opt some of its 
ideas.  It was made clear that, under a future Labour government, co-operatives would be encouraged and 
companies actively encouraged to convert: “We shall make advice widely available to those firms and 
workforces which wish to convert to democratic ESOP (Employee Share Ownership Plans) - that is, 
employee ownership schemes which transfer real powers of control to the workforce.  We shall change the 
law to make the mechanics much simpler and will offer tax incentives if appropriate”480.  This commitment 
was repeated in the 1992 election manifesto481.  The Labour Party made a clear preference, ethical and 
economic, for greater democracy in the workplace.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
So do these developments in Labour’s economic ideas and policy constitute a novel and radical break from 
previous thinking?  In Eric Shaw’s study of this period they certainly do.  They represent “a repudiation of 
the proposition often found in Party statements that the market was inherently flawed”482.  However, 
conversely, he finds such reflection consistent with the history of revisionism, highlighting what is often the 
 
477 G. Radice, Labour’s Path to Power: The New Revisionism, Macmillan, London, 1989, p.14. 
478 J. Le Grand and S. Estrin (eds.), Market Socialism, op.cit., ch.1.    
479 Gould, however, was a key figure in Labour’s economic policy-making over the Policy Review period.  As well as the co-
convenor of the ‘Productive and Competitive Economy’ review group, he was, until October 1989, the Shadow Industry 
Secretary. 
480 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, op.cit., p.13. 
481 Labour Party, It’s Time to Get Britain Working Again, general election manifesto, Labour Party, London, 1992, p.14.   
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distinction between rhetoric and the reality of government.  Other writers have perceived a social 
democratic tradition which rests alongside the development of capitalism.  Thus David Sassoon sees 
capitalism not as a “particular transitory phase in the historical development of humanity, but a mode of 
production which was subject to political (i.e. non-market) regulation”483.  The task of socialists was “to 
devise a regulatory framework which would enable the advancement of certain values, such as justice and 
equality, while ensuring that the viability of capitalism was not seriously impaired”484. 
 This is the context within which the question of Labour’s response to Thatcherism should be 
considered.  The debate between Colin Hay and Martin Smith is representative of the debate on the left485.  
For both it is Thatcherism to which Labour primarily responded.  Their point of departure concerns extent 
and purpose: the extent to which Labour reacts to Thatcherism and the purpose Labour has in doing so.  Hay 
responds to Smith’s analysis that the period was one of necessary “modernization” by arguing that Labour 
simply accommodated much of the Thatcherite agenda leading to what has now become a “post-Thatcher 
settlement”486.  This ‘accommodationist’ thesis states that Labour capitulated to free market liberalism and 
had a tendency to follow, rather than lead, public opinion.  Hay observes a “psephologically-inspired 
‘politics of catch-up’”487.  This chapter, however, has demonstrated the more sophisticated reasoning behind 
Labour’s thinking on economic ideas and policy.  This owed much to the need to transcend what Geoff 
Hodgson has called the “planning/markets dichotomy”488.      
 Richard Heffernan and Mike Marqusee note the influence, as does Hay489, of the Marxism Today 
analysis of working class decline: “There was no more mileage to be gained by talking about poverty and 
 
482 E. Shaw, The Labour Party since 1979, op.cit., p.86.   
483 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, op.cit.,  p.734. 
484 Ibid.  
485 C. Hay, Labour’s Thatcherite Revisionism: Playing the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’, pp.700-707; M. J. Smith, Understanding the 
‘Politics of Catch-Up’: the Modernization of the Labour Party, pp.708-715.  
486 C. Hay, ibid., p.701. 
487 Ibid., p.704. 
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public services or the welfare state. The arithmetic of electoral success demanded that Labour repudiate 
anything in its programme, practice or presentation that might not appeal to the newly discovered stratum of 
‘affluent’ voters”490. Mark Wickham-Jones responds to this debate by disputing Hay’s argument that 
Labour’s policy changes represent unnecessary concessions to Thatcherism491.  “Preference 
accommodation”, he argues, “need not be Thatcherite”492.  Thus, the Thatcherite objective of promoting “a 
liberal economic order” is very different from the “distinctive economic strategy and set of objectives” 
which Labour offered493.  Similarly, Smith’s contention that Labour has not “accepted the Thatcherite 
agenda”494 is based on a separation between distinct sets of political ideas.  The Conservative interpretation 
of freedom is, he believes, preoccupied with state encroachment into areas of individual freedom which is 
guaranteed only by the market.  Conversely, Labour’s coupling of freedom with equality makes for clear 
divergence: “the role of the state is positive. To enable the individual to gain greater freedom, choice and 
welfare within society, the state must intervene”495.  This is rather different from, and more accurate than, 
Gregory Elliott’s thesis that Labour abandoned equality for liberty496.   
 When it comes to the market, however, there was significant movement by Labour and Martin Smith 
points out that the traditional left/right divide has narrowed.  In the Policy Review, the market is now taken 
by Labour as “essentially morally neutral”497.  This is not completely dissimilar to Hay’s analysis of 
accommodation to Thatcherism498.  Smith, however, is right to illustrate Labour’s distinction made between 
market outcomes which are efficient and morally justifiable and those that are inefficient, unfair or produce 
 
488 G. Hodgson, ‘Overstating the State’, Marxism Today, Communist Party, London, June 1984, pp.21-2. 
489 Ibid., p.702. 
490 R. Heffernan and M. Marqusee, Defeat from the Jaws of Victory, op.cit., p.95. 
491 M. Wickham-Jones, ‘Recasting Social Democracy: a Comment on Hay and Smith’, op.cit., pp.698-702. 
492 Ibid., p.699. 
493 Ibid. 
494 M. J. Smith, ‘A return to revisionism: The Labour Party’s Policy Review’, op.cit., p.23. 
495 Ibid., p.24. 
496 G. Elliott, Labour and the English Genius, op.cit., p.134.   
497  M. J. Smith, ‘A return to revisionism: The Labour Party’s Policy Review’, op.cit., p.24. 
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unjustifiable inequality.  Whereas Thatcherism, he continues, separates the state and the market (and views 
the former as an impediment to the latter), it is Labour’s view that the market necessitates the assistance of 
the state.  The remedy for market failure, therefore, is market socialism.  
 The party’s new analysis of ownership follows from this: public ownership has a role, as foreseen by 
Anthony Crosland, not as an end in itself but as an often justifiable means’ for example, regarding the basic 
utilities499.  Smith concludes that following the Policy Review, Labour is “ideologically closer to 
revisionism than Thatc
 
 “In terms of principles, the review and revisionism have strong  
 similarities.  The Policy Review is revisionist in its view of capitalism.   
 Capitalism can be reformed to achieve public goals, the market is a  
 useful means of distribution and nationalization is only desirable where  
 it can provide the means to particular ends”501.       
 
Smith is correct to point out that much of the Keynesian economic framework, which was so integral to 
Crosland’s thesis, is rejected.  The strategy of demand-management and the assumption of perpetual 
economic growth was widely seen as having fallen flat in the 1970s.  In response the Policy Review turned 
to an emphasis on measures which the state could take to improve the supply side of the economy: 
 
 “The Policy Review is an attempt to develop post-keynesian  
 revisionism where the emphasis is moved from demand to  
 supply...it is a revisionism for a different era which has learned  
 the lessons of the 1970s”502. 
 
498 C. Hay, Labour’s Thatcherite Revisionism: Playing the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’, op.cit. 
499 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, op.cit., p.15.  
500  M. J. Smith, ‘A return to revisionism: The Labour Party’s Policy Review’, op.cit., p.25. 
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For Colin Hay, this indicates something completely different - the success of the New Right.  It has been 
demonstrated here that there was indeed a New Right influence on market socialism, which simultaneously 
developed within the Labour Party; this was acknowledged by the market socialists themselves.  It has also 
been shown, however, that Labour’s economic thinking is distinct from that of the New Right, and that the 
policies produced in the Policy Review were based on political ideas altogether at odds with free market 
thinking.       
 
 Part I examined the historical context of Labour’s political ideas.  I began this chapter by presenting 
the political and economic context within which Labour existed as the 1980s began.  The context is broader 
than that presented by Hay, Smith and others.  Political ideas are not properly discussed and economic 
policy cannot be understood solely in relation to the relative effect of Thatcherism.  This context included 
the Marxism Today analysis of fundamental economic and cultural change, involving the labour market and 
the homogeneity of social class.  It shared some of its analysis with the psephology of the class/party 
equation.  The criticisms of both ‘schools’ were noted as was the indelible impression each appeared to have 
made on the Labour Party.  The shared agenda of the market socialists and senior party representatives was 
scrutinized.  Labour’s thinking on economic ideas and policy, and the work of thinker-politicians and 
Labour intellectuals, represents both an integral part of the context itself and a concerted attempt to 
comprehend Labour’s position within it and how it should react.  The revision, therefore, of Labour’s 
economic policy was greatly influenced by this set of circumstances and a self-conscious attempt to grapple 
 
501 Ibid., p.26. 
502 Ibid. 
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with the dilemmas of change, as well as a crucial development in the history of Labour’s political ideas.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Political Ideas of Labour’s  
Social Policy  
 
 
 
Social policy is the area where Labour thinking has perhaps been weakest following the decline in 
influence of the ideas of Beveridge, Crosland and Keynes.  This has been the opinion of commentators 
such as Peter Alcock who observes the “immunity of welfare policy from the swings in Labour politics 
in the 1980s”503.  Similarly, Nicholas Timmins, in his biography of the welfare state, found that on “the 
Labour benches in the 1980s it remained far easier, and much safer, to oppose than to think”504.  There is 
some truth to these claims.  Yet the thinking on social policy that emerged from around 1983, when 
placed in its historical context, presents the possibility of dramatically re-casting the welfare state’s 
mould.  The situation is greatly paradoxical, and one which shows a discrepancy between policy and 
ideas.   
 On the one hand, Labour policy was conservative, setting out to reverse the perceived 
Conservative onslaught on much of the welfare state.  There were obvious political reasons for this: 
 
503 P. Alcock, ‘The Labour Party and the welfare state’, in M. Smith and J. Spear (eds.), op.cit., p.139. 
504 N. Timmins, The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State, Harper Collins, London, 1995, p.488.  
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public opinion consistently showed overwhelming support for the welfare state505 (see below); and the 
welfare state is seen by many inside the Labour Party as a cherished part of its record506.  The Labour 
Party is therefore locked into the post-war welfare state.  This produced certain political requisites in 
respect of Labour’s relationship with the welfare state.  On the other hand, however, many within the 
party (‘thinker-politicians’), as well as others, mainly academics but also journalists, closely connected 
to the party (‘Labour intellectuals’), began to question the very structure of the party’s inheritance.  
These arguments, examined here, led to an “important challenge to many of the existing institutional 
structures and practices of state welfare”507.  Even more fundamentally, a critique emerged which 
challenged the values and assumptions that lay behind the welfare state.  The Policy Review saw many 
of these ideas inserted into official party documentation for the first time.     
 Labour intellectuals and thinker-politicians aimed to defend Labour values against those of 
Thatcherism.  In so doing, there was a parallel exercise in their own analysis of the welfare state.  The 
latter was a difficult task because it entailed a large degree of self-criticism and a certain ‘dis-
connection’.  These two ambitions are not separable: the political ideas of Labour’s social policy are not 
synonymous with one particular pattern of welfare (again, a difference between means and ends).  In an 
early assessment of the post-war welfare state’s progress, Crosland wrote that “welfare-state-plus 
Keynes” was not the same as socialism508.  Welfare was, as Cole had viewed, a crucial stepping stone to 
socialism509.  Thirty five years later in 1983, Howard Glennerster’s comment that “all is not well in the 
welfare state as we know it - and not just because of Mrs Thatcher’s cuts”510, alludes to the realisation that 
 
505 Although a more sophisticated inspection denotes a discrimination in favour of some services above others. 
506 Discussed in Chapter 3, p.7. 
507  P. Alcock, ‘The Labour Party and the welfare state’, op.cit., p.143. 
508 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit., p.79.  
509 G. D. H. Cole, ‘The Dream and the Business’, Political Quarterly, July-September 1949, p.203.  
510 H. Glennerster, ‘The Need for a Reappraisal’, in H. Glennerster (ed.), The Future of the Welfare State, Heinemann, London, 
1983, p.1. 
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the welfare state fell below even Crosland’s transitory benchmark. 
 
 These debates are embedded in the conceptual relationships we have been analysing.  The 
relationship between socialist means and ends, the state and the market, and the comparison between an 
ethical and economic centred socialism, are both central to, but also affected by, political thinking on 
the welfare state.  Again, they are debates which are explicable within a context of historical 
development; they are cast in the light of earlier thinking.  But they are also reactions to new 
developments, in particular the kind of social and economic change which so affects social policy, but 
also as a response to competing political ideas.  There entailed both marked continuity and change in 
social policy thinking.  It was thinking which does not constitute a break from that which has preceded 
it.  Much of the analysis took root at a relatively early stage in the post-war welfare state’s development, 
as will be shown.  At the same time, however, ideas that appear to strike right at the welfare state’s 
foundations, highlight a radical departure indeed.  It is by no means a commonly held view that such 
thinking took place.  The major accounts of the Labour Party over this period that were  discussed in the 
introduction do not record a fundamental rethink in the area of social policy.   
 The reason for this is not that the thinking did not occur, but that it was not articulated as a 
systematic review.  There was certainly no modern equivalent of William Beveridge’s momentous war-
time report, Social Insurance and Allied Services511, (known as the Beveridge Report), which framed 
both the institutions and ideas behind  post-war social policy.  There were therefore two co-existing, but 
contradictory, factors.  The first was the Labour Party’s attachment to the welfare state based on a belief 
that it represents important steps towards socialism.  The second was a reflection based on both 
qualitative and quantitative study of the workings of the welfare state, and analyses of social and 
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demographic change, which challenges such optimism and proposes change.  In respect of both, it is 
necessary to do three things: first, to locate these debates historically by providing a context of welfare 
development; second, to identify the dominant aspects of the Conservative governments’ approach to 
social policy in the 1980s; and third, to examine the new thinking itself.  Contextualization is vital to 
understanding Labour’s social policy in the 1980s because Labour played the leading role in the 
establishment of the welfare state after 1945.    
 
 
 
1.  Social policy and a history of ideas  
 
 
In the history of post-war social policy, there is much debate over the significance of Thatcherism in 
relation to the administrations it succeeded.  Does Thatcherism constitute a authentic break from 
previous social policy?  Can we group the period from 1945 to 1979 as somehow constituting an era of 
consensus - a post-war period of broad two-party agreement, replaced by a political project that set out 
to overturn much, if not all, of what had come before?   
 Arguably, there was indeed such a project, following an ideological supercession in the 
Conservative Party, following Margaret Thatcher’s succession to the leadership in 1976, by the New 
Right over traditional, Disraelian one-nation conservatism512.  Such conservatism513, epitomised in the 
 
511 W. Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services, op.cit. 
512  There is much debate as to whether conservatism constitutes an ideology or contains its own distinct political ideas.  
Despite the best efforts of conservatives to expound upon the non-ideological nature of their beliefs, they achieve the 
opposite effect.  Nowhere is this clearer than in Michael Oakshott’s Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, Methuen, 
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twentieth century by the premierships of Harold Macmillan and Edward Heath, saw much of the welfare 
state as part of its own inheritance.  The development of the British welfare state - which we can trace 
back at least as far as the reforming administrations of Disraeli in the 1860s and 1870s514 - is the 
practical realisation of paternalism, one of conservatism’s central concepts, since they argue that in 
times of need and during childhood and old age, the duty of the state is to provide protection and 
support.  So, although the first post-war Labour Government instigated the huge system of social 
services and social security, this fitted relatively comfortably within this dominant Conservative 
tradition.  The party could claim that these epoch-making reforms were the product of wartime coalition 
thinking and preparation in the first place (indeed, the crucial 1944 Education Act was pioneered by the 
Conservative R. A Butler). 
 The debate can be simplified by flagging up what can be described as the original interpretation, 
and then describing the reaction it inspired.  It draws a distinction between the years of formation and 
consolidation between 1945 and 1975 .  However, the years 1975, 1976 and 1979 are all feasible dates 
for the proclaimed social policy departure.  In 1975 Margaret Thatcher assumed the leadership of the 
Conservative Party and signalled a very different [social policy] intent based on the political ideas of the 
New Right (see below).  Equally, it can be claimed that the crucial year was 1976, the year the Labour 
Government allegedly abandoned Keynesianism, as discussed in the previous chapter, and the rest of 
that particular ‘party’515.  The third year, perhaps the most stated in this historiography, 1979, witnessed 
the crucial Conservative General Election victory which saw a reversal - at least, in intention - of earlier 
 
London, 1962.  For an analysis of the ‘ideology’ of conservatism see, F. O’Gorman, British Conservatism, Longman, 
London, 1986.  
513 For an introduction to the ideas underpinning Thatcherism see A. Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State, 
Macmillan, London, 1988.   
514 D. Roberts, Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1960.    
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trends516. 
 The essence of the first phase is the evocation of the ideas of a political consensus that unites 
both Labour and Conservative around a set of commonly held goals, from support of the welfare state to 
the maintenance of full employment.  The second phase charts the breakdown of this structure and the 
rise of an opposing critique.  It normally starts with the Conservative election victory of 1979, although 
a more sophisticated analysis begins four years earlier with the succession of a party leader who 
appeared to offer a rigorous critique of both the direction of the welfare state and her party’s role in 
developing it517.  This was coupled with uncertainties over Labour’s role.  In a time of economic crisis 
and no, or little, economic growth, it was unclear how Labour could deliver its social policy 
prospectus518.  As Timmins has recalled, the “magic prescription” of growth, public expenditure and 
full employment, paid for by higher taxation and perhaps slightly higher inflation, had ceased to ho
together519.  There was much discussion in the mid-1970s of a ‘crisis of welfare’ and right-wing critics 
spoke of a ‘burden’ of welfare520.  Cuts were imposed on public expenditure by the Labour 
Government; and a record of failure was recorded by many in the party itself521. 
 The central criticism of this historiography is that there was no such homogeneity in the political 
 
515 Crosland’s reaction, to a predicament which had grave implications for his earlier thesis in The Future of Socialism 
(discussed in Chapter 3), was that “the party’s over”.  The remark was made to local government officers at Manchester 
Town Hall on 9 May 1975.    
516 The first early analyses of the significance of the 1979 election appeared in Marxism Today.  See M. Jacques, 
‘Thatcherism - Breaking Out of the Impasse’, October 1979.  For a more specific study of the implications for social policy, 
see I. Gough, ‘Thatcherism and the Welfare State’, July 1980. 
517 In 1975, Margaret Thatcher signalled that “a vital new debate is beginning, or perhaps an old debate is being renewed, 
about the proper role of government, and the welfare state and the attitudes on which it rests”. The extension of welfare in 
order to further redistribution and equality amounted to a “progressive consensus” which she wanted no part of; in Let Our 
Children Grow Tall: Selected Speeches, 1975-1977, Centre for Policy Studies, London, 1977.  
518 This was powerfully described as the “fiscal crisis of the state”; J.  O ‘Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, St. James’ 
Press, New York, 1973.   
519 N. Timmins, The Five Giants, p.317. 
520 H. Glennerster, ‘Public Spending and the Social Services: The End of an Era?’, in M. Brown and S. Baldwin, The Year 
Book of Social Policy in Britain, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, 1980, p.15.  
521 N. Bosanquet and P. Townsend (eds.), Labour and Equality, Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1980. 
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system prior to Thatcher’s defeat of Edward Heath in 1975522.  As discussed in Chapter 3, many 
commentators have observed fundamental disagreement between the two major parties523. There was no 
shared political currency - no concurrence, either in ideas or policy, during the so-called ‘consensus’524. 
 This interpretation is also challenged at the point of its conception.  If the British welfare state is hard 
to define it could be because there was no ‘Day 1’, no Year Zero525.  In many ways, the historic report 
of William Beveridge in 1942 represents a social policy blue-print and the author is often referred to as 
the architect of the welfare state.  But it is also the case that there is a much longer evolution which goes 
back at least several centuries526.  The Poor Law Act of 1601  was the first attempt by the state to 
assume a social role527.  The nineteenth century saw much in terms of social reform, particularly 
following the widening of the franchise, and any history of welfare would have to highlight the broad 
programmes of public policy in health, sanitation and working conditions which this period witnessed.  
These were mainly the products of Disraeli’s Conservative administrations rather than their opponents, 
the Liberals and their Whig predecessors.  Likewise, we could trace a history of social policy which 
places a central focus on the reforming new liberal  Government which introduced the insurance 
principle to social security and the old-age pension. 
 However, it is from the 1940s that we see the fundamental building blocks of the welfare state 
put down.  Whether we start at 1942, the year of the Beveridge Report, or 1945, the year of the election 
of the first post-war Labour government, is contestable.  What is clear is that the immediate post-war 
years ushered in a ‘never again’ mentality which had as much to do with the social and economic 
 
522 N. Deakin, In Search of Post-War Consensus, LSE Quarterly, vol.3, no.3,  pp.65-83. 
523 Chapter 3, p.9. 
524 R. Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain, Macmillan, London, 1993, p.85.  
525 Although libertarian opponents of the welfare state, who see it as a violation of individual liberty, may well see the 
Labour Government elected in 1945 as having inaugurated a totalitarian Year Zero! 
526 D. Fraser’s The Evolution of the British Welfare State, is a comprehensive analysis of the development of the welfare 
state.  He concludes that the welfare state “was not born - it had evolved”; Macmillan, London, 1984, p.239.   
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problems of the 1930s as it had with a determination to avoid the mass destruction that war-time Europe 
had just witnessed.  The mass unemployment and poverty of the preceding decade was condemned by 
Labour politicians as the inevitable consequence of the free market.  But likewise, there was a similar 
response from within Conservative ranks.  Harold Macmillan’s The Middle Way528, published in 1938, 
embodied the Disraeli tradition529, which in the middle of the twentieth century could be interpreted to 
advocate “a mixed economy and far greater state intervention than was believed in by the Tory party of 
the 1930s”530. 
 T. H. Marshall argues that the foundations of the welfare state were put down by the war-time 
coalition government531.  It is therefore possible to see how, within such an immediate political context, 
coalition could give way to consensus532.  It could be countered that an administration led by Churchill, 
who during the 1945 election campaign warned that Labour’s social policies violated Britain’s 
traditional sense of freedom and would depend upon a Gestapo for their implementation533, would have 
produced quite different legislation.  The Conservative Opposition voted against the National Health 
Service Bill in 1946.  Election campaigns though are rarely informed guides to government outcomes, 
and future Conservative governments did not reverse Labour’s most significant reforms534 (whether or 
not this was for reasons of ideological compatibility or electoral acquiescence is a matter of dispute).   
 The welfare state was not a programmatic transformation of British social policy.  It was the 
self-declared first welfare state535, albeit after the event, yet its roots are unclear, its ideological 
 
527 M. Hill, Understanding Social policy, Blackwell, Oxford, 1988, p.13. 
528 H. Macmillan, The Middle Way, Macmillan, London, 1966. 
529 For an analysis of the significance of this text and the impact of Macmillan’s thinking on British politics in general, see 
A. Horne, Harold Macmillan: 1894-1956, Viking, London, 1989.  
530 N. Timmins, The Five Giants, op.cit., p.163. 
531 T. H. Marshall. Social Policy, Hutchinson, London, 1965, p.87-8. 
532 See footnote 33, Chapter 3. 
533 I. Kramnick and B. Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life on the Left, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1993, p.481. 
534 J. D. Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition, MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1964.    
535 D. Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State, op.cit., pp.xxi-xxii.   
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composition ambiguous.  There has never been any agreed, coherent set of principles behind it and, by 
the same token, never any declared boundary generally recognised as encompassing its essentials.  It is 
possible to trace key strategies and continuities that dominated the period from 1945 to 1979, even 
though it may also be true that they were pursued for different reasons.   
 At least part of the explanation for this can be found in an understanding of the developments in 
political ideas over this period.  It was possible for Labour and  the Conservatives, when in government 
and opposition, to support certain policies, indeed institutions of the welfare state, though for different 
reasons.  This is most notably the case with the National Health Service which is commonly seen to 
embody socialist principles, notably equality.  When we observe a system of health care based on need 
rather than the ability to pay, funded from a system of progressive taxation, it is possible to see how the 
minister who took the legislation through Parliament, Aneurin Bevan, could describe it as “pure 
socialism”536.  It was perhaps for this very reason that Conservatives could support Labour’s reforms, 
because social policy would forestall socialism.  The fear of socialism was the “catalyst of social 
politics” wrote Bentley B. Gilbert537 .  However, a  Conservative conception of a paternalistic state 
founded upon a strong sense of the responsibility of rulers to the ruled could also encompass a free 
universal system of health care.  This was not of course the thinking of the time and the Conservative 
Opposition voted against much of Labour’s post-war legislation.  However, with the publication of The 
Industrial Charter in 1947, the Conservatives adjusted to much of Labour’s legislation, heralding an era 
 
536 A. Bevan, In Place of Fear, MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1966, p.62 
537 B. Gilbert, British Social Policy: 1914-1939, Batsford, London, 1970, p.305.  
Prominent Conservatives repeated as much.  A. J. Balfour, later to be Prime Minister, put it that socialism would never take 
hold of the working class if  the state were to address every “legitimate grievance”.  In this respect, social legislation is not 
“merely to be distinguished from socialist legislation but is its most direct opposite and its most effective antidote”; quoted 
in D. Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State, op.cit., p.139.  
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of much agreement in social and economic policy538.  The policy document was overseen by R. A. 
Butler and greatly influenced by the political ideas of Macmillan.  It rests firmly within the tradition of 
conservatism within the Conservative Party539.  
 If it not possible to refer to a  party political consensus, it is possible to perceive a coalition of 
social policy inheritance.  Historically, its roots may lay in socialist and radical agitation for improved 
living conditions and greater equality; or according to a conservative perception of a cautious, 
evolutionary paternalist state.  Alternatively, the evolving liberal definition of liberty may be seen to be 
crucial, a conception which moved from a negative to a positive interpretation, resulting in the 
acceptance of state intervention at the turn of the century.  The post-war welfare state can be seen to 
have emerged from all three: the socialist Bevan (the NHS), the Conservative Butler (his 1944 
Education Act created free, universal secondary education) and the Liberal Beveridge (whose famous 
1942 Report set out the over-arching framework designed to slay the ‘Giant Evils’ of idleness, or 
unemployment, want, disease, squalor and ignorance)540.  T. H. Marshall has accordingly referred to the 
welfare state’s “mixed parentage”541.   
 Despite, however, an apparent ideological flexibility, there were parameters.  One important 
ideology could not fit in: classical, free market liberalism and its post-war incarnation inside the 
Conservative Party, the New Right.  It is possible to juxtapose the end of the “expansionary state in the 
mid 1970s” and “the dynamic of the new more market orientated discourse on welfare that characterized 
 
538 For example, “We want co-operation [with industry] in making...the national budget of our economy...and competitive 
enterprise in carrying them out.  There is no other way in which both freedom and efficiency can be secured”; ‘The 
Industrial Charter’, 1947, quoted in Conservatism: 1945-1950, Conservative Political Centre, Thanet Press, London, 
1950,p.53. 
539 The Industrial Charter attacks the idea that laissez-faire economics is a principle of the Conservative Party.  The 
document argues that the “retreat from laissez-faire began when the Conservative Party introduced legislation to raise the 
standards of conditions of work in mines and factories”; ibid., p.47-48.  
540 D. Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State, op.cit., ch.9. 
541 T. H. Marshall. Social Policy, op.cit., p.87-8.  
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the 1980s”542.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Thatcherism and the welfare state  
 
 
Until the end of the 1980s however, Conservative social policy was mainly a continuation of general 
post-war trends - though not perhaps by design. There was no demolition of the welfare state as 
promised by an ideology which held that the majority of people should seek their general welfare 
provision, be it their health care or education, from the private market, while only a minority, the most 
needy, would require protection from the state.  What Richard Titmuss referred to as a “residual welfare 
state”543 had patently not been realised.  For if this was the scenario, the National Health Service should 
have been privatised and universal social security benefits, such as Child Benefit, abolished.  There had 
been explicit recognition of these targets as New Right think-tanks like the Institute of Economic 
 
542 D. Gladstone, ‘Preface’, in D. Gladstone (ed.), British Social Welfare: Past, present and future, op.cit., p.vii.  
543 Titmuss described a “residual welfare state” as one which is “based on the premise that there are two “natural” (or 
socially given) channels through which an individual’s needs are properly met; the private market and the family.  Only 
when these break down should social welfare institutions come into play and then only temporarily”; Social Policy: An 
Introduction, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1974, pp.30-31.   
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Affairs, proponents in the media and universities called for such action544.  Changes that did occur were 
marginal but significant.  The great exception to this rule was the dramatic overhaul of housing policy.  
House building and expenditure fell, both due to the wider flag-ship policy of council house sales.  But 
also in pension policy the decision to break the link with earnings was of critical importance545.   
 However, it remained the case after two terms of Thatcherism that the welfare state was largely 
intact.  It is necessary to explain why this was the case if the nature and significance of what was to 
follow is to be properly understood.  A possible explanation may lie in the comment, by Ivor Crewe 
after the 1983 election, that Keynes may now be dead but not Beveridge546.  This is certainly true 
institutionally because the main institutions which co-ordinate and implement social policy, such as the 
comprehensive education system and the National Health Service, remained unreconstructed.  It was 
also, moreover, the case economically because the welfare state continued to be funded through general 
taxation (if not as progressive a form as it had been) and public expenditure rose each year - in marked 
contrast to explicit aims547.  This point is spelt out by John Clarke and Mary Langan: 
 
 “From the political agenda which the new right established and 
 from the hostility expressed towards the inefficiencies, inequities 
 and social and economic consequences of state welfare by senior  
 government figures during the 1980s, it would be reasonable to  
 expect evidence of a shrinking welfare state or declining public 
 spending on welfare.  In fact, this is not what we find when  
 
544 For a persuasive account  of the influence of think-tanks in the Conservative Party see R. Cockett, Thinking the 
Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983, op.cit.    
545 A. Deacon, ‘Spending more to achieve less?  Social security since 1945’, in D. Gladstone (ed.), British Social Welfare: 
Past, Present and Future, UCL Press, London, 1995, p.91. 
546 I. Crewe, The Guardian, 14 June 1983. 
547 The 1980 White Paper on Public Expenditure stated: “The Government intend to reduce public expenditure progressively 
in volume terms over the next four years”; The Government’s Expenditure Plans 1980-81 to 1983-84, Cmnd 7841, HMSO, 
1980, para.2.   
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 considering the patterns of public spending during the 1980s”548. 
 
There is a marked discrepancy between expectation and evidence.  Julian Le Grand describes the 
“robustness” of  a welfare system which, between 1974 and 1987, “successfully weathered an economic 
hurricane in the mid 1970s and an ideological blizzard in the 1980s”549.   A comprehensive study at the 
London School of Economics concluded that, “reports of the death of the welfare state have, like Mark 
Twain’s, been greatly exaggerated”550.  But why was British social policy not radically re-cast along the 
lines of a New Right agenda?  Why was the whole plethora of state provision not swept aside by the 
seemingly impervious incoming tide of thinking which focused on the market as opposed to the state, a 
thinking which after all, with thunderous parliamentary majorities, faced no real legislative check?     
 One feasible explanation concerns the historical role of the Conservative Party as an inherently 
pragmatic organization which sees itself as the natural party of government551, and is quite happy to let 
political realities of the day predominate over political ideas.  A  scepticism of ideas constitutes a 
significant conservative tradition and was central to the works of key conservative writers through the 
ages, from Edmund Burke to Michael Oakshott552.  This is born out in a recent work by Nicholas 
Timmins, The Five Giants553.  His interview with David Willetts, who was Thatcher’s health and social 
security adviser, now a Conservative M.P. and renowned proponent of New Right thinking, is 
important.  Willetts makes two points.  First, social policy was just simply not one of Thatcher’s 
priorities.  She was much more concerned with the economy in general, and privatization and the trade 
 
548 J. Clarke and M. Langhan, ‘Restructuring Welfare: The British Welfare Regime in the 1980s’, in A. Cochrane and J. 
Clarke (eds.), Comparing Welfare States: Britain in International Context, Open University and Sage Publications, London, 
1993, p.54.      
549 J. Le Grand, ‘The State of Welfare’, in J. Hills (ed.), The State of Welfare, op.cit., p.350. 
550 J. Hills, op.cit., p.1. 
551 Andrew Gamble argues that conservatism is better understood as a set of beliefs about governing (The Conservative 
Nation, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, 1974). 
552 N. O’Sullivan, Conservatism, Dent, London, 1976, ch.5. 
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unions in particular.  Second, he believes that she was fully aware of the possible political costs of 
changing the welfare state: 
 
 “She was keen on radical thinking and didn't mind people debating  
 all sorts of radical ideas in front of her; but she was reluctant to go  
 and implement, because she was aware of the political appeal of  
 institutions like the NHS.  People don't realise it.  But she was very  
 cautious.”554 
 
All of this may be true.  Alternatively, it could be an apologia for either the failure to translate 
ideological thinking into practical legislation, or a failure of political will which was supposedly the 
very hallmark of Thatcher’s legislative style.  Nevertheless, it certainly appears a plausible explanation 
that an election-centred machine may not want to risk the electoral wrath of an electorate which 
attached some of the welfare state’s institutions555 to its own sense of identity.  Sullivan believes that 
public opinion saved the welfare state from its potential destruction556.  Such a wholly political 
perspective may also have taken a more measured approach to the inevitable bureaucratic resistance it 
would have faced.  Practical problems of implementation are not to be under-estimated557. 
 However, following Margaret Thatcher’s record-breaking third successive general election 
victory in 1987, the picture began to change.  Anthony Seldon has written that of the entire post-war 
settlement “only the Welfare State remained largely intact into Mrs Thatcher’s third term of office.  But 
 
553  N. Timmins, The Five Giants, op.cit.  
554 D. Willetts, in N. Timmins, The Five Giants, op.cit., p.372. 
555 There was less public affinity, than say there was with the NHS, towards the social security system, and this was indeed one of 
the few areas which saw significant change with a move towards greater means-testing (A. Deacon, ‘Spending more to achieve 
less?  Social security since 1945’, in D. Gladstone (ed.), British Social Welfare: Past, Present and Future, UCL Press, London, 
1995, pp.87-91). 
556 M. Sullivan, The Politics of Social Policy, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1992. 
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after 1987 even the last bastion of consensus came under attack”558.  In the years between 1988 and 
1990, education, health and community care were extensively re-organised.  These were clearly not the 
periphery of the welfare state, but core services, central ‘merit goods’, institutions which pundits and 
politicians had taken to be sacrosanct for decades - to such a degree that they even appeared 
impenetrable to two whole terms of Thatcherism.  As one of Thatcherism’s prime thinkers, David 
Willetts, has said, from the mid-1980s the question became: “is there a Thatcherite way we can improve 
the quality of the welfare state services without the public having to pay for them?”559.  What then 
appears to have taken place is a significant re-think on the right.  Whatever the explanation, there was a 
change of strategy that seemed capable of bearing fruit for the Thatcherites.   
 If the market could not replace the state as the main provider of welfare, then the market could 
be infused into the state.  Such reforms were to have as much a cultural impact as they fell within the 
normal borders of social policy.  These quasi-markets560 challenged the whole ethos of the welfare state 
from within, aiming to implant market values into perceived ailing state bodies.  Why though were 
education, health and community care the focus of these reforms?  In many ways, they are central to the 
ethos of the welfare state so, by the same token, they had become open to question by those who had 
come to doubt the validity of both the means and end of social policy.  Notions of individuality, 
flexibility, openness, choice and accessibility were seen as alien to the delivery side of welfare which 
appeared marked far more for its paternalistic, uniform, centralised and bureaucratic nature.  Moreover, 
neither the end nor the objectives of the welfare state were seen as providing anything approaching an 
effectiveness of response, especially as this was now being measured against completely new criteria: 
 
557 D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes, Implementing Thatcherite Policies: Audit of an Era, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 
1992. 
558 A. Seldon, The Conservative Party since 1945, in T. Gourvish and A. O. Day (eds.), ‘Britain since 1945’, Macmillan, London, 
1991, p.233. 
559 D. Willetts, in N. Timmins, The Five Giants, op.cit., p.433. 
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the mantras of consumerism, rationality, markets and competition561.  Moreover, growing perceptions 
of anti-professionalism and ‘anti-expertism’, meant that there was room for such market manoeuvres562
 Public choice theorists argued that bureaucrats had an inherent tendency to self-interest and expansion 
that would only lead to waste and inefficiency, assertions which did not necessarily stand closer 
scrutiny563.   
 This is an important new phase in the development of the welfare state.  What was Labour’s 
response to these developments?  The Fabianism of Sidney and Beatrice Webb examined in Chapter 2 
and 3 was in many ways the welfare state’s ideological architecture.  Their work was crucial to the 
Labour Party’s faith in the potential of state institutions to alleviate social problems and achieve greater 
economic efficiency than could be delivered by the free market.  It was held that social research would 
lead to social reform.  As George Bernard Shaw wrote in 1896, one of the aims of the Fabian Society 
was “the collection and publication of authentic and impartial statistical tracts” in order to make “the 
public conscious of the evil conditions of society under the present system”.  By shaping the state itself 
around this idea, and creating bureaucracies, it was believed that age-old social problems could be 
eradicated.  A socialist paternalism therefore stood alongside conservative paternalism.  However, by 
the 1980s, the Fabian diggers of British social policy, the state bureaucrat and the expert, were reaching 
their graves quicker than they were reaching Jerusalem.   
 
3.  Labour’s ‘social politics’564 
 
 
560 J. Le Grand and W. Bartlett, Quasi Markets in Social Policy, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1993. 
561 The result of the reforms on these - their own - terms is uneven, as discussed in J. Le Grand and W. Bartlett, ibid.    
562 See J. M. Buchanan, The Economics of Politics, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1989.  
563 P. Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991.  
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There are three factors which explain Labour’s thinking on social policy in the 1980s.  They mirror 
precisely the factors behind economic policy discussed in the previous chapter.  The first concerns a 
reflection on the recent history of the welfare state and its own [leading] role in this history.  The second 
involves adjustment to the political context of the day, namely the relative successes and failures of the 
Thatcher governments.  The third, is the history of political ideas within which this study is based.   They 
led to one central claim: the structure of the welfare state and the assumptions behind it were incompatible 
with a whole plethora of issues and themes articulated in the 1980s.  The diagnosis of the ‘poverty trap’, 
demographic trends such as the ageing population, the changing nature of the family, the critique of the 
relationship between women and welfare, the related issue of child care, and the position of the disabled, all 
appeared at odds with the Beveridge framework.   
 It is not, unfortunately, as clear-cut as this.  The structure laid down in the Beveridge Report, 
although representing the broad framework of British social policy up to, as we have seen, the mid- to late-
1970s, did not constitute a monolith.  This was most evidently the case with the system of social security,  
which had evolved and, in some respects, escaped from the requisites underpinning the corpus of post-war 
social policy.  The most important example is the rise of means-tested benefits.  By the late 1970s, 5 
million people were dependent on means-tested supplementary benefits565.  This had nothing to do with 
either the Beveridge Report or the intentions of Attlee’s reform programme.  Means-tested benefits, 
referred to, by their proponents at least, by the 1980s as ‘targeted’ benefits, both preceded and 
succeeded Beveridge.  The difference in the 1980s was that government was now committed to moving 
 
564 The term social politics is used by Bentley Gilbert to describe a situation when the social policy of a state is under-going 
marked change; see British Social Policy: 1914-1939, Batsford, London, 1970. 
565 Supplementary Benefits Commission, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth, Report 
No.6, Lower Incomes, HMSO, London, Cmnd. 7175, 1978, p.28. 
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further toward means-tested benefits566, supplementing this strategy with a refusal to up-rate universal 
benefits in line with inflation567. 
 Through its response to developments in the welfare state, Labour in many ways took on the role 
of the conservative party in British politics568.  The party became the defender of the welfare state 
against the perceived Thatcherite onslaught.  It is an irony of both political ideas and political history: 
for the first time in its history the Labour Party found itself in the position of actually defending the 
welfare state’s status quo.  It had campaigned all through the 1920s and 1930s for the radical social 
reform which was seemingly delivered by its first majority government elected in 1945.  Future 
governments could not match it for the nature and extent of its social policy, but there were still some 
important developments569.  
 Politically it was an understandable posture.  Opinion polls consistently showed both majority 
support for the welfare state570 (which also highlighted a contradictory willingness for higher taxation 
for the purpose of additional expenditure which was not born out at election time) and a far greater trust 
of Labour over the Conservatives on social policy issues generally.  Empirical data is unclear: continual 
public support throughout the 1980s for a political agenda of progressive taxation and greater public 
expenditure was not matched by the willingness of the electorate to support Labour’s more 
redistributive socio-economic agenda, however moderate, in three consecutive general elections571.  So 
it was an instinctive political reaction for Labour to play such a defensive role, interpreting 
Conservative actions and proposals, particularly on health, as threats to the welfare state.  Such a 
 
566 N. Barr and F. Coulter, ‘Social Security: Solution or problem?’, in J. Hills (ed.), The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in 
Britain since 1974, op.cit., pp.277-283. 
567 Ibid.  
568 Anthony Giddens has made the same point, see Chapter 4, p.6. 
569 In particular, the creation of Child Benefit and the State Earnings Related Pensions Scheme (SERPS), both in 1975. 
570 Peter Taylor-Gooby, in British Social Attitudes, 8th Report, Dartmouth Publishing, Aldershot, 1991, pp.23-41.  
571 C. Pierson, ‘Social Policy’, in D. Marquand and A. Seldon, The Ideas that Shaped Post-War Britain, op.cit., pp.154-5. 
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situation was not one which left much room for fresh thinking within the Labour Party.  Social policy 
was one of the very few policy areas in which the party consistently scored higher than the 
Conservatives in opinion polls.  So it is perhaps not difficult to understand why, as Timmins has said, “a 
profound conservatism reigned”572.   
 Alongside such electoral considerations, however, there was a growing feeling that the welfare 
state was not something that should simply be defended in its totality.  Indeed there was a growing 
analysis, which had always existed on the left but grew more prominent in the 1980s, that there were 
fundamental problems.  A number of social policy’s leading thinkers voiced grave concerns, perfectly 
represented by Glennerster’s explication573.  Such texts, notably Walker’s Social Planning: A Strategy for 
Socialist Welfare574, were important not just because they directly triggered a re-think.  What they did 
was to form a movement of analysis and recognition which showed that: first, many of the 
developments of Thatcherism could and should be condemned; and second that, nonetheless, the 
solution was not to adopt the mantle of protectionism, and to form a blanket defence of the old 
institutions of the post-war settlement.  It was one thing to attack a perceived onslaught on the National 
Health Service, but quite another to present the party as the guardians of a welfare state which in reality 
was in urgent need of reform and re-invigoration.  The New Right managed to create great antagonism 
to much of the state system of services and benefits. 
 Julian Le Grand’s The Strategy of Equality575 was of great importance in provoking this re-
think.  Through a thorough demonstration that welfare was of the greatest value to the middle cla
concluded that “the strategy of equality through public provision has failed”576.  The text brought to a 
 
572 N. Timmins, The Five Giants, op.cit., p.487. 
573 H. Glennerster (ed.), The Future of the Welfare State, Heinemann, London, 1983, p. ??. 
574 A. Walker, Social Planning: A Strategy for Socialist Welfare, Blackwell, Oxford, 1984. 
575 J. Le Grand, The Strategy of Equality, Allen and Unwin, London, 1982. 
576 Ibid., p.151. 
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head many of the uncertainties that laid beneath the view that the Labour Party was the welfare state’s best 
protector and guarantor.  It drew out the ambiguous nature of the relationship between the Labour Party and 
a future approach to the welfare state.  For it showed that simply increasing spending did not in itself 
necessarily benefit the poor and/or narrow inequalities: 
 
 “Public expenditure on the social services has not achieved equality in any  
 of its interpretations.  Public expenditure on health care, education,  
 housing and transport systematically favours the better off, and thereby  
 contributes to inequality in final outcome”577.  
 
 Much of the new thinking on the social policy can be explained in terms of the relationship 
between those involved in the process and the political context.  This is particularly true when it comes 
to thinking on the welfare state.  Donald Sassoon is one who has observed the significance of such 
generational intellectual re-ordering.  He counters the view that the new thinking of the late 1980s can 
simply be referred to as “a right-wing, social-democratic takeover of ‘genuine’ socialist parties, as 
traditionalists have all too often lamented”.  Rather, he believes there to be a crucial difference between 
“Right-wing social democrats”, who are “pragmatic, trade-union orientated, statist and gradualist 
socialists”, with “little time for feminism or ecology, which they regarded as middle-class fads”; and 
those, who he terms “neo-revisionists”, who “often originated from the first ‘new left’, and had been 
deeply influenced by the new individualist politics of the 1960s and 1970s”578.  It is therefore necessary 
to re-connect this analysis with its historical context, in order to illustrate how Labour social policy 
thinking in the 1980s emerged.  The change in thinking - from establishing the welfare state to being 
 
577 Ibid., p.137. 
578 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, op.cit., p.736. 
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deeply critical of it - demonstrates perfectly the need for an historical context of political ideas. We then 
see that the basis of the dispute is actually a dispute over means not ends.      
 It is feasible to denote both a dominant tradition (the post-war welfare state) and a response to it. 
 The response is based on less homogeneity: there was no ‘new Beveridge’. At least part of the reason 
for this is the sheer breadth of the welfare state itself, a conception which covers the varied areas of 
health, education, social security, housing and the personal social services579.  However, if we examine 
the ideas behind this social policy thinking it is possible to present a shared analysis.  The critique of 
social policy by Labour intellectuals and politicians is not based on competing political ideas but, rather, 
is embedded in the ideational relationships traced here.  It is based on shared political values conceived 
in different contexts.  A new political, social and economic context produces a fresh attempt to orientate 
ideas.  To those who hold such ideas, it is necessary to instigate new policies to bring them about.  The 
means represent a nexus; irrespective of the  generation in which they are designed, they are responses 
to the same ideas.  
 Those who laid the foundations of the post-war welfare state and those who inherited it and 
(often) worked within it were the first generation of Labour politicians and thinkers who grew up in the 
heyday of the 1945-1950 Labour Government and the dramatic expansion of the institutions of the 
welfare state.  This was the socialism of the Fabians rather than the Guild Socialists580, the socialism of 
The New Statesman rather than New Age; the socialism of Herbert Morrison and the London County 
Council.  As Kenneth Morgan has written, the legacy of the first ever majority Labour Government was 
reverentially acclaimed by both the Gaitskellites and the Bevanites581.  Attlee’s was viewed as an 
epoch-making government.  Extensive social reform produced a much broader system of social security; 
 
579 For a detailed examination of the major developments in each of these policy areas, see the various contributions in J. Hills 
(ed.), The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974, op.cit., chs.3-7.  
580 Discussed in Chapter 2.  
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a fundamental council house-building programme and slum clearance; and the establishment of a free, 
universal health service.  This, together with the war-time coalition’s extension of free education to the 
age of 15 and its pledge to the future maintenance of full employment, clearly constitutes the largest 
single development of welfare in history582.       
 What is perhaps the most remarkable point is how soon Labour intellectuals and politicians 
began to question this framework.  By the early 1960s the central criticism was that the welfare state 
had failed to lead to the greater equality which many in the Labour Party had hoped for.  This coincided 
with what can be described as the ‘rediscovery of the poor’.  During the 1950s there was a general belief 
that poverty had been largely abolished.  There was a complacency that was epitomized by the assertion 
in Crosland’s The Future of Socialism that rising living standards, the welfare state and the progressive 
taxation system had virtually destroyed poverty583; and Labour’s 1964 manifesto spoke of “pockets of 
poverty”584.  A key player in this reappraisal of the welfare state was the ‘Child Poverty Action Group’, 
who were extremely hostile to the records of the Wilson and Callaghan Governments on poverty.  
Indeed, in 1970 it was sensationally claimed that “the poor had got poorer under Labour”585. 
 Most important of all, however, was the growing realisation that neither the economic system 
(based on full employment)586 nor the social system (based on social security) were capable of 
eliminating poverty587.  Towards the end of the 1974-79 Labour Administration, the Government’s 
‘Supplementary Benefits Commission’ concluded that the benefit offered recipients “incomes that are 
barely adequate to meet their needs at a level that is consistent with normal participation in the life of 
 
581 K. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945-51, op.cit. 
582 P. Hennessy, Never Again, Britain 1945-51, Jonathan Cape, London, 1992.  
583 A. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, op.cit.   
584 Labour Party, Let’s Go with Labour for the New Britain, 1964 General Election manifesto.   
585 Child Poverty Action Group, An Incomes Policy for Families, 1970, reprinted in F. Field, ‘Poverty and politics’, Heinemann 
Educational Books, London, 1982, ch.7.   
586 Examined in Chapter 4.  
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the relatively wealthy society in which they live”588.  There was a decisive role played here by social 
policy academics from the London School of Economics.  Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend’s The 
Poor and the Poorest showed not only the continuation of widespread poverty but also that of all the 
people in low expenditure households, a large minority (35%) were in households headed by a full-time 
worker589.  This was of critical importance because it had been widely assumed on the left that full 
employment was all that was required to abolish poverty.  If there was a crisis over means, however, 
there was also a crisis of confidence - public confidence.  In a review of the period up to 1979, David 
Donnison has demonstrated the great difficulty which arises when there is both general criticism of the 
welfare state and a continuation of ‘old’ problems:    
      
 “‘Middle England’ is not ready to be convinced by research and Blue    Books 
that benign public services will - or should - create a more  humane and a more equal society.  
Yet the old evils of capitalism  (unemployment, low wages and exploitation) for which Crosland  
 pronounced a requiem are still very much alive”590.   
  
A fundamental issue was the state itself. The ‘welfare state’ is just that, the ‘welfare state’.  The 
distinction between a Fabian, economic socialism and an ethical socialism centres on different 
conceptions of the state.  Anthony Crosland was in no doubt that the framework institutionalized by the 
Attlee government, based on Beveridge’s social policy and Keynes economic policy, was the right 
 
587 D. Piachaud, Poverty in Britain, Journal of Social Policy, vol.17, no.3,  pp.335-49.  
588 Supplementary Benefits Commission, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth, Report 
No.6, ‘Lower Incomes’, Cmnd 7175, HMSO, 1978, p.28.  
589 B. Abel-Smith and P. Townsend, The Poor and the Poorest, Bell, London, 1965, p.30. 
590 D. Donnison, Social Policy since Titmuss, Journal of Social Policy, April 1979, p.152.  
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one591.  The former had predominated in Labour Party thinking but as the welfare state faced criticism, 
the debate returned to these traditional arguments. The critique that the welfare state had become 
paternalistic and over-bearing, harsh and bureaucratic was difficult for Labour intellectuals to frame 
because the welfare state had also brought around significant gains592.  As this was becoming evident in 
1949, Tawney wrote: “The increase in the freedom of ordinary men and women during the last two 
generations has taken place, not in spite of the a1ction of governments, but because of it...The mother of 
liberty has, in fact, been law”593.   
 In The Socialist Case, published two years earlier, Douglas Jay wrote: “in the case of nutrition 
and health, just as in the case of education, the Gentleman in Whitehall really does know better what is 
good for people than the people know themselves”594.  This quote exemplifies the emergent conflict 
between the state and the individual, a relationship which challenged the ‘supporters’ of the welfare 
state to question whether social policy was a threat to freedom.  By the early 1980s, these arguments 
were being articulated.  There were calls for the democratization of social policy, an agenda which 
included greater participation by the users of services595.  In an article written for The Times in 1983 
entitled ‘Take the heavy hand out of the welfare state’, David Donnison observed that “when the 
education authorities decided to provide nursery schooling they laboured for years to create an 
inadequate and very expensive all-professional system, operating at times of the day and for periods of 
the year which were devised to suit teachers, not children or their parents”596. 
 Criticism denotes state services run for the benefit of those working in them, rather than those 
they were designed to serve and who often paid for them.  The critique of the  phenomenon of 
 
591 As discussed in Chapter 3.  
592 Described in Chapter 3.  
593 R. H. Tawney, The Radical Tradition, Pelican, London, 1964, p.169. 
594 D. Jay, The Socialist Case, Penguin, London, 1947, p.258. 
595 M. Wicks, A Future for All: Do We Need a Wefare State?, Penguin, London, 1987, ch.11.  
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“producer capture” has been traced to both socialist thinking in the 1970s and the New Right critique of 
welfare, as well as the latter’s analytical stable-mate, public choice theory597.  Described in 1990 as one 
of the “central disciplines in the critique of state welfare”, public choice theory undermined the “naive 
assumption of ‘public service’, arguing that there is no reason to assume public bureaucrats will comply 
with their organizations’ explicit ends of public welfare”598.  The relationship here between the New 
Right and Labour thinkers on social policy needs to be carefully disentangled.  A New Right attack on a 
spiralling bureaucracy elicits a straightforward engagement of political ideas with state welfare.  But the 
Labour Party created the welfare state and the bureaucracies and providers which go with it.  There is 
no reason, however, why increasing levels of bureaucracy should be defended per se; unless, that is, 
such an increase produced a corresponding increase in welfare or provision of the benefit or service in 
question599.  The same is true with the issue of value for money and efficiency.  Greater accountability 
and transparency in social policy would automatically lead to calls for greater cost-effectiveness, but 
how is this to be distinguished from a Conservative agenda of plain  cost-cutting.  This leads to difficult 
question of producer interests - a problematic issue indeed for a party of labour.  Jack Straw put it like 
this: “those of us who believe in the sustained use of public money should have a far greater interest in 
the efficiency of the public sector: far more to gain from efficiency, than ever the welfare state’s 
detractors”600. 
 The party’s thinking on government and administration is historically based on the 
parliamentary road to socialism, the potential of central government and the local authority to 
 
596 D. Donnison, ‘Take the heavy hand out of the welfare state’, The Times, 4 March 1983.  
597 D. Anderson, ‘The state of the social policy debate’, in N. Manning and C. Ungerson (eds.), Social Policy Review 1989-90, 
Longman/Social Policy Association, Essex, 1990, pp.33-34.  
598 Ibid., p.34.  
599 M. Wicks, A Future for All: Do We Need a Wefare State?, op.cit., pp.225-6.  
600 J. Straw, speech to Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy Annual Conference, 5 June 1984, p.6. 
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implement radical reform601.  As we have seen, in terms if ideas, this is based on the Fabian influence 
on the Labour movement, and its top-down, expert-led approach to solving social problems602.  The 
position of the ‘benevolent bureaucrat’, however, was increasingly undermined by an analysis of the 
welfare state’s growing complexity603.  
Within such a context it is difficult to see how values of empowerment and accountability could be 
promoted by socialists.  It is feasible to see how the New Right could attack the welfare state for failing 
on these counts.  Its agenda, or at least the rhetoric behind the agenda (we have explored the reasons 
why these stated objectives were not realised), was clear: state welfare threatened individual freedom 
and should be radically reduced.  But for the Labour Party, embedded in its traditions, a double-sided 
appraisal of this history and an opposition to Thatcherism, social policy thinking is deeply problematic. 
          
 Labour’s Policy Review indicates the impact many of these arguments had.      There was an 
attempt to reverse, or at least redress the imbalance of a ‘top-down’ elitist welfare system.  There was a 
shift away from the state and the expert, towards accountability and participation, with numerous 
proposals on service delivery and local input604.  There was, as Peter Alcock has commented, a growing 
“focus on individual enforcement of rights to welfare and user participation in local planning of the delivery 
of welfare services”605.  There was certainly some cross-over with New Right ideas, as well as sharp 
opposition.  There was growing talk - from the right - of dependency, that many social security 
claimants and their families were completely dependent upon their provision.  The result was said to be 
 
601 M. Wicks, A Future for All: Do We Need a Welfare State?, op.cit., p.131.  
602 See Chapter 2, p.16. 
603 Barbara Wooton has argued that ‘complexity’ was a giant that should be added to Beveidge’s ‘five giant evils’; B. Wooton, in 
P. Bean and S. MacPherson (eds.), Approaches to Welfare, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, 1983, p.286.   
604 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, The Labour Party, London, 1989, sect.4, ‘A Fairer Community: Report 
of the Policy Review Group on Economic Equality’, pp.29-39.     
605 P. Alcock, ‘The Labour Party and the welfare state’, p.143. 
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fundamental damage to individual character and responsibility606.  An arguable irony here is that it was 
successive Conservative governments in the 1980s that created dependency.  The tripling of 
unemployment by the beginning of the following decade, from one million to three million, was the 
most significant statistic607.  The huge growth of long-term unemployment - particularly of the young - 
was widely seen as the most dramatic example of the phenomenon.  Likewise, the rise in the numbers of 
lone-parent families, and the high proportion of these on benefit608, was seen as indicative of a social 
security system which seemed better at keeping claimant on benefits than in propelling them back into 
work.   
 The existence and extent of  poverty is explicitly recorded, and its implications for  future 
policy.  The argument is forged both as an attack on Conservative governments and a more broad 
critique of post-war social policy:  
 
 “Nearly half a century after the publication of the Beveridge Report  
 which promised an end to want in Britain, there are still millions of  
 people living in poverty.  Over the past ten years their numbers have 
 grown from 11 million people in 1979 to over 15 million today”609. 
     
What is remarkable about poverty in Britain, the Report of the Policy Review Group on Economic 
Equality (1989) argues, “is not just that it is so widespread, but that so many families are poor at a  time 
when many on top incomes have enjoyed unprecedented new wealth, financed in part by government 
tax cuts.  But growing inequalities are not recognised by this government as a sign of failure in their 
 
606 V. George and P. Wilding, Welfare and Ideology, op.cit., p.31-4. 
607 HMSO, The Government’s Expenditure Plans 1991-92 to 1992-93.  
608 J. Hills, The Future of Welfare: A guide to the debate, revised edition, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York, 1997, pp.30-38. 
609 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change: A New Agenda for Britain, op.cit., p.29. 
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social and economic policies”610.  It follows explicitly from this that the ‘success’ of a future Labour 
administration’s social policy depends on a reduction in inequality.         
 The result of such thinking was the development of the notion of ‘pathways out of poverty’ to 
independence611: 
 
 “We must enable people to be independent, by opening doors to 
 those denied an opportunity to work.  Creating better childcare 
 services will help thousands of single mothers to get jobs.   
 Investment in the regions and our new training programme will 
 help the long-term unemployed to work again”612.  
The emphasis is on increasing individual freedom and not equality, indicating the influence of the 
thinking of the market socialists613.  This involved a quite brutal analysis of past Labour policy, in and 
out of government office, which was seen to have emphasised increasing the levels of individual 
benefits more than actually thinking about ways in which claimants could successfully re-enter the job 
market, receive training or education.  Such thinking was conceived from an earlier, critical analysis of 
means-testing614 and the idea of the ‘poverty trap’615.  The poverty trap was defined as a situation 
whereby the benefit claimant’s transition from recipient to worker and tax-payer could have the effect 
of only a marginal net increase or even a reduction in total income616.  This term was as much a 
criticism of the welfare state in general as it was of the then Conservative government’s social security 
policy.  It had become increasingly apparent that the conventional arrows of social policy were now 
 
610 Ibid., p.29.  
611 Ibid., pp.29-31.  
612 Ibid., p.29.  
613 The most significant assertion of market socialism was that freedom was more important than equality; Chapter 4, pp.23-28. 
614 A. Deacon and J. Bradshaw, Reserved for the Poor: The means-test in British Social Policy, Basil Blackwell/Martin 
Robertson, London, 1983. 
615 The term originates from an article in the New Statesman by Frank Field and David Piachaud; 3 December 1971, p.772-3.  
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falling wide of the mark. 
 Labour’s opposition (in the Policy Review) to means-testing as a central strategy of social 
security policy is fundamentally different to the Conservatives, certainly bearing no resemblance to a 
‘Thatcherite revisionism’.   There is a classic divide in the social policy literature between advocates of 
means-testing universalism.  Labour and the Conservatives fall across the same lines.  The Review 
states: “A central objective of our Social Insurance strategy is to reduce the need for means-tested 
benefits by providing insurance benefits as of right, both to those who have contributed in the past  and 
to those who, given the opportunity, will contribute in the future”617.   
 However, it was not just the welfare system that was causing concern but the mechanism of 
provision as well.  A further complaint was that services appeared to be run for the benefit of 
professionals rather than welfare recipients.  This is also problematic because the main practical reason 
for the creation of the party was to represent labour, and so the Labour Party is strongest at representing 
workers such as the providers of the post-war welfare state and less so at considering the interests of 
users.  This is particularly true in a social security system where means-testing predominates because staff 
are compelled to challenge claimants to prove their poverty618.  The pressure on staff is “not to ensure that 
applicants secure their rights, but to see that nobody gets a penny to which they are not entitled”619.  Labour 
view the staff to be just as much the victims of the system as benefit claimants and propose the recruitment 
of substantial numbers of extra staff, more hospitable reception areas and a commitment to secure a higher 
proportion of benefit  take-up through extra publicity620.     
 Certain priorities were highlighted, however, where the resultant proposals were more familiar: 
 
616 A good brief account of the mechanics of the poverty trap is given in J. Roll, Understanding Poverty, Family Policy Studies 
Centre, London, 1992. 
617 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change: A New Agenda for Britain, op.cit., p.34.   
618 Labour Party, Social Justice and Economic Efficiency, op.cit., p.20.   
619 Ibid.  
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an increase in social security benefits.  The Economic Equality document identified three groups who 
“have first claim on improvements in benefits - pensioners, children and people with disabilities”621.  
On pensions, a commitment of no less than the 1987 manifesto pledge of an immediate £8 a week for 
married couples and £5 for single pensioners was one of the cornerstones of the document.  After this 
first year increase, the promise was made to restore the formula, broken by the Conservatives,  which 
linked the uprating of pensions with prices or earnings, whichever was higher.  The Policy Review 
signalled a return to the principle of the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS).  Every future 
pensioner will receive an earnings-related supplement on top of the basic pension, based on the 
contributor’s twenty best years of earnings.   
 With regard to children, two points predominate: the party’s attitude to Child Benefit and its 
explication on the issue of child care.  A strategy to radically improve the availability of child care was 
devised as a prime ‘pathway out of poverty’.  The “lack of appropriate childcare makes it almost 
impossible for many families - particularly lone parents - to continue in paid work”622.  Furthermore, 
the promise was made to increase Child Benefit and a rigorous defence was made of the benefit as
universal entitlement623.    
 The issue of disability is a classic example of a social phenomenon624 which the ‘Beveridge 
welfare state’ does not address.  The Economic Equality paper asserts that fundamental reform of the 
system of benefits for the disabled is essential625.  Labour sees this as a key example of an area 
requiring ‘pathways to independence’; and again this entails reducing or removing means-tested 
benefits.  Labour will “introduce a new Disability Benefit which will provide assistance with the extra 
 
620 Ibid.  
621 Ibid., p.35. 
622 Ibid., p.30.  
623 Ibid., p.36.  
624 As such, it is similar to the rise in the numbers of single parents, discussed below.  
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or disability”626.     
                                                                         
costs of disability matched to the degree of disability.  It will also supply a guaranteed income witho
means-test for people with disabilities of working-age who cannot obtain employment by reason of 
long-term illness 
  
 The post-war settlement, both its institutions and policies, were inappropriate to welfare 
demands.  This is the case for two reasons: first, through economic conditions, primarily claimant 
numbers and expenditure on benefit levels; second, due to the impact of demographic and social 
change, in particular the rising elderly population and changing nature of the family. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fusion of social and economic policy   
 
 
At the beginning of the previous chapter the point was made that the separation between social policy 
 
625 Labour Party, Social Justice and Economic Efficiency, op.cit., p.36.  
626 Ibid., p.37.  
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and economic policy is problematic.  There is no clear dividing line and there are central issues, such as 
unemployment, which are both social and economic problems.  It was agreed, however, that it was pertinent 
to proceed with the traditional divide (traditional, both in government and academically).  Both ‘thinker-
politicians’ and Labour intellectuals largely adopt the dichotomy.  It is an unequal relationship, however, for 
the welfare state is conventionally taken to be subordinate to economic policy.  “In some ways”, Vic George 
and Paul Wilding have written in their Welfare and Ideology, “the key issue which divides perspectives on 
the proper role of the state in welfare is the judgement about whether or not government can successfully 
manage the economy to achieve certain economic and social purposes.  The post-Second World War 
welfare state in Britain was based very explicitly on this assumption - that the economy could be managed 
to secure full employment and such an economy could afford a developing welfare state”627.  As we have 
seen, from the mid-1970s very different political ideas came to challenge this.  The break-up of the agenda 
set by Beveridge, Crosland and Keynes, centring on a reliance on continuing economic growth, had vital 
implications for public expenditure and therefore the welfare state, as we saw above.  But the nature of the 
imbalance between social and economic policy did not change.  A very different set of economic objectives, 
based on reducing taxation and public expenditure, automatically implied an end, even reversal, of any 
‘developing welfare state’.  The relationship of social policy with economic policy was marked by 
subservience not symbiosis.  Esping-Anderson has illustrated the connection between the welfare state and 
the labour market628, noting for example the “organization of social services, particularly for women, is 
decisive for a nation’s employment structure”629.   
 Although this study has separated economic policy with social policy in traditional fashion - and 
there remain clear reasons for doing so - an emergent analysis, of great relevance to the welfare state, 
 
627 V. George and P. Wilding, Welfare and Ideology, op.cit., 1994, p.195.   
628 G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990, ch.6.   
629 Ibid., p.58.  
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criticised this division.  There are two component parts to this critique.   First, it takes the form of a 
critique of the Beveridge/Keynes/Crosland analysis which is argued to prioritise the economy over 
welfare.  A successful economy will produce growth which can be channelled into welfare.  It follows 
from this that an economy in recession will not be able to improve expenditure on welfare, and may in 
fact have to decrease the volume of such expenditure (if economic policy is so prioritised this clearly 
follows).  Second, this division may mean that the very goals of social policy (redistribution, greater 
equality, citizenship) are unattainable.  Inequalites of wealth and income widened between 1983 and 
1992630.  Julian Le Grand argued that this is to the great detriment of the welfare state because the better 
off are able to make more effective use of welfare services631.  The analysis was not new; many on the 
left had flagged up the welfare state’s relative impotence in a wider context of economic inequalities, as 
we have seen, since the early 1960s632.  Hence David Donnison’s conclusion - that social policy “is not 
something to turn to only when economic problems have been solved.  It is itself one of the problems, and at 
the same time an essential foundation of their solution”633 - drew out this critique as well as pointing to a 
way forward.  It follows, as Alcock has argued, that social policy and economic policy should be planned 
together634. 
 An important explanation for these problems lies in the relationship between social policy and 
economic policy.  The prime presupposition behind the so-called post-war consensus was that the 
former was dependent upon the latter.  That is to say that a growing economy would lead to extra social 
expenditure.  The possibility of no or little growth was not discussed.   There was thus an implicit 
admittance that social policy was of secondary importance.  A key ideological development of the 
 
630 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Inquiry into Income and Wealth, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York, 1995, vol.1. 
631 J. Le Grand, The Strategy of Equality, op.cit., p.3. 
632 Discussed pp.19-20. 
633 D. Donnison, A Radical Agenda, Rivers Oram Press, London, 1991, p.146.  
634 P. Alcock, ‘The Labour Party and the welfare state’, op.cit., p.144. 
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1980s was the analysis of this polarisation and the call for its eradication.  This occurred on the right of 
British politics as well as the left. Thatcherism entailed a reversal of the mechanics of this dichotomy.  
Economic success would not be achieved if its one purpose was to fatten an already colossal and 
pampering welfare state.  This thinking again accepted that economics were superior, but for an entirely 
different purpose.  Central to New Right thinking, as we have seen, were the notions that a truly free 
society was based on a vision of negative liberty, an enterprise culture and a minimal welfare state.  In 
legislative terms in the 1980s this translated into a package of tax cuts and greater means-testing in 
social security, although it can be argued that Thatcher failed in her overall socio-economic strategy 
because public expenditure rose for every one of her years in office635.  
 The theoretical backbone of the post-war settlement was in many ways pure Fabianism; and the 
two most important theses of the Webbs’ socialism were conducive to the perpetuation of the economic-
social split: there was both an assertion of the primacy of the state and of economic policy636.  On the 
other hand, it can be added that the social policy field has been too narrow in its disregard of economics. 
 The welfare state in the 1980s was clearly influenced more by macro-economic policy than 
developments in social policy and administration, notwithstanding the very important changes that did 
occur due to legislation in this field.  But certainly the return of mass unemployment had more of an 
impact upon the welfare of individuals than, say, social security, housing, health policy, or any of the 
other traditional areas of social policy.  It also had massive implications for public expenditure in terms 
of its cost637.  Often the social policy literature is at fault for neglecting this issue.  Indicative of this is 
the core social policy text, The State of Welfare, written by academics from the Welfare State 
 
635 The Government’s Expenditure Plans 1981-82 to 1983-84 sets out reducing public expenditure as the prime economic 
objective.  
636 See Chapter 2. 
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Programme at the London School of Economics in 1990638, which failed to comprehend the relevance 
of mass unemployment639
 It seemed especially necessary to understand the connection between economic and social policy 
in view of the apparent contradiction between Labour’s existing policies and the analysis that the 
existing social policy framework had become out-dated.  That is, to say that the post-war settlement, 
both its institutions and policies were inappropriate to welfare demands.  This is the case for two 
reasons.  First, through economic conditions, primarily claimant numbers and expenditure on benefit 
levels.  Second, due to the impact of demographic and social change, in particular the rising elderly 
population and changing nature of the family. 
 One of the main products of this re-thinking was the commitment to the introduction of a 
minimum wage, in both the 1987 manifesto and then again in the Policy Review.  This accepted much 
research, both quantitative and qualitative, particularly by the Low Pay Unit, that poor pay could lead to 
social hardship and poverty in the same way as joblessness.  This was a classic example of the inter-
connection of economic and social policy on the British left in the 1980s.  For it made the tacit point: is 
poverty a social problem or an economic one?  Clearly, it is both.  Thus it should be tackled as such - in 
the form of a joint social-economic strategy.  For alternatively, a social policy approach alone might 
involve what Pete Alcock describes as “recourse to extensive means-tested support for low wages”640.  
Neither is this a withdrawal by the Labour Party from radical economic reform; rather, the opposite is 
true, as Alcock again writes: 
 
637 This issue is powerfully discussed by various contributors in A. Glyn and D. Miliband (eds.), Paying for Inequality: The 
Economic Cost of Social Injustice, IPPR/Rivers Oram Press, London, 1994; in particular, J. Philpott, ‘The Incidence and Cost of 
Unemployment’.   
638 J. Hills (ed.), The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990. 
639 The book’s structure is illustrative of the error, with chapters on each of the established subjects in social policy (there is a 
wider issue here about the technicalities of classifying academic areas). 
640 P. Alcock, ‘The Labour Party and the welfare state’, op.cit., p.144.  
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 “...implementing it will require a future government to engage  
 in a level of intervention in economic development previously  
 avoided by post-war administrations”641. 
 
The minimum wage pledge is significant for another reason.  For not only does it unite the social and 
economic arenas; it transcends them.  It does this by strengthening what democratic socialists regard as 
the ethical dimension of the welfare state, its bond of citizenship and mutual rights, which Esping-
Andersen has referred to as “de-commodification”642.    
 The minimum wage was especially targeted by Labour at women643 trapped, according to Jane 
Lewis and David Piachaud, “in a vicious circle of domestic responsibilities, and low pay, low status 
employment”644.  This fits into a broader context: the changing role of women and the structure of the 
family.  This is another area in which the old predominance of economics over welfare fails to provide a 
purposeful evaluation of new problems requiring action.  The Family Policy Studies Centre has 
highlighted the radical demographic and social changes in the modern family645.  Again, this can be 
elucidated by way of comparison with the post-war welfare state.  When William Beveridge wrote his 
momentous report, Social Insurance and Allied Services646, the role of women was conceived in terms 
of a once-married, non-working, child-bearing lifestyle.  By the 1980s, however, divorce and re-
marriage rates were much higher (one in three new marriages are expected to end in divorce), and 
cohabitation had increased dramatically (accounting for 20% of single women by the end of the 
 
641 Ibid. 
642 G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990, ch.2.  
643  Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, op.cit., p.33. 
644 J. Lewis and D. Piachaud, ‘Women and Poverty in the Twentieth Century’, in C. Glendinning and J. Millar (eds.), Women and 
Poverty in Britain, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1987, p.31.   
645 K. Kiernan and M. Wicks, Family Change and Future Policy, Family Policy Studies Centre and Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
London, 1990. 
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decade); twice as many married women were working (30% in 1951; 60% by 1987); 25% of children 
were born outside of wedlock; and more and more mothers were seeking an early return to employment 
(by 1987, nearly half of mothers with children aged 3-4 were in work, if mainly only part-time)647.   
 Such research raises the question of the efficacy of traditional Labour thinking on social policy.  
Is Labour equipped with the necessary policy tools to react to such fundamental change?  Or do 
fundamental changes in society necessitate a new analysis and political response?  It became 
increasingly evident that the welfare state was ill-prepared for these developments.  The feminist 
critique of welfare648 argued that the welfare state was ill at ease with these developments.  It has been 
powerful in pointing to male domination at the time of the welfare state’s inception649.  Indeed, 
according to one leading expert in the social policy field, in the 1980s, “the gender analysis of welfare 
became the dominant perspective in the academic study of social policy”650.  Labour did appear to 
respond to this analysis.  The conception of ‘pathways out of poverty’ was directly aimed at women.  
“Women form the majority of the poor today”, concluded the Policy Review, and more “women then 
men claim means-tested income maintenance benefits”651.   
 Feminist thinking on social policy was particularly concerned with citizenship.  A major 
development in social policy in the 1980s was the linkage of social policy with notions of citizenship.  It 
was argued that the welfare state was a patriarchal construction - designed by men for men - which 
consequently excluded the role and concerns of women in its assumptions.  It follows therefore that this is 
 
646 W. Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services, op.cit. 
647 All of these statistics are from K. Kiernan and M. Wicks, Family Change and Future Policy, op.cit. 
648 For an over-view see V. George and P. Wilding, Welfare and Ideology, op.cit., ch.6. 
649 F. Williams, Social Policy: A Critical Introduction, Polity, Cambridge, 1989.  
650 D. Gladstone, ‘The welfare state and the state of welfare’, in D. Gladstone (ed.), British Social Welfare: Past, Present and 
Future, op.cit., p.23. 
651 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, op.cit., p.29. 
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reflected in the structure of social service provision and in the provision of social security652.  Once this 
analysis has been made there are ramifications for the whole framework of taxation and social security, 
which has been shown to discriminate against unmarried, cohabiting women, single women and women 
wishing to re-enter the labour market after child birth.  Child care became therefore an issue of both 
social and economic significance, and policies were put forward on child care and nursery education in 
a document published in 1991, Family Prosperity653.  This appears to offer a solution to the long-
standing problem for government of whether to regard lone-parents as “mothers or as workers, in other 
words whether to promote dependence on the state or the labour market”654.   
 It was further agreed that a ‘Ministry for Women’ would be established655.  Labour argued that 
the establishment of a separate government department for women would do much to over-turn the 
prejudices and contradictions which so marked British social policy656.  It was argued that there is also 
an intrinsic economic logic, for how efficient is it to deny an ailing economy skilled women due to a 
lack of government investment in the provision of child care?657  It was argued in Social Justice and 
Economic Efficiency that greater child care, more flexibility in working hours and statutory parental 
leave would “ensure that women genuinely enjoy equal opportunities at work, and therefore realise their 
contribution to efficient production”658.  Thus it was contended that moves towards real sexual equality 
are both economically efficient and socially just. 
  
 
 
652 F. Williams, Social Policy: A Critical Introduction, op.cit.    
653 Labour Party, Family Prosperity, The Labour Party, London, 1991.   
654 J. Lewis, Women in Britain since 1945, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, p.43. 
655 Labour Party, A New Future for Women: Labour’s Programme for Women, The Labour Party, London, 1989.   
656 Ibid.  
657 Labour Party, Social Justice and Economic Efficieny, op.cit., p.12.  
658 Ibid.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
The prominent social policy historian, Bentley Gilbert, used the term social politics to describe a situation 
when the social policy of a state is unclear or under-going marked change659.  He used it to describe 
Britain’s social policy in the 1930s, contending that social policy was in a period of turmoil because the 
existing structure was in no position to address the particular social and economic situation of the time, 
in particular mass unemployment and poverty.  British social policy, as we have seen, has been marked 
by a process of evolution rather than the programmatic transformation which some writers believe best 
describes Labour’s post-war reforms660.  Gilbert’s conception does not contradict this - there are periods 
of far-reaching reform, of public confidence in the welfare system, and periods of uncertainty.   
 Social politics is a term which is extremely useful in understanding Labour’s social policy and 
the political ideas behind it between 1983 and 1992.  Gilbert wrote that social politics emerges when 
“the consensus on social policy breaks down”661.  This was true in the 1930s when state provision was 
judged by many as inadequate in the face of severe poverty and deprivation.  It is also true of the 
welfare state in the 1980s.  Not only was the governing Conservative Party advocating a different set of 
social policy priorities, but Labour was also beginning to call into question its advocacy of the status 
quo.  On one level, it is easy to understand the indictment of Nicholas Timmins, that when “the 
 
659 B. Gilbert, British Social Policy: 1914-1939, op.cit. p.305. 
660 Thus Victor George’s view that legislation after the Second World War was “significant in social policy thinking” because it 
was “an excellent example of comprehensive instead of piecemeal thinking”; Social Security and Society, Routledge and Keegam 
Paul, London, 1973, p.24.   
661 B. Gilbert, British Social Policy: 1914-1939, op.cit., p.305.  
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Conservatives unleashed their storm of new thinking on welfare state structures in education, social services 
and health after 1987, Labour was neither remotely prepared nor intellectually equipped”662.  This is an 
understandable point of view: Labour’s defensive posture appeared unexciting and weak in the face of 
the sheer dynamism of the Conservative’s reforms in the late 1980s (although we have seen how the 
quasi-market reforms did not match the promised radicalism of the political ideas of the New Right).   
 However, this is an observation of Labour policy up to the Policy Review, and of the party’s 
day-to-day rhetorical response to the actions of government.  In contrast, Labour’s social policy 
thinking was vibrant and potentially of more significance than anything since Crosland’s analysis of the 
welfare state and socialism in the 1950s.  Labour’s 1982 Programme663 and the election manifesto of the 
following year664 noted none of the developments examined  here and thus offered no solution to them.  
The socio-economic presuppositions of these documents were firmly in the mould of the party 
manifestos of the 1970s.  None of the acute social and economic trends discussed above were 
acknowledged, and Labour did appear to play the role of the conservative party of British politics, as 
Anthony Giddens has argued.  However, we have seen how many academics and Labour politicians 
were challenging the very assumptions and institutional framework of the post-war welfare state which 
is based on the ideas of Beveridge, Crosland and Keynes, among others.  This was challenged from 
different perspectives, but it all amounts to a coherent critique which perceives a welfare regime based 
more on bureaucracy, elitism and paternalism than on flexibility, accountability and democracy.  It was 
seen to fail to deliver on traditional objectives (greater equality, alleviating poverty), appearing 
incongruous and unable to adapt to social and demographic change.   
 The recent developments in the welfare state have exposed the conjunction between Labour ideas 
 
662 N. Timmins, op.cit., p.489. 
663 Labour Party, Labour’s Programme 1982, The Labour Party, London, 1982.   
664 Labour Party, The New Hope for Britain, the Labour Party, London, 1983.   
 173 
 
 
 
                    
and policy.  Digby Anderson wrote the following in 1990: “At least one strand of socialist social policy 
thinking had indeed criticized the services for failing the clients especially in the early 1970s...But suddenly 
when the producers of welfare services came ‘under attack’ from Conservative ‘cuts’, the critics forgot their 
care for the consumers and rallied to ‘defend essential services’.  The Policy Review, however, made an 
important start in putting this right.  There was a decisive shift in thinking away from the state towards 
the citizen; notions of choice, empowerment and accountability lined up against a bureaucratic and 
uniform welfare state.  The influence of the New Right is undeniable.  The view of economic liberalism 
is that if the state over-reaches into the socio-economic sphere, individual choice and therefore liberty 
are threatened.  The re-emergence of these ideas by the New Right should not be seen as remarkable 
when the welfare state was in crisis (although their ideas were ventilated rather less during the years of 
the welfare state’s post-war design and consolidation in the 1950s and 1960s665). 
 The New Right had a marked influence on the work of Labour intellectuals in the 1980s, a fact 
acknowledged by thinkers such as Plant.  It is also the case that their political thinking draws from one 
strand of British socialism: ethical socialism666.  Although not the prime influence of Labour 
governments, it has remained strikingly salient in Labour’s political thinking.  Nicholas Ellison had 
distinguished between three sets of political ideas (he refers to visions): Keynesianism, technocratic and 
qualitative socialism667.  Qualitative socialism, or what we have been calling ethical socialism, has 
formed the political ideas basis of this welfare critique.  It bears stark resemblance to the dispute 
examined in Chapter 2 between the Fabians and the ethical socialists over the role of the state within 
socialism.          
 
665 It is rarely noted that Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, op.cit., which was so central to the debate on the welfare state from the 
mid-1970s, was first published to very little effect in 1944.  Hayek’s work was certainly a defiant effort in the last full year of a 
coalition government which designed much of the post-war social policy agenda, notably the Employment White Paper of the 
same year, and only months before the election of the Attlee government.   
666 Chapter 2, pp.14-17.  
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 There are also clear distinctions and points of departure from New Right social policy thinking.  
How does Labour’s social policy thinking relate to the broader debate on the ‘meaning’ of the Policy 
Review?  The view articulated here is that an understanding of Labour’s social policy revision and 
social policy ideas requires the stated contextualization.  Within this - but only as one part within this - 
lies the influence of New Right ideas and Thatcherite policy.  The hypothesis of commentators like 
Colin Hay and Gregory Elliott, that the Policy Review simply co-opted Thatcherism in the form, as Hay 
argues, of a “politics of catch-up”668, is not born out.  An analysis that is overtly deterministic only 
prevents an authentic account of what actually took place.  Labour’s opposition to a means-tested 
system which blocks “pathways out of poverty” contrasts with the central role means-testing played in 
the social policy of successive Conservative governments.  On the issue of up-rating benefits, Labour 
opposed the actions of Conservative governments.  It was estimated at the time that if in 1989 the 
provisions and up-rating policy had been the same as 1979, the total benefits budget would have been 
ten per cent higher669.  What Labour did co-opt was much of the feminist critique of welfare and the 
beginning of specific policy pledges in this direction, from pledges on child care to independence for 
women in the taxation system670.  This too appears at odds with the ‘catch-up’ thesis, unless that is, it is 
to ‘catch-up’ with feminist social policy.              
Ideas to democratize and decentralize the welfare state in fact bear a striking resemblance to the 
ideas behind ethical socialism.  “I feel sure”, G. D. H. Cole wrote, “that a Socialist Society that is to be 
true to its equalitarian principles of humanitarian brotherhood must rest on the widest possible diffusion 
of power and responsibility, so as to enlist the active participation of as many of its citizens in the task 
 
667 Discussed in Chapter 1. 
668 C. Hay, ‘Labour’s Thatcherite Revisionism: Playing the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’, op.cit.   
669 J. Millar, ‘Bearing the Cost’, in S. Becker (ed.), Windows of Opportunity, Child Poverty Action Group, London, 1991, pp.9-
21.  
670 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, op.cit., p.33.  
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of democratic self-government”671.    
 The difference between the New Right and the new Labour thinking is based on the distinction 
between negative and positive liberty.  It was a direct echo of the classical liberal/new liberal divide, a 
separation which, as we have seen, brought the new liberalism very close to ethical socialism.  L. T. 
Hobhouse argued:   
 
 “In the socialistic presentment...[the expert] sometimes looks strangely  
 like the powers that be - in education, for instance, a clergyman under  
 a new title, in business that very captain of industry who at the outset  
 was the Socialist’s chief enemy.  Be that as it may, as the “expert” comes  
 to the front, and “efficiency” becomes the watchword of administration,  
 all that was human in Socialism vanishes out of it”672. 
 
 In his history of the welfare state, which ends where we begin in 1983, Derek Fraser remarks 
that “it is at least arguable that social policy influenced ideas as much as the other way round”673.  In 
this examination of the political ideas behind Labour’s social policy, it is apparent that this continues to 
be the case.  
 
671 G. D. H. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, vol.5, Macmillan, London, 1960.   
672 L. T. Hobhouse, quoted in R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, op. cit., p. 21. 
673 D. Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State, op.cit., p.xxvi. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
   
 
 “As the twentieth century was coming to a close, socialists could  
 not but re-examine, yet again, the framework of their doctrine.   
 They did so as they had always done: in a confused and unco- 
 ordinated manner, propelled by the contingency of everyday  
 politics and the pressure of electoral considerations.  They could  
 not do otherwise.  Moving forward is no guarantee of success.   
 Standing still offers the certainty of defeat”. 
       - Donald Sassoon674 
 
 
I have examined the political ideas of the Labour Party between 1983 and 1992.  I adopted two detailed case 
studies: economic policy and social policy.  The thesis demonstrated the need for a broader analysis than 
can be found elsewhere in the literature675.  This took the form of an historical contextualization based on 
three factors.  First, and of most importance, the history of Labour’s political ideas, discussed in Part I, 
which illustrated the extent to which former debates re-emerge.  To a large extent, Labour continued in the 
1980s to re-examine ‘traditional problems’.  Second, Labour’s economic and social policy thinking was, at 
least in part, a reaction to earlier thinking.  It was certainly, in part, a reflection on its own record in 
government.  Thus Part II, the examination of economic policy and social policy, began with an historical 
 
674 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, op.cit., p.754.  
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context of Labour policy in these areas since the 1940s.  Third, the immediate political context between 
1983 and 1992 is also central to an understanding of Labour ideas over this period.  This primarily includes 
the impact of Thatcherism as well as the effect of fundamental economic and social change, and the leading 
interpretation of these developments, the ‘post-fordist’ thesis.   
 These three factors formed the basis of the examination of the ideational content of Labour’s 
thinking on the economy and the welfare state in Part II.  The foremost political event was the Policy 
Review.  The Policy Review was a concerted and strategic attempt to re-examine the party’s political ideas 
and revise its policy.  It was not adequate, however, to restrict an examination of Labour’s political ideas to 
official reports of party policy.  This is the fault with all of the most important texts on this subject676.  For 
the conception, however, of ‘Labour’s ideas’ entailed a broader scope.  A significant distinction between 
this and other work is the definition of ‘Labour’ that is employed.  I included official policy publications, 
the individual work of leading party figures and Labour intellectuals.  This, therefore, was a more 
complicated formulisation, for how do we theorise such diverse forces?  What is contended here is that an 
assessment of Labour’s political ideas must include all three.   
 In some respects, the individual works of thinker-politicians, notably Roy Hattersley and Bryan 
Gould but others too, form the bridge between the party and its intellectuals.  Hattersley and Gould’s work 
were not official party pieces: in this respect they acted like Labour intellectuals, foremostly academics but 
also journalists (both, for example, contributed to the influential Marxism Today677).  However, they were 
also central party figures and, more importantly, at the heart of Labour’s Policy Review.  
 
675 The literature of the 1983-1992 period was discussed in Chapter 1. 
676 This includes the following: E. Shaw, The Labour Party since 1979, op.cit., the edited volume by M. J.  Smith and J. Spear 
(eds.), The Changing Labour Party, op.cit., C. Hay, ‘Labour’s Thatcherite Revisionism: Playing the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’’, 
op.cit., M. J. Smith, ‘Understanding the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’: the Modernization of the Labour Party’, op.cit., and M. 
Wickham-Jones, ‘Recasting Social Democracy: a Comment on Hay and Smith’, op.cit.  
677 Discussed in Chapter 4, pp.105-9.  
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 The connection between Labour and its intellectuals is ambiguous but only because it is unofficial.  
Academics normally make a more explicit contribution in government678.   Hattersley and Raymond Plant 
were known to have collaborated intellectually, and there was substantive congruity between the thinking of 
the market socialists and the two central Policy Review documents Social Justice and Economic Efficiency 
and Meet the Challenge, Make the Change679.  It is no less important because the relationship cannot be 
explicitly described: it does not mean that it does not exist or that it is not important.   Indeed, the thesis 
which has been argued here - that an understanding of Labour’s political ideas required the stated 
contextualization - requires an expansive examination of ‘Labour’s ideas’. 
 The historical context of Labour’s political ideas was examined in Part I.  It  included the work of 
socialists, both ethical socialists and the Fabians, and the new liberals.  The work of Tawney, Cole, Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb, Hobhouse and Hobson, Beveridge, Crosland and Keynes was crucial to the 
development of Labour’s economic and social policy over the period.  Part II analysed the ideational 
content of Labour’s social and economic policy.  This could only be understood within the historical context 
of political ideas of Part I.  Labour’s economic policy and social policy between 1983 and 1992 was, however, 
partly a product of its time.  To a certain extent, it was a response to Thatcherite political ideas.  Of more 
importance, however, were the familiar conceptual relationships Labour sought to resolve.  
 The study of the Labour Party’s political ideas is a much neglected area in the political science 
literature.  This thesis constitutes an attempt to redress the balance.  It examined the political thinking of this 
period within an historical context.  The changes in the political ideas of the Labour Party were unclear and 
un-coordinated because there was no overriding ‘school of thought’, or classic political text, like R. H. 
Tawney’s Equality or  Anthony Crosland’s The Future of Socialism.  This is not indicative of the fact that, 
 
678 This is particularly true in social policy.  Previous Labour governments employed the services of experts either directly in 
government or indirectly in specific statutory bodies or Royal commissions.  For example, David Piachaud was a member of the 
Number 10 Policy Unit, and David Donnison chaired the Supplementary Benefits Commission in the 1970s.  
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at the same time, highly significant developments took place.  The examination here of the ideas behind 
Labour’s economic and social policy in the 1980s illustrated this.  
 Many of the problems and issues concerning the Labour Party’s political ideas over this period are 
explicable within an historical context.  Above all, five inter-connecting conceptual comparisons were 
paramount.  First, the relationship between the means and the ends of socialism.  Second, the dispute itself 
over which one of the two most fundamental means socialists should pursue, democracy or revolution?  
Third, the relationship between the ethical and the economic.  Fourth, the interplay between the state and 
the market.  Fifth, the relationship between the state and the individual.  An examination of Labour’s 
political ideas has highlighted the re-emergence of former concerns.  These ideational relationships have 
dominated the history of the Labour Party’s political ideas. 
 The New Liberal influence on Labour’s post-war economic and social policy was clearly 
discernible.  As Peter Clarke argued in Liberals and Social Democrats, the “work of the Attlee Government 
turned the hopeful proposals” of Hobhouse and Hobson into “concrete achievements”680.  From Keynesian 
techniques to managing the economy, to the Beveridge Report’s articulation of social insurance, the 
influence of New Liberalism on the Labour Party was tangible.  The historical interplay between liberal and 
socialist political ideas is central to an understanding of Labour’s political ideas both before and during the 
1983-1992 period.   
 
1. Context 
 
 
 
679 Chapter 4, pp.120-136.  
680 Peter Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats, p.283. 
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The academic debate over the 1983-1992 period, however, is often pitched around one critical question.  For 
many commentators the question is whether Labour acquiesced in response to Thatcherism or whether Labour’s 
thinking on ideas and policy was an introspective product of revisionist reflection.  The debate between Colin 
Hay681 and Martin Smith682, adjudicated by Mark Wickham-Jones683, demonstrated this perfectly.  The 
former argument takes two forms, arguing either that Labour was motivated purely by electoral 
considerations and so played out a “politics of catch-up”; or that the ideas of economic liberalism were 
accepted on their own terms.  The second argument defines Labour’s thinking and policy revision as a 
fundamental reappraisal of ideas and policies in the light of a changing social, economic and political 
environment.  The Policy Review was therefore an exercise in political revisionism684.  The two hypotheses 
lacked sophistication.  This analytical fault was brought about by the failure to provide an historical context, 
particularly a history of political ideas.  Existing interpretations of Labour over this period, such as these, 
are overly heroic and did not analyse political ideas.  
 The changes in the Labour Party from 1983 to 1992 were not explicable solely in terms of 
contemporary phenomena.  The history of Labour’s political ideas is not separable from more recent events. 
 The historical context set out in Part I provides a trajectory of evolution but, importantly, not a false 
determinism685.  It is not so much that the two hypotheses represent a false dichotomy but, rather, that they 
only set out a part of the picture.  An analysis of the Labour Party’s political ideas in the 1980s clearly 
necessitates an understanding of the influence of Thatcherism.  The debate involving Hay, Smith and 
Wickham-Jones was particularly useful here.  But as the historical context showed, this was only one part of a 
 
681 C. Hay, ‘Labour’s Thatcherite Revisionism: Playing the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’’, op.cit. 
682 M. J. Smith, ‘Understanding the ‘Politics of Catch-Up’: the Modernization of the Labour Party’, op.cit.  
683 M. Wickham-Jones, ‘Recasting Social Democracy: a Comment on Hay and Smith’, op.cit. 
684 The historical roots of revisionism were discussed in Chapter 2, pp.40-3. 
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broader picture.  It can be over-stated and was so in much of the literature.  The impact of Thatcherism on 
Labour’s economic policy and social policy was clearly discernible.  The reform, for example, of the welfare 
state in part shaped, and in part gave Labour the space for a reappraisal of its political ideas.  For some this took 
the form of a crusade: reclaiming freedom as a socialist idea away from the polemics of the New Right.  Roy 
Hattersley’s Choose Freedom aimed to reconstruct the party’s political ideas on the basis of a re-statement of 
values, freedom in particular686.  At the same time, the reason behind his work was a perceived need to 
challenge Thatcherism on the level of ideas.  If Thatcherism did Labour any service it was to provoke Labour’s 
re-think in the 1980s and draw out the paucity of much of the party’s thinking on the economy and the welfare 
state.  
 
 Part I of this work showed how debates and concerns over political ideas in one generation may 
shape debates and arguments which follow, even if for some time they remain dormant.  An understanding 
of Labour’s political ideas between 1983 and 1992 necessitates such contextualization.  There was a 
resurrection of precisely the same analysis which was deployed in the first quarter of the century.  Socialism 
in the 1980s rediscovered its early scepticism of the state.  In both periods there was a distinct concern over the 
central state: in the first period, predicting problems which a centralised Fabian state could cause; the 
second, highlighting these problems and thereby acknowledging the prescience of the first.  The relationship 
between the state and the individual was central to this discussion.  The point, that the Webbs’ approach to 
the state threatened to simply replace the ‘boss with the bureaucrat’, as a new tyranny for the working class, 
 
685 Quentin Skinner, discussed in Chapter 1, wrote a powerful critique of the writing on the history of philosophy and political 
ideas in which he demonstrates a tendency to imply false progression, as though one historical episode (written or action) 
anticipated later events.  He was thinking particularly about histories of ideas which build ‘inevitability’ into chronology.     
686 R. Hattersley, Choose Freedom, op.cit.  
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was both a democratic point and a socialist one.  This was the thinking behind ethical socialism as well as 
new liberalism687.      
 Two of the most enduring of the conceptual comparisons are the relationship between the ethical and 
the economic, and the state and the market.  They form the heart of the two strands of British socialism this 
century: Fabian and ethical socialism.  The task for socialists in the 1980s, according to Anthony Wright, 
was to: “show how to abolish the capitalist form of the concentration of power and property without thereby 
inaugurating a new form of socialist concentration”.  “In terms of the economy”, he continued, “this would 
clearly involve an accommodation between plan and market, in the interests both of efficiency and 
consumer choice, and with a range of forms of enterprise and social ownership but with a preference for the 
small scale and the self-managing”688.    
 The ideas of the market socialists were marked by continuity and change.  Their thinking is marked 
by revisionist strictures (the distinction between means and ends).  Conversely, their analysis of central 
political ideas, namely liberty and equality, was new.  They argued that the traditional socialist triumphirate 
of ‘liberty, equality, fraternity (or community) should be re-organised.  Freedom, the market socialists 
argued, is the most important idea.  Moreover, their arguments on the market went further than much that 
preceded them.  In Market Socialism, Julian Le Grand and Saul Estrin drew a distinction between the 
market and capitalism689.  It was argued that the market could be made to serve socialist ends: “There is 
nothing intrinsic in planning that implies equality or in nationalization that eliminates exploitation.  Nor, by 
extension, is there anything intrinsic in markets that prevents them from being used to achieve those 
ends”690.   
 
687 The subject of Chapter 2. 
688 A. Wright, Socialisms, op.cit., p.135.  
689 J. Le Grand and S. Estrin (eds.), Market Socialism, op.cit., p.1-3. 
690 Ibid., p.2.   
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 This argument greatly resembles the critique of the ethical socialists against the Fabian conception 
of the state.  A state-run economy based on the public ownership of the means of production (public 
ownership is not the same as social ownership) was very different from the economic democracy implicit in 
workers’ control.  Bryan Gould contrasted the benefits of a “decentralization of economic power” with a 
centrally planned economy691.   
 
 
2.  Ideas   
 
Did the re-examination of Labour’s political ideas and the revision of policy form a continuity with Labour 
tradition or a  move in another direction.  It was argued earlier that if the pursuit of either hypothesis 
provokes the assembling of information (the sources examined such as the writings of political thinkers or 
policy documents) towards the vindication of one, this would be disingenuous.  The situation was more 
complicated: Labour’s ideas and policy between 1983 and 1992 was not shaped uniformly along the lines of 
this juxtaposition.  The changes to Labour’s economic and social policy in the Policy Review follow a 
pattern of re-acquaintance with Labour’s post-war economic thinking following the rise and fall of the 
Alternative Economic Strategy in the 1970s and the adoption of much of its remit, in a diluted form, in 
Labour’s Programme of 1982, and the election manifesto of the following year692.  On the other hand, the 
Policy Review, produced a new analysis of different economic conditions, and thereby different policies and 
prescriptions.   
 
691 B. Gould, A Future for Socialism, op.cit., p.96. 
692 Discussed in Chapter 4. 
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 Labour’s ideational structure, by the end of the 1980s, resembled the revisionism of the 1950s in 
many respects.  The argument of the importance of separating socialist means from ends derived from 
Crosland who, in turn, drew on a broader tradition of revisionism.  The balance between the state and the 
market also recalled The Future of Socialism, though in an even more rigorous way.  The Labour Party, and 
in individual publications, its thinker-politicians, argued against what was taken to be a false choice in a 
polarised debate.  The Policy Review applied itself to what the market could and should do in practice, and 
to what it could not.  The justification behind the approach was that it was necessary to endorse the market’s 
strengths and benefits in order to most effectively demonstrate its weaknesses and disadvantages.  “The case 
for a socialist economic policy”, stated the Policy Review, is that “the free market, although possessing 
great strengths which must be utilised, is ultimately incapable of building unaided a strong and modern 
economy”693.  Clearly this can be taken to illustrate a timidity of intellectual conviction or it can be seen as 
an attempt to theorise what - at least in practice - had long been a reconciliation between state and market.   
 Labour intellectuals increasingly turned their attention to, what Anthony Wright called, an attempt to 
develop an “account of how a democratic socialist economy would plausibly work”694.  Clearly, what 
Wright alludes to here is a particular interpretation of a ‘socialist economy’.  Proponents of the Alternative 
Economic Strategy drew up detailed plans of their desired ‘socialist economy’, as we saw in Chapter 4695.  
What is being referred to is a market socialist economy.  The central development in Labour’s thinking on 
the economy was to address more explicitly how the market and socialism could be harmonised.  For a 
growing number, an account of how a conceivable socialist economy “would plausible work” could not be 
based on Keynesian means.  There were two reasons for this.  The first, an issue with which Labour only 
tentatively began to grapple, was the phenomenon of the globalisation of capitalism.  Keynesianism is based 
 
693 Labour Party, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, op.cit., p.10.   
694 A. Wright, R. H. Tawney, op.cit., pp.145-6.   
695 Chapter 4, pp.101-4.  
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on essentially ‘national’ assumptions and, for Sassoon, a “national road to social democracy” was no longer 
possible696.  The globalisation thesis, however, may have been over-stated.   
 For Labour intellectuals and thinker-politicians a post-Keynesian economic policy entailed a 
transition from an emphasis on demand to supply.  A key reason behind this was the legacy of the perceived 
failings of previous Labour governments.  The balance between two of the ideational relationships deployed in 
Part I - the state and the market, and the state and the individual - were thereby in transition.  Labour had 
always accepted the ‘mixed economy’, in the literal sense that a role for the market as well as the state is 
accepted (and presented as a reality).  However, party rhetoric notwithstanding, Labour’s approach to the 
state - the state as a feasible instrument for its economic and social policy - can be classified as neutral, at 
the least, and benevolent, at the most697.     
 The thinking in the Labour Party in the 1980s, the work of the market socialists in particular, sought 
to unite its thinking on the market with Labour’s core values.  We have seen that throughout the party’s 
history, economic issues have been central to its political ideas.  Questions of central values were re-
examined in the light of changing economic conditions and thinking on the relationship between the market 
and the state.  Nicholas Ellison believes that “elements” of market socialism persuaded a number of senior 
Labour figures, “to the extent that the traditional emphasis on collective outcomes has largely been rejected 
in favour of strategies designed to produce ‘democratic equality’ and equalise ‘effective freedom’”698.  The 
inquiry here into Labour’s pre-eminent thinker-politicians demonstrates that this was indeed the case.  “A 
feasible socialist market economy should be pluralistic”, wrote Michael Meacher699.  “There should be a 
large co-operative sector, a sector in which capital-labour partnerships were formed in varying proportions 
 
696 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, op.cit., p.739.    
697 I am not referring to the ‘democratic’ state but the ‘central’ state.  That is, not to discount Labour’s post-war suspicions of the 
state - defined as the political elite or establishment - in view of its interventionist proposals, which were examined in Chapter 2.  
   
698 N. Ellison, Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics, op.cit., p.202. 
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around a 50:50 norm, a sector of worker buy-outs of larger firms, as well as a sector taking a conventional 
capitalist form”700.  This is a clear indication of the attempt by Labour politicians, as well as intellectuals, to 
develop a socialist approach to the market.  
 The relationship between the state and the market is one of the key ideational relationships in 
Labour’s history.  In the 1980s it became central to the work of Labour intellectuals, thinker-politicians and 
directly to the party itself.  The market socialists provided the first fundamental attempt to reconcile the 
market with socialism.  As Rodney Barker expressed it: “The adoption by socialists of the mechanisms of 
the market was the single most radical break in the entire socialist tradition”701. 
 
 Anthony Crosland wrote that socialism equals equality702.  A principal development of the period 
1983 to 1992 was the casting of freedom as Labour’s central political value.  An historical context of 
political ideas illustrates why this is important.  The emphasis on freedom is significant, because it had 
displaced equality.  Equality was still central to Labour’s political ideas, but the final objective, the central 
political value, was freedom.  There were two grounds for this.  One, an historical argument within 
socialism over core political values.  Two, a perceived need to respond to Thatcherism’s appropriation of 
the idea.  For David Miller, freedom “has recently returned to prominence on the Left, as socialists have 
begun to realize how politically disastrous it is to allow the New Right to equate the free society with 
capitalism”703.  But there was a broader historical resonance.  As Anthony Wright put it: “At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, socialists assured the world that socialism was synonymous with human freedom, 
 
699 M. Meacher, Diffusing Power, op.cit., p.133.  
700 Ibid.  
701 R. Barker, Politics, Peoples and Government: Themes in British Political Thought Since the Nineteenth Century, Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 1994, p.110.   
702 A. Crosland, Socialism Now, Cape, London, 1979, p.15. 
703 D. Miller, ‘Why Markets?’, op.cit., p.32. 
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while anti-socialists warned that it was to be identified with coercion and tyranny.  It can scarcely be 
claimed that the rest of the century has done much to strengthen the socialist-side of the argument”704.    
 The policy debate was couched explicitly in ideas.  The Thatcherite usage of freedom held 
considerable public resonance when applied to economic and social policy.  Labour altered its thinking on 
the welfare state the economy because it had re-asserted the importance of freedom within its corpus of 
political ideas.  The New Right critique of the welfare state had considerable resonance in the 1980s.  It led 
socialists to re-focus on the ethical socialist tradition; a tradition which had not been lost, but at the same 
time had not been at the fore of the Labour Party’s political ideas.  We have seen how the rhetoric of the 
New Right was not matched by its policy programme in social policy.  With significant exceptions, the 
welfare state remained largely intact by the end of our period.  What had changed was the public debate - 
the ability for Labour to increase welfare spending seemed unlikely. 
 In a Fabian essay, Equality, Markets and the State, Raymond Plant adopted the following strategy: 
to relate equality to the market through liberty.  It rests on the traditional socialist critique of the negative 
conception of liberty and the free market.  Is this a radical break in socialist political ideas or have we seen 
it before?  Does it represent a departure or is it grounded in a context that is familiar?  In fact, it is both.  
The argument that liberty is only genuine if it contains positive value, obtainable by greater equality, runs 
through British twentieth century thought, through Tawney to Crosland.  The attempt, however,  to couple 
this analysis with the market - thereby to link ideas with the economy - was distinctly novel. 
 Gregory Elliott’s interpretation was that it was during this period that Labour abandoned equality for 
liberty705.  The examination presented here contradicts this view.  An important aspect of the historical 
context presented here illustrated the role of the new liberals.  New liberalism highlighted the distinction 
 
704 A. Wright, Socialisms, op.cit., p.133.  
705 G. Elliott, Labour and the English Genius, op.cit., p.134 .  
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between positive and negative liberty, and the argument that the positive conception of liberty draws close 
to the arguments presented for greater equality.  Elliott’s interpretation of freedom is in the negative, free 
market sense, not one where it can be said that: “the role of the state is positive...To enable the individual to 
gain greater freedom, choice and welfare within society, the state must intervene”706.  This is rather 
different, and more accurate, than Elliott’s argument.   
 We have seen how thinkers like Tawney, Cole and Crosland argued that freedom was a vacuous 
conception unless it was twinned with equality, or at least ‘greater equality’.  In so doing they closely relate to 
the new liberals’ Hobhouse and Hobson’s idea of ‘positive’ liberty.   What Plant, Le Grand and Miller did 
which is different is to make explicit the secondary status of equality vis-à-vis freedom.  Plant à la new 
liberalism argued: “in order to realize what is valuable about liberty, we have to be able to pursue values of 
our own, and to do this we have to have abilities, resources, and opportunities”707.  It is evident, therefore, 
that the market socialists are the inheritors of the new liberal tradition as much as any socialist one.  The 
conception of positive liberty is central to both. 
 However, the market socialists were not a homogeneous school of thought.  A distinction can be made 
between those like Plant, Wright, and also Hattersley, who were more explicit about equality, and the others.  
They saw equality as a necessary condition of freedom, following a tradition that can be traced back to Tawney, 
as Hattersley wrote: 
 
 “The achievement of a more equal distribution of wealth and power, and  
 the resultant increase in the sum of freedom for the community as a  
 whole,  is the principal goal of socialism.”708 
 
 
706 M. J. Smith, ‘A Return to Revisionism: The Labour Party’s Policy Review’, op.cit., p.24. 
707 R. Plant, ‘Socialism, Markets and End States’, op.cit., p.65. 
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As Wright put it, it is of prime importance to provide a “convincing account of a socialist conception of equality 
that genuinely enlarges freedom”709.  This could be better defined in the diagrammatic form of a pyramid, with 
freedom at the top and equality and community equidistant at the base.  A key argument of the market socialists 
is to oppose equality in its ‘end-gate’ form.  Equality was re-defined as a ‘starting-gate’ notion, as an essential 
precursor to a positive conception of liberty.     
  This shows very clearly the impact of the New Right.  The New Right brought about a political 
environment in which thinkers on the left had to make very clear the kind of equality they were proscribing; and 
called for a re-claiming of freedom as a socialist value in the face of Thatcher’s appropriation of the idea in its 
negative, ‘old’ liberal hue.  But there was great strength to this re-thinking too.  A demonstration of positive 
freedom and a demonstration of how greater equality could improve this resurrects equality from its dismal 
historical casting; as the polar opposite of freedom. 
  
 The work of Labour intellectuals found its way into the Labour Party’s thinking.  There was a 
realisation that all was not well with the welfare state.  Further, there was an analysis that Keynesian 
economics could not continue to serve.  This created an almighty vacuum indeed: the social policy of 
William Beveridge and the economic policy of John Maynard Keynes were the framework upon which the 
post-war order was laid.  The new ideas put forward to challenge them were, in fact, often the ideas of the 
ethical socialists.  
 There was a further, equally important similarity with the earlier ideas of the ethical socialists.  
Many of the political thinkers I have looked at argued for greater economic democracy.  The argument, 
however, was not fashioned in the Fabian tradition of public ownership.  The ethical socialists, like G. D. H. 
 
708 R. Hattersley, Choose Freedom, op.cit., p.xviii. 
709 A. Wright, Socialisms, op.cit., p.134.  
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Cole, pointed out that such an economic strategy could simply superimpose one non-democratic economic 
hierarchy for another710.  A move from capitalist ownership to public ownership does not automatically 
bring with it a greater level of worker participation; and certainly nothing like industrial self-government.  
This argument involves one sleight of hand: it conflates public ownership with state ownership.  The 
criticism of the ethical socialists and then the market socialists regarded the latter and not the former.  
Indeed, public ownership could be seen as corresponding closely with industrial self-government, and for 
many of its advocates it meant precisely that.  There is little doubt that public ownership came to mean state 
ownership.  This is what G. D. H. Cole meant when he wrote that he could describe himself as “neither a 
Communist nor a Social Democrat, because I regard both as creeds of centralisation and bureaucracy”711.     
     
 Thus the central issue of ends and means, and the importance of the revisionist distinction between 
the two for British socialism.  Crosland contended that if socialism is defined in terms of public ownership 
we arrive at conclusions which are “impossible to reconcile with what the early socialists had in mind when 
they used the word”, for example, that the Soviet Union, unlike Sweden, is a “completely socialist 
country”712.        
Andrew Gamble stated: “The Policy Review is the most explicit rejection of the policy of expanding public 
ownership which the Party has ever made”713.  There was a growing analysis of economic democracy which 
resembles the ethical socialism of the 1920s discussed in Chapter 2.   In no way can it be argued, however, that 
Labour was arguing that it would implement a radical policy of industrial ownership, for his would be too 
massively over-state Labour’s analysis.   
 
 
710 G. D. H. Cole, Self-Government in Industry, Bell, London, 1917, p.? ? ? 
711 G. D. H. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, Macmillan, London  
712 Crosland, The Future of Socialism, pp.66-67.  See Chapter 3.   
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Understanding Labour’s political ideas  
 
 
Ideas are, by definition, neither tangible nor dense; they cannot be described in the same way as policy can 
be.  This relates back to the theoretical issue of the relationship between political ideas and policy.  This was 
raised in Chapter 1: the very question of the political ideas of a political party.  It is a fundamental question. 
 Are ideas autonomous entities which have a pervasive role or are they contingency factors which are 
shaped by other forces, economic or political?  It was taken here that ideas are crucial and that they have a 
role - sometimes marked, and sometimes secondary to other concerns - which do shape, and sometimes 
predominate in, political events.  
 I began my discussion on ideas by examining the debate in the area of the ‘history of political ideas’. 
 This debate does not relate directly to the main issue here: the nature of the relationship between ideas and 
parties.  However, the two prime intellectual positions, concerning the relative merits of either a textual or a 
contextual method, are helpfully deployed.  The former focuses on the writing itself, while the latter refutes 
this position in arguing that meaning is impossible without context.  The academic tradition of the ‘history 
of political ideas’, on the one hand, is not applicable to party ideas.  Its primary concern is the ‘great texts’ 
of political philosophy.  On the other hand, the contextual approach to ideas, by definition, moves away 
from a focus on texts and makes wider assumption about ideas.  Quentin Skinner’s asserted that 
contextualization serves to “illuminate some of the connections between political theory and practice”714.  
 
713 A. Gamble, ‘The Labour Party and economic management’, op.cit., p.65.   
714 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume One: The Renaissance , op.cit., p.xi. 
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Political ideas lie between these two points.  The intention has not been to argue that the ideas ‘determine’ 
the link between theory and practice.  Likewise, neither are they the only factor that is relevant.  Policy and 
structural approaches, for example, are both relevant to the study of political ideas and political parties.  
This makes the point, however, that the contextual position in the history of political ideas is applicable to 
the ideas of parties.   
 The contribution in this thesis, therefore, has been to offer an illustration of how the political ideas 
of a political party may be understood, as well as providing an analysis of the ideas themselves.  An 
examination of Labour’s political ideas is not a straight-forward task because it is necessary to take a broad 
interpretation of ‘Labour’.  This is because political ideas “cluster around parties”715, and a comprehensive 
analysis cannot be obtained from an exclusive analysis of official party publications.  This is a critical part 
of the picture, particularly when a party engages in an explicit examination of its ideas and policy.  
However, it is paramount also to include the works of, what was termed here, Labour’s intellectuals and 
thinker-politicians.  There is clearly much scope here for future research because such a definition of a 
party’s ideas makes for both difficult organisation and dissemination. 
 What Skinner termed “genuine histories” of political ideas716 was attempted in this thesis: an 
examination of Labour ideas in a contextualized from.  It is contended here that an assessment of Labour’s 
political ideas entails an examination of the history of those ideas themselves.  Rodney Barker was correct 
to argue that political ideas lie “between philosophy and the hustings”717.   Ideas do, as he says, “cluster 
around parties”718.  But such geo-politics takes the student only so far.  An understanding of Labour’s 
political ideas necessitates an historical context.  Leonard Tivey was also right to express the importance of 
 
715 R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, 1997, op.cit., p.6. 
716 Ibid., p.xiii. 
717 R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, op.cit., pp.2-3. 
718 R. Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain, 1997, op.cit., p.6. 
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“the politics” of ideas719.  This too is a vital part of the equation, as the assessment of the impact of 
Thatcherism and the split on the Labour left has shown.  But the history of ideas is of equal importance.  
Labour’s ideas must be understood in terms of both, because as Geoffrey Foote argued: “Labour is a living 
political organism, always seeking new ways to adapt and develop older ideas”720.   
 
 
 
719 L. Tivey, ‘Introduction: Left, Right, and Centre’, in L. Tivey and A. Wright (eds.), op.cit., p.1. 
720 G. Foote, The Labour Party’s Political Thought, p.4. 
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